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 Abstract 
Since 2008, the effects of the Great Recession have lingered in memory and in public 
discourse, and have underscored the need to better understand the determinants of financial 
resilience. Financial resilience refers to the household’s ability to absorb and respond to financial 
shocks (MacKinnon & Derickson, 2013). A financial shock may be induced by a rapid decline in 
income or asset values, an increase in expenses, or some combination thereof. Solvency – the 
relationship between a household’s assets and liabilities – is one aspect of financial resilience: 
maintaining a healthy debt ratio affords a household the opportunity to liquidate assets to meet 
debt obligations in response to a financial shock. Thus, the practical question which inspired this 
dissertation was “what is the right amount of debt for the household?” Within the personal 
finance and consumer economics literature, borrowing and saving – behaviors which influence 
household solvency – are conceptualized in part as functions of individual future orientation. The 
premise that resources are fungible, however, has led to the characterization of concurrent 
borrowing and saving as a behavioral anomaly. Corporate finance, by contrast, does not 
characterize this common practice as an anomaly, but suggests that concurrent borrowing and 
saving is, in part, a matter of balancing the costs and benefits of debt. However, theories of 
corporate finance cannot predict or explain how individual future orientation might influence a 
household’s capital structure. Thus, this dissertation adds to the literature by exploring precisely 
this question: how does individual future orientation influence household capital structure? The 
present results suggest, in contrast to the existing body of research, that future orientation is 
positively associated with an individual’s propensity to use leverage to finance investments; but 
that within a complex family resource management system, this individual propensity is 
moderated by the relative bargaining power of the other members of the household. 
  
HOUSEHOLD CAPITAL STRUCTURE AND FINANCIAL RESILIENCE:  
EVIDENCE FROM THE NETHERLANDS 
 
 
by 
 
 
DAVID ALLEN AMMERMAN 
 
 
 
B.M., University of Cincinnati, 2006 
M.B.A., Webster University, 2011 
 
 
 
A DISSERTATION 
 
 
submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree 
 
 
 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
 
 
School of Family Studies and Human Services 
College of Human Ecology 
 
 
 
KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY 
Manhattan, Kansas 
 
 
2017 
 
 
 
Approved by: 
 
Major Professor 
Maurice M. MacDonald, Ph.D. 
  
 Copyright 
DAVID ALLEN AMMERMAN 
2017 
 
 
  
 Abstract 
Since 2008, the effects of the Great Recession have lingered in memory and in public 
discourse, and have underscored the need to better understand the determinants of financial 
resilience. Financial resilience refers to the household’s ability to absorb and respond to financial 
shocks (MacKinnon & Derickson, 2013). A financial shock may be induced by a rapid decline in 
income or asset values, an increase in expenses, or some combination thereof. Solvency – the 
relationship between a household’s assets and liabilities – is one aspect of financial resilience: 
maintaining a healthy debt ratio affords a household the opportunity to liquidate assets to meet 
debt obligations in response to a financial shock. Thus, the practical question which inspired this 
dissertation was “what is the right amount of debt for the household?” Within the personal 
finance and consumer economics literature, borrowing and saving – behaviors which influence 
household solvency – are conceptualized in part as functions of individual future orientation. The 
premise that resources are fungible, however, has led to the characterization of concurrent 
borrowing and saving as a behavioral anomaly. Corporate finance, by contrast, does not 
characterize this common practice as an anomaly, but suggests that concurrent borrowing and 
saving is, in part, a matter of balancing the costs and benefits of debt. However, theories of 
corporate finance cannot predict or explain how individual future orientation might influence a 
household’s capital structure. Thus, this dissertation adds to the literature by exploring precisely 
this question: how does individual future orientation influence household capital structure? The 
present results suggest, in contrast to the existing body of research, that future orientation is 
positively associated with an individual’s propensity to use leverage to finance investments; but 
that within a complex family resource management system, this individual propensity is 
moderated by the relative bargaining power of the other members of the household.
vi 
Table of Contents 
List of Figures .............................................................................................................................. viii 
List of Tables ................................................................................................................................. ix 
Acknowledgements ......................................................................................................................... x 
Dedication ..................................................................................................................................... xii 
Preface.......................................................................................................................................... xiii 
Chapter 1 - Introduction .................................................................................................................. 1 
Financial Resilience and Research Purpose ................................................................................ 4 
Introduction to Household Capital Structure .............................................................................. 5 
Research Themes and Questions ................................................................................................ 6 
Contribution to the Literature ..................................................................................................... 9 
Chapter 2 – Literature Review ...................................................................................................... 12 
Asset and Debt Accumulation .................................................................................................. 13 
Household Capital Structure ..................................................................................................... 14 
Intertemporal Choice ................................................................................................................ 18 
Implications for Asset Allocation and Debt Structure .............................................................. 21 
Economic Theory of Self-Control ............................................................................................ 27 
Collective Financial Decision-Making ..................................................................................... 30 
Governance and Capital Structure ............................................................................................ 35 
Household Governance Framework ......................................................................................... 38 
Summary ................................................................................................................................... 43 
Chapter 3 – Methods ..................................................................................................................... 45 
Survey Description ................................................................................................................... 45 
Part One .................................................................................................................................... 47 
Sample Description ............................................................................................................... 47 
Empirical Models and Variable Measurement...................................................................... 48 
Dependent Variables ......................................................................................................... 50 
Independent Variables ...................................................................................................... 51 
Analytical Methods ............................................................................................................... 56 
Part Two .................................................................................................................................... 58 
vii 
Sample Description ............................................................................................................... 58 
Empirical Models and Variable Measurement...................................................................... 59 
Analytical Methods ............................................................................................................... 66 
Chapter 4 – Results ....................................................................................................................... 69 
Part One .................................................................................................................................... 69 
Descriptive Statistics ............................................................................................................. 69 
Regression Analyses ............................................................................................................. 71 
Future Orientation and the Household Debt Ratio ........................................................... 71 
Future Orientation and Household Asset Allocation ........................................................ 77 
Future Orientation and Household Debt Structure ........................................................... 79 
Part Two .................................................................................................................................... 82 
Descriptive Statistics ............................................................................................................. 82 
Regression Analyses ............................................................................................................. 86 
Bargaining Power, Governance, and Household Capital Structure .................................. 86 
Determinants of Household Governance ........................................................................ 100 
Chapter 5 – Discussion ............................................................................................................... 103 
Research Findings ................................................................................................................... 103 
The Unitary Model of Household Capital Structure ........................................................... 104 
Household Capital Structure ........................................................................................... 104 
Asset Allocation .............................................................................................................. 107 
Debt Structure ................................................................................................................. 110 
The Collective Model of Household Capital Structure ....................................................... 113 
Bargaining Power and Household Capital Structure ...................................................... 113 
Household Governance ................................................................................................... 118 
Limitations .............................................................................................................................. 122 
Implications for Future Research ............................................................................................ 124 
Implications for Practice ......................................................................................................... 128 
Summary and Conclusions ..................................................................................................... 130 
References ................................................................................................................................... 135 
 
  
viii 
List of Figures 
Figure 2.1 The Doer, The Planner, and Intertemporal Choice ...................................................... 29 
Figure 2.2 The Shopper, The Accountant, and Household Intertemporal Choice ........................ 40 
Figure 2.3 Comprehensive Household Governance Framework .................................................. 43 
Figure 3.1 Simplified Collective Model of Household Capital Structure .................................... 61 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ix 
List of Tables 
Table 2.1 Cash Flows to Investors for Unlevered versus Levered Firm ...................................... 15 
Table 2.2 Returns on Equity for Unlevered versus Levered Firm ................................................ 16 
Table 4.1 Part One Subsample Descriptive Statistics (n = 824) ................................................... 70 
Table 4.2 Balance Sheet of Average Household in Part One Subsample (n = 824) ..................... 71 
Table 4.3 Hierarchical Tobit Regression Predicting Household Debt Ratio (n = 824) ................ 75 
Table 4.4 Multinomial Logistic Regression Predicting Debt Ratio Categories (n = 824) ............ 76 
Table 4.5 Fractional Logistic Regression Predicting Cash to Total Assets (n = 824) .................. 78 
Table 4.6 Fractional Logistic Regression Predicting Mortgage Debt Ratio (n = 824) ................. 80 
Table 4.7 Part Two Subsample Individual Descriptive Statistics (n = 412) ................................. 84 
Table 4.8 Part Two Subsample Household Characteristics (n = 412) .......................................... 85 
Table 4.9 Balance Sheet of Average Household in Part Two Subsample (n = 412) .................... 86 
Table 4.10 Numerical Example of Coefficient Interpretation with Interactions .......................... 88 
Table 4.11 Bargaining Power Predicting Debt Ratio, Complete Sample (n = 412) ..................... 91 
Table 4.12 Bargaining Power Predicting Debt Ratio, Homogeneous Future Orientation (n = 215)
 ............................................................................................................................................... 92 
Table 4.13 Bargaining Power Predicting Debt Ratio, Heterogeneous Future Orientation (n = 197)
 ............................................................................................................................................... 93 
Table 4.14 Governance Predicting Debt Ratio, Complete Sample (n = 412) ............................... 97 
Table 4.15 Governance Predicting Debt Ratio, Homogeneous Future Orientation (n = 215)...... 98 
Table 4.16 Governance Predicting Debt Ratio, Heterogeneous Future Orientation (n = 197) ..... 99 
Table 4.17 Multinomial Logistic Regression Predicting Management Roles (n = 412) ............ 101 
Table 4.18 Logistic Regression Predicting Use of Separate Accounts (n = 412) ....................... 102 
 
 
  
  
 
 
x 
Acknowledgements 
I would like to acknowledge the faculty and staff of the Institute of Personal Financial 
Planning for all of their time and support, and my committee members for their mentorship and 
service. I especially want to thank my major professor, Dr. MacDonald, for the many hours he 
spent reading my materials, offering responsive and constructive feedback, and for helping me 
develop strategies to publish articles from this research. Simply stated, working with Dr. 
MacDonald has made me a deeper and more thorough thinker. Additionally, his support and 
encouragement have been vital for developing a relatively innovative approach – showcased in 
this dissertation – of adapting a corporate finance perspective to the household. Further, Dr. 
MacDonald has been an amazing collaborator on other related projects, and it is my sincere hope 
that our partnership will last for many years to come. I also want to recognize Dr. Britt, who 
served as my major professor during my first years in the doctoral program. During my first class 
with Dr. Britt, she impressed upon me and my fellow students the high level of quality and rigor 
that would be expected from us – standards which I expected and have adopted as my own. 
Additionally, I want to recognize and thank Dr. Britt for encouragement to finish this dissertation 
sooner rather than later; and for all of her time and support in helping me develop the finished 
product. There are few times in life when one is lucky enough to work with and be led by their 
ideal role models; but in this program, I have had that experience twice.  
I would also like to thank my wife, friends, and family for their ongoing encouragement. 
My wife, Angela, has been especially encouraging and supportive as I have become somewhat of 
a “night owl” (e.g., I am currently writing this at about two o’clock in the morning) and maybe 
slightly more irritable, as I have continued working on this project and other educational 
adventures. None of this would be possible without her understanding and support. I also want to 
xi 
recognize my friends and fellow cohort members: Sarah Asebedo, Jamie Lynn Byram, Joy 
Clady, Linda Leitz, Derek Tharp, Cametra Thompson, and Lloyd Zimmerman. In addition to 
working with a stellar faculty on a beautiful campus, spending the summers with this close group 
of people who shared my intellectual curiosity helped make my doctoral experience everything I 
hoped it would be. Being more of a corporate finance practitioner with experience in the 
governmental and non-profit sectors, the insights I gained from our lunch discussions, 
partnerships on projects, and class sessions were invaluable in helping me find the areas where 
my own unique experiences and insights could be brought to bear on important issues facing 
families and the profession of financial planning. Whatever future contributions I am able to 
make to the research and practice of financial planning, a substantial amount of the credit will 
belong to my classmates.  
 
   
xii 
Dedication 
This dissertation is dedicated to the critical thinkers and skeptics who have at any time 
wondered, “how much debt is really the right amount of debt?” – which is probably everyone. In 
particular, I would like to dedicate this dissertation to my college roommate and best friend, 
Jordan Witt.  
  
xiii 
Preface 
I had originally decided not to include a preface because, quite frankly, it is optional and I 
saw little value in adding to my workload. In retrospect, that was a myopic decision. Fortunately, 
it seems that my inner planner has regained control (as will be explained later) now that I have 
nearly reached the end of this process; and I find myself now thinking about how this dissertation 
will be viewed or used in the future. This has led to a feeling that I should offer some personal 
background to the reader. What follows is a brief personal biography which I believe will 
enhance the reader’s understanding of how this dissertation was developed. 
I came to the field of personal financial planning research from a rather different path. As 
the son of two teachers, I grew-up in a household marked by a relatively high degree of money 
vigilance, which it seems I inherited. Toward the end of my investment in a music degree, I 
began to analyze my future earnings prospects and determined that a change in course was 
needed. I ultimately decided to pursue a career in the military, and after conducting rudimentary 
financial scenario analyses I decided to apply to the United States Marine Corps Officer 
Candidates School rather than enlist and join the band. After earning my commission, I had some 
initial difficulty in settling on an occupational specialty. It was actually my wife who helped me 
realize that I should pursue a career in finance, which had never before entered my imagination. I 
had developed a detailed multi-year monthly personal budget (which I still keep and maintain) 
which assisted me in paying bills, reconciling accounts, and tracking our household financial 
position against savings goals. One day, I was paying our credit card bill and was shocked to see 
new charges on our statement. When I (rhetorically) asked my wife how that had happened, she 
responded that I should “do the Marine Corps’ budget and leave her alone.” That seemed like a 
good idea. 
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I was assigned the military occupational specialty of 3404, Financial Management 
Officer, and assigned to the Second Marine Division as the Budget Officer in August 2007 (near 
the end of the fiscal year). The Marine Corps only offered its Financial Management Officers 
Course twice per year at that time, so I still had not completed any formal training in financial 
management. Yet, as the new Budget Officer, it fell to me to draft the Division’s FY08 operating 
budget for approval by our Commanding General. I followed the same general approach to the 
Division’s $35 million annual operating budget as I had followed in developing my personal 
budget – I worked with subordinate unit Supply Officers to determine what their operating needs 
would be for the year (i.e., office supplies, fuel, travel, replacement parts – including things like 
tank engines – shipping and logistics, etc.) and consolidated this zero-based approach (which I 
did not know at the time was a zero-based approach) into a Division-level budget, by unit, by 
quarter. I then compared this to previous years’ operating budgets which I had on file to make 
sure my numbers were reasonable compared to what previous Budget Officers had created 
(which they were). With a few minor adjustments, my budget was approved by my boss (the 
Deputy Comptroller, as the Comptroller and most of our staff were deployed to Iraq at the time) 
and by the Commanding General. This was a formative experience in shaping my view of 
finance as simply reflecting the resources required for operational activities.  
I ultimately earned my master’s in business administration in order to match my 
developing experience in financial management with the appropriate education. I had no idea at 
the time that this would awaken in me a love of learning, which eventually led me to doctoral 
studies. My favorite master’s course was Managerial Economics, which I saw as holding the key 
for figuring out the “best” way to allocate resources. As I sought to quench my thirst for learning 
more about economics, I was exposed to behavioral economics and the idea that individuals 
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sometimes acted against their own self-interests. This validated my personal perception, which 
had been developing for a few years, that some of my colleagues in the military were making 
financial decisions that did not make sense.  
I wanted to know more about how individuals made financial decisions. At the same 
time, I started to plan for my post-military career. I did not know anything about financial careers 
outside of the military, but personal financial planning seemed to be the perfect blend of 
mentoring others and financial management – the two aspects of my Marine Corps career that I 
enjoyed most. The doctoral program at Kansas State University seemed to be the perfect fit for 
me to make a transition to financial planning and satisfy my newfound curiosity in individual 
financial decision-making. I applied, and will be forever thankful that I was accepted to the 
program.   
I resigned my commission from the Marine Corps three years earlier than originally 
planned in order to stay in the National Capitol Region and to provide my wife with some career 
stability. (Inasmuch as I have a positive opinion of what I can offer the financial planning 
community in terms of teaching and research, she is a true rising star in her field and I am deeply 
committed to and invested in her career.) Being somewhat more knowledgeable about the risks 
involved in a career in financial planning, and being very risk-averse when it comes to my 
personal income, I decided to pursue a (salaried) position as a business unit Administrator at a 
small for-profit company upon my exit from the Marine Corps. It was a great opportunity to see 
first-hand how a for-profit company worked from the inside; and to learn that managers do not 
make any better financial decisions simply by virtue of working at a for-profit. 
After a year, I had the opportunity to take a financial management position with a large, 
well-established and well-respected non-profit company in Washington, DC. The job offered me 
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the opportunity to work with funding from virtually every government agency and several 
private foundations. But more importantly, it offered me the chance to learn that managers do not 
make any better financial decisions simply by virtue of working for a large, well-established, 
well-respected company; nor by virtue of being relatively highly educated, experienced, and 
well-paid. More than ever I wanted to know what forces shaped individual financial decision-
making. 
The combination of my experience in organizational settings (i.e., governmental, for-
profit, and non-profit financial management) and my education in business has always shaped 
how I manage my own finances. I have always thought that if a practice or approach could 
maximize the wealth of Google’s shareholders, then I could apply the same practice at home to 
maximize my own wealth. As such, it surprised me to (gradually) learn over the course of my 
doctoral studies that some see a gap between the research and practice of corporate finance and 
personal finance. This seemed most apparent to me in the area of using debt.  
Debt seems to have a decidedly negative connotation within the personal finance 
literature; or at least in the popular literature. I have always found this curious and surprising 
because in my business education debt was never characterized as qualitatively good or bad. I 
was taught that debt is simply a tool that should be handled with knowledge and respect – like a 
chainsaw, or a chef’s knife. As I learned more about debt from the personal finance and 
consumer economic perspectives, I started to sense that there was a gap in the understanding of 
how individuals and households should use debt compared to how corporate financial managers 
are taught to use debt. What I have attempted to do is to bridge this apparent gap between 
corporate finance and personal finance in order to advance our understanding of the possible 
benefits of financing investments with debt in the household context. 
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I would like to say that I was so thoughtful and intelligent as to have all of these ideas 
and realizations neatly organized into a deliberate research agenda from the very beginning of 
the dissertation process. But that was not the case. Developing this dissertation was actually a 
messy process of entertaining opaque feelings, developing concrete questions and ideas, and then 
pulling threads and peeling onions. In retrospect, I believe this dissertation was born out of a 
personal desire for intellectual consistency in the practice of finance across different domains – a 
desire which was not apparent to me until now, at the end of the process. It is my hope that future 
students and researchers will see this work as a step in that direction. 
Finally, it is with an orientation to the future that I have written this dissertation in such a 
style so as to be intelligible and useful for anyone – from the lay person, to the student, to the 
experienced researcher – interested in understanding how individuals and families can and do 
use debt financing in a manner consistent with established theories of finance. If parts of this 
dissertation seem instructive in tone, that was done on purpose. As a work designed to fill a gap 
between two domains of finance, I have felt it necessary to include some rudimentary 
explanations and examples so that future students of personal finance can better understand the 
corporate perspective and vice versa. Lastly, it must be stated that the analyses undertaken in this 
dissertation are merely first steps, and implications for application and future research are 
outlined in the final chapter.  
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
Since the 1980s, economic losses due to natural catastrophes around the world (some insured 
and some not) have increased at a quickening pace (Kunreuther, Michel-Kerjan, & Pauly, 2013). The 
occurrence of several natural disasters during the early 21st century has energized governments and 
industry to create and bolster programs aimed at increasing preparedness and resilience. While these 
programs usually focus on non-financial aspects of sustainability, natural disasters are also typically 
accompanied by financial shocks which result from the destruction of assets and loss of income. 
Indeed, before the global economic crisis of 2008, environmental conservation received the greatest 
amount of attention in the sustainability and resilience literature (Ashford, Hall, & Ashford, 2012). 
Yet in the wake of the Great Recession, it has become evident that financial shocks are not solely 
dependent on weather and geology; they can also be man-made. 
Deregulation of the U.S. banking industry during the 1980s gave rise to various financial 
innovations, poor lending practices, and flawed risk assessments which would ultimately jeopardize 
the U.S. financial system (MacKinnon & Derickson, 2013). During the same period, fundamental 
changes in global economic conditions were taking shape which would magnify the crisis (Stiglitz, 
2010). The drive towards globalization influenced not only trade imbalances and offshoring of jobs, 
but also the integration of capital markets (Stiglitz, 2010).  
The bursting of the dot-com bubble was, by many accounts, the prelude to the Great 
Recession (Stiglitz, 2010). The crash of technology and internet stocks impacted both institutional 
and individual investors around the world. The Dutch pension system was particularly vulnerable due 
to the high value of accumulated assets in private pensions relative to GDP (Høj, 2011).  
The Dutch pension system is designed around three pillars: State-funded pensions, employer-
sponsored pensions, and individual savings. State and employer-sponsored pensions are supposed to 
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provide a benefit approximately equal to 70% of an individual’s final wages (de Boer, 2009). 
However, the sharp decline in portfolio values precipitated by the bursting of the dot-com bubble 
contributed to the Dutch pension fund solvency crisis in the early 2000s (Alessie, Van Rooij, & 
Lusardi, 2011). In response to the crisis, Dutch lawmakers changed the calculation of pension 
benefits from a percentage of career-final earnings to a percentage of career-average earnings. As a 
result, the average wage replacement ratio declined for most Dutch workers, and individual savings 
and investment became a more critical component of retirement planning. As in the United States, 
more of the responsibility for retirement preparedness shifted to the individual (Alessie et al., 2011).  
Yet in the years leading up to the global financial crisis of 2008, Dutch workers reported 
thinking little about their retirement and were generally confident that they would receive a generous 
pension (Alessie et al., 2011). Individuals perceived future economic conditions as positive and 
personal savings were still considered a relatively unimportant part of retirement planning (Obstfeld 
& Rogoff, 2009). At the same time, banks and insurance companies around the globe increased their 
exposure to risky mortgage-backed securities.  
When rates increased on variable rate mortgages, many U.S. homeowners were unable to 
afford their new monthly mortgage payments. As mortgage defaults increased, the U.S. housing 
market was flooded with excess supply, precipitating the bursting of the U.S. housing bubble. Many 
homeowners found themselves with negative home equity – some had taken second mortgages on 
their homes to finance consumption as wages failed to keep-up with inflation – and were not able to 
refinance their mortgages (de Boer, 2009; Stiglitz, 2010). Foreclosures increased dramatically, banks 
were forced to write-off billions in securities backed by sub-prime mortgages, and insurers who had 
issued credit default swaps against such securities found themselves obligated for losses they could 
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not cover (Verick & Islam, 2010). Banks were unable to lend to businesses and the financial crisis 
spread throughout the global economy (de Boer, 2009).  
The response by governments and central banks was generally to infuse banks with capital in 
the hopes that doing so would unfreeze capital markets (Verick & Islam, 2010). In doing so, 
governments created conditions where long-term interest rates fell and the fair value of existing debt 
issues increased, as investors preferred the higher promised yields of previously issued debt 
(Kashyap, Rajan, & Stein, 2008). Thus, the solvency ratios of many pension funds declined below 
minimum required thresholds due to sharp reductions in the value of assets and increases in the value 
of pension liabilities (Høj, 2011). For the second time in a single decade, the retirement of pensioners 
was put in jeopardy.  
While many researchers have highlighted the contributing role of poor lending practices to the 
Great Recession, others have emphasized the circumstances which led many individuals to engage in 
risky borrowing (Stiglitz, 2010). Research shows that between 2000 and 2011 consumption 
inequality declined while income inequality increased (Meyer & Sullivan, 2013). The general 
explanation for this observation has been that middle- and low-income households relied upon debt 
financing to sustain their consumption (Van Treeck & Sturn, 2012). Taken together, the evidence 
suggests that macroeconomic factors influenced household financial behaviors, that these behaviors 
(i.e., borrowing and lack of saving) have partially influenced the development of financial and 
economic crises, and have also made households vulnerable to financial shocks. 
Thus, in the latter part of the 20th century the stage had been set for what would be one of the 
worst financial shocks in a generation. In the wake of the global financial crisis, U.S. households lost 
over 13 trillion dollars in wealth and the unemployment rate more than doubled between 2008 and 
2009 (Dimitris, Dimitris, & Tullio, 2011). Unemployment increased dramatically in countries 
4 
belonging to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD); and labor force 
participation in the U.S. fell to its lowest level since the late 1970s (Hotchkiss & Rios-Avila, 2013; 
Verick & Islam, 2010). Many families looked at the market indexes as a barometer for future 
economic conditions and were left with negative expectations for the future and a reduced sense of 
well-being (Deaton, 2012).  
Financial Resilience and Research Purpose 
With the effects of the Great Recession lingering in recent memory, the overarching purpose 
of this dissertation is to explore the nature of household financial resilience. The concept of resilience 
refers to an economic entity’s (be it an individual, a household, business, community, or government) 
relationship to stress, disruptions, and crises (MacKinnon & Derickson, 2013). Financial disruptions 
are characterized by an increase in expenses, or a decline in income or asset values. A household may 
be described as resilient when it exhibits the ability to absorb and recover from environmental 
shocks, typically through the “redeployment of assets” (MacKinnon & Derickson, 2013, p. 16). 
Maintaining financial slack (i.e., liquidity) is one method by which households can assure themselves 
of having sufficient resources for redeployment in the event of a financial shock (Brealey, Myers, & 
Allen, 2014). Indeed, it is common for financial planners to recommend that households maintain 
between three and six months-worth of expenses in monetary assets as an emergency fund (Grable, 
Klock, & Lytton, 2013). 
Solvency is also an important characteristic of financial resilience because it affords a 
household the opportunity to liquidate assets in order to meet debt obligations. When the household 
has few debts relative to assets, it can theoretically liquidate some portion of assets to satisfy its debt 
and still retain sufficient resources to continue consumption and investment. Thus, solvency has 
traditionally been a primary objective of personal financial planning, and a debt ratio (i.e., total 
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liabilities divided by total assets) of 40% is generally considered an acceptable benchmark (Grable et 
al., 2013). Given that financing assets with debt (such as a home mortgage, which is a key area of 
household finance and investment) entails concurrent saving and borrowing, however, it seems best 
to explore the question of solvency within the framework of household capital structure. 
Introduction to Household Capital Structure 
Many of the studies which have explored factors related to solvency have focused on asset 
and debt accumulation; that is, saving and borrowing behaviors. Many of these have adopted a 
lifecycle perspective and posit that individuals engage in borrowing and saving in order to smooth 
consumption over their lifetime. Others have adopted behavioral frameworks to explain saving and 
borrowing as addictive or compulsive behaviors. These studies are premised on the common 
economic assumption that money is fungible over some time horizon. It is traditionally thought that 
individuals allocate resources over time so as to maximize utility through consumption. 
Theoretically, individuals should prefer to either bring resources forward in time for more present-
oriented consumption, or they should allocate present resources to future periods for later 
consumption; they should not be simultaneously present-oriented and future-oriented by borrowing 
and saving concurrently. However, individuals and households typically do engage in concurrent 
saving and borrowing (Spencer & Fan, 2002). For example, individuals may save for retirement or 
for an emergency fund while simultaneously borrowing to finance a home or automobile; or even 
using credit cards for present consumption. 
Some researchers have attempted to overcome this challenge by exploring the determinants of 
net saving (i.e., net worth). The problem with such analyses is that net worth, in isolation, obscures 
how a household uses debt. This is easily demonstrated by the accounting equation: the total assets of 
any economic entity must equal the sum of total liabilities and total equity. For the household, equity 
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or net worth is simply the residual value derived by subtracted total liabilities from total assets. 
Assume, for example, that a household has accumulated $1,000 in assets through precautionary 
saving and holds $0 in debt: the household’s net worth is $1,000. A different household may hold 
$2,000 in assets and $1,000 in debt and also have a net worth of $1,000. Both households exhibit the 
same net worth but use debt very differently. Thus, an analysis of net worth obscures differences in 
household debt policies.  
A capital structure approach to household finance overcomes such limitations by rearranging 
the accounting equation: the variable under observation is not net worth, but the proportion of assets 
financed by debt. Capital structure is a fundamental concept in corporate finance and refers to the mix 
of debt and equity corporations use to finance their assets. The quintessential problem for corporate 
managers is determining the optimal amount of debt with which to finance assets (Brealey et al., 
2014). Households must answer the same question: what is the optimal amount of debt relative to 
assets? As mentioned, a capital structure approach to household finance involves the analysis of 
household debt ratios. Consider again the households from the example above. For the first 
household, none of the assets were financed with debt; contrastingly, the second household financed 
50% of its assets with debt. Thus, an analysis of debt ratios reveals household financing decisions in 
ways that net worth cannot, and a capital structure approach therefore provides a more accurate 
framework for exploring how households engage in concurrent saving and borrowing.  
Research Themes and Questions 
This dissertation has two themes. The first theme is household financial resilience. This theme 
is developed via an analysis of the influence of various different factors on household solvency and 
liquidity. Thus, the primary research questions are (a) how do households determine the quantity of 
debt used to finance assets, and (b) how do households allocate their assets and structure their debts 
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between short- and long-term maturities? In this way, solvency is treated as the characteristic of 
primary interest; and asset allocation and debt structure are treated as sub-components within the 
larger issue of capital structure.  
Households which finance a relatively small proportion of their assets with debt exhibit lower 
debt ratios: they hold fewer debts relative to assets. By mathematical definition, such households are 
more solvent than those with high debt ratios, and may be considered relatively more financially 
resilient, ceteris paribus. As such, the study of household capital structure reveals a characteristic of 
household financial resilience. It should be noted, however, that a resilient capital structure does not 
necessarily imply a financially optimal capital structure. For example, the most resilient capital 
structure would be one in which assets are financed completely with equity (i.e., the household’s 
retained earnings). However, this would require the household to forgo valuable tax shields from tax-
deductible interest on (some) debt. Thus, households face a trade-off between the costs and benefits 
associated with pursuing the goal of financial resilience.  
Policy makers have an interest in understanding factors which influence household capital 
structure in order to formulate incentives and programs for bolstering household financial resilience. 
As governments consider reductions in public benefits to address their sovereign debt, individuals 
and households may find themselves assuming an even greater share of the responsibility for their 
own economic well-being (Alessie et al., 2011; Ostry, Ghosh, & Espinoza, 2015). Additionally, 
financial planners and counselors are required to act “in a manner [they] believe to be in the best 
interest of the client” (Certified Financial Planner Board of Standards, 2008). As a result, 
practitioners also have an interest in understanding the determinants of household capital structure in 
order to help families and individuals develop the traits and habits conducive to building financial 
resilience.  
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Time preference is one personal factor which may influence household financing decisions. It 
is a psychological preference: the subjective valuation of costs and benefits based on when they occur 
in time, conceptualized in traditional models of intertemporal choice as the rate at which future 
utilities are discounted (Frederick, Loewenstein, & O’Donoghue, 2002). Research suggests that time 
preference influences both the accumulation of debts and assets (Henegar, Archuleta, Grable, Britt, 
Anderson, & Dale, 2013; Lusardi & Mitchell, 2006; Rha, Montalto, & Hanna, 2006). Theoretically, 
future-oriented individuals discount future costs and benefits at a lower rate than present-oriented 
individuals. It stands to reason, then, that time preference may influence household capital structure.  
Given that assets and liabilities are classified on the household balance sheet according to 
when their economic benefits and costs are expected in time (i.e., current versus long-term), asset 
allocation and debt structure may also be viewed as intertemporal choices (Kieso, Weygandt, & 
Warfield, 2013). As such, it seems likely that time preference would influence the proportion of 
assets held in short-term, liquid accounts; and the proportion of total debt comprised of consumer 
debt (Angeletos, Laibson, Repetto, Tobacman, & Weinberg, 2001).  
Finally, whereas many studies of household finance utilize a unitary model of decision-
making (i.e., where a single individual makes the financial decisions for the household), it seems 
implausible that the capital structure of a multi-person household would be dictated by a single 
family member. Indeed, research suggests that most financial decisions, for both firms and 
households, are made within a human ecology (Charness & Sutter, 2012). Assuming that the 
members of a multi-person household do not have uniform utility functions, then it seems likely that 
households must have some mechanism for managing the divergent preferences of their members. 
That is, households may employ some form of household governance in order to moderate the 
influence that each member has in determining the household capital structure.  
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At this point, the secondary theme of this dissertation should be apparent: theories of 
corporate finance are adaptable to the household. Just as corporations engage in strategic behavior to 
manage scarce resources and achieve organizational objectives, so do households behave strategically 
to allocate scarce resources toward the achievement of family goals (Grable et al., 2013; Brealey et 
al., 2014). In treating the household as a unique type of utility-maximizing enterprise, research from 
the corporate finance domain is borrowed and leveraged to advance the understanding and practice of 
personal financial planning. 
Contribution to the Literature 
This dissertation is unique in several respects. Most notably, and perhaps controversially, 
theories of finance and governance are adapted from the corporate domain and applied to the 
household. In so doing, an innovative model of household financial decision-making is developed 
and tested. Given that the personal financial planning literature is rich in its treatment of the 
psychological and sociological determinants of family resource management and individual financial 
behavior, and that corporations are considered to maximize profits and not utility, it is natural to 
question whether this approach is appropriate and whether anything can be gained from it. In short: 
there is much to be learned by adapting theories of finance to the household.  
In practice, households and businesses face the same fundamental question: how much debt 
should be used to finance assets? By its very nature, this question implies concurrent borrowing and 
saving: both assets and debts are accumulated. As discussed, however, this behavior is treated in the 
personal finance literature as a behavioral anomaly, usually attributed to mental accounting and 
lifecycle motivations, based on the premise that money is fungible and that individuals should not be 
simultaneously present-oriented and future-oriented (Campbell, Cocco, Gomes, & Maenhout, 2001; 
Shefrin & Thaler, 1988; Spencer & Fan, 2002). As such, it can be said of the personal finance 
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literature that “various models exist that predict or explain debt behavior or savings behavior 
although no current models exist to predict or explain simultaneous debt and savings behavior” 
(Spencer & Fan, 2002, p. 27). The paradigm in corporate finance is different in that the capital used 
to make investments (i.e., debt or equity) is considered separate from the investments themselves 
(i.e., assets). Thus, in the corporate finance and accounting literature concurrent borrowing and 
saving is not at all anomalous but a fundamental concept. Being a fundamental issue in corporate 
finance, the literature from this domain offers several theories to predict and explain why managers 
elect to simultaneously borrow and save to varying degrees (Brealey et al., 2014; Koller, Goedhart, & 
Wessels, 2015; Modigliani & Miller, 1958).  
Since the corporate finance literature offers theoretical models and explanations for 
concurrent borrowing and saving whereas the personal finance literature treats this common practice 
as an anomaly, it stands to reason that if these theories could be adapted to the household (via the 
inclusion of personal factors and household traits which have been shown to influence household 
financial behavior) it would represent a significant step toward the development of a model which 
does “predict or explain simultaneous [household] debt and savings behavior” (Spencer & Fan, 2002, 
p. 27). That is precisely what this dissertation does. This dissertation treats practices such as 
financing a home with a mortgage, financing a car with a loan, or financing education with debt not 
as anomalous behaviors, but as the common financial management practices that they are. By 
adopting a well-established capital structure approach to finance within the household, with 
appropriate adaptations, the research presented within this dissertation offers new insights regarding 
the way households choose to finance investments and consumption – insights which will ultimately 
inform and refine the practice of personal financial planning in a manner consistent with the theory 
and practice of finance. 
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Second, this dissertation makes use of a data set rich with detailed information regarding 
household finances and individual psychological characteristics: De Nederlandsche Bank (DNB) 
Household Survey (DHS). The use of this data set, which is nationally representative of the Dutch 
speaking population in the Netherlands, provides an international perspective which extends the 
personal and behavioral finance literature beyond the borders of the United States, and paves the way 
for future international collaboration in the behavioral sciences; particularly with regard to economic 
behavior (Teppa & Vis, 2012). 
Additionally, while the primary theme of this dissertation is household financial decision-
making, researchers and practitioners of corporate finance may also find the results interesting. A 
growing body of evidence suggests that the personal characteristics of corporate executives influence 
firm policies and performance (Cain & McKeon, 2014). The approaches and results presented here 
may inform future research in the area of corporate finance, particularly with regard to the influence 
that corporate executives’ time preference may have on a firm’s target or long-run capital structure. 
Secondly, researchers may find the collective bargaining framework useful for exploring how 
corporate boards and executives collaborate within their unique ecology to ultimately determine the 
debt policy of the firm. Thus, because this dissertation borrows from various domains of finance and 
economics to develop an innovative model of household finance, the findings from this dissertation 
may be exported back to those domains. Indeed, the secondary theme of this dissertation was 
formulated specifically for this purpose. 
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Chapter 2 – Literature Review 
All economic entities depend upon the intake and consumption of resources for survival. 
Unfortunately, scarcity requires individuals to make trade-offs between consumption choices. 
Further, because individuals have uncertain lifespans, which typically last longer than a single period, 
they must also make trade-offs in the timing of consumption. Simply stated, individuals must 
determine both which resources to use and when to use them. Within the classical economic 
framework, individuals manage these trade-offs by making decisions that maximize expected lifetime 
utility. Borrowing allows entities to bring consumption forward in time, but at a future cost. 
Investment in assets allows entities to delay consumption to the future, but at a present cost. The 
question of balancing future costs with future benefits to maximize utility is, by definition, the 
problem of intertemporal choice. It is also the implicit problem of capital structure: how should 
households balance future costs (i.e., debt) in relation to future benefits (i.e., assets)? Yet the 
intertemporal problem does not end with capital structure.  
Households must also choose how to allocate their assets and debts between short- and long-
term classes. The proportion of assets invested in short-term classes affects, of course, the liquidity of 
the household. Thus, household solvency and liquidity may be understood within the context of 
intertemporal choice, and may therefore be functions of individual time preference. Given that the 
purpose of this dissertation is to explore the determinants of household financial resilience, that 
solvency and liquidity are elements of financial resilience, and that household capital structure and 
portfolio allocation may be understood as outcomes of intertemporal choices, the following analysis 
examines the influence of individual time preference on household capital structure and the 
composition of asset and debt portfolios. 
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Asset and Debt Accumulation 
Whereas household capital structure has received comparatively little attention, a large body 
of literature exists regarding the related behaviors of saving and credit use. Many of these studies 
have adopted a lifecycle perspective in which individuals attempt to smooth their consumption by 
borrowing during early life when income is low; and saving in mid-life when income is high in 
preparation for retirement. Empirical findings have not, however, been universally supportive of this 
perspective as a descriptive model (Winter, Schlafmann, & Rodepeter, 2012). Personal factors and 
financial management practices, including the adoption of longer planning horizons and use of 
heuristics, seem to explain savings behaviors better than lifecycle status (Winter et al., 2012). These 
findings provide initial evidence to support the notion that an individual’s target debt ratio may be 
influenced by their intertemporal consumption preferences. 
Some researchers have adopted behavioral frameworks to explore household saving and 
borrowing. Many of these studies model excessive consumer debt as a function of addictive or 
compulsive behavior (McCarthy, 2011). In a recent study of credit card use, for example, Henegar et 
al. (2013) found that individuals with greater self-control were less likely to own credit cards, and 
that an individual’s impulsivity and their mother’s present-orientation were both positively associated 
with revolving a balance. These finding suggest that intertemporal motivations influence household 
capital structure: individuals with relatively less self-control may adopt higher target debt ratios, 
which permits them to accumulate a higher level of debt.  
On the asset side, some studies have modeled savings as a function of expected future utility 
relative to the loss of present utility (Finke & Huston, 2013). Results have indicated that future-
orientation is a strong indicator of the propensity to save. Thus, some operationalized measures of 
time preference have been shown to influence the accumulation of both debts and assets. These 
findings are consistent with the present framework in which intertemporal motivations influence 
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concurrent saving and borrowing. Yet few studies have explored how individual time preference 
influences the accumulation of debts relative to the accumulation assets; or rather, household capital 
structure as measured by the debt ratio.  
Household Capital Structure 
Capital structure refers to the mix of debt and equity economic entities use to finance their 
assets. Most research in this area has come from the corporate finance domain. Generally, researchers 
have investigated the nature and determinants of corporate capital structure with an interest in 
calculating the optimal (i.e., value-maximizing) mix of debt and equity financing. Modern 
scholarship on capital structure is thought to have originated with Modigliani and Miller’s (1958) 
seminal work on the subject. Modigliani and Miller (1958) demonstrated that under certain 
conditions, firm value is independent of financing. If capital markets are perfect, where firms and 
investors can borrow and lend at the risk-free rate, and assuming that there are no costs of financial 
distress and no taxes, then firm value is independent of financing. Under such conditions, increasing 
debt provides no tax shield but also does not increase the cost of financial distress. As a result, 
operating cash flows (and the riskiness of those cash flows) do not change with an increase in debt. 
Therefore, because the cash flows from assets do not change, the market value of the firm will be the 
same with or without leverage, assuming perfect capital markets (see Brealey et al., 2014 for further 
explanations and examples). This realization provides a basic premise from which the influence of 
taxes and market efficiency on firm value can be better understood. 
Of course, Modigliani and Miller (1958) did not author their seminal work at a time when 
there were no corporate income taxes. Indeed, the only things that are certain in life are death and 
taxes. The key implication of their work, therefore, is that tax shields do have value. Tax shields 
result from tax-deductible interest on borrowed capital. When a firm can reduce its tax burden by 
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deducting interest on debt, the result is an increase in operating cash flows that can be paid to 
investors (i.e., both lenders and shareholders). A short example (assuming there are no fixed assets so 
that the treatment of depreciation can be ignored) is provided in Table 2.1. Assume that the 
abbreviated financial data shown are for the same company so that the riskiness of operations may be 
considered equal. In the unlevered condition, the firm has no debt in the capital structure and so it has 
no interest expense. The only investors in this condition are the shareholders, and they have a claim 
on net income (which has been equated to the cash flow to equity for simplicity). If the firm adds 
leverage (i.e., debt) to its capital structure, then the investors are comprised of both shareholders (who 
provided the equity financing) and lenders (who provided the debt financing). Lenders earn their 
returns in the form of interest; shareholders continue to own a claim on the residual cash flows of the 
firm. While paying interest to lenders decreases the net income and cash flows available to 
shareholders, the tax-deductibility of interest results in an overall increase in the cash flow from 
available to all investors. It is this increase in total cash flow to investors that may be considered to 
increase firm value. 
Table 2.1 Cash Flows to Investors for Unlevered versus Levered Firm 
 Unlevered Levered 
   
Earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) $100 $100 
Interest expense  10 
Earnings before taxes (EBT) 100 90 
Taxes, at 40% of EBT 40 36 
Net income 60 54 
   
Cash flows available to investors  $60 $64 
 
Focusing on the equity position provides yet another way to think about and analyze the 
effects of leverage. Building on the above example, assume that both the unlevered firm and the 
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levered firm hold $1,000 in assets. Further assume that the levered firm has financed a portion of its 
assets with a $200 note. Under these conditions the unlevered firm realizes a return on equity of 
6.00% while the levered firm realizes a return on equity of 6.75% as shown in Table 2.2. In essence, 
the levered firm can control the same quantity of assets using less invested equity. This demonstrates 
the magnifying effect of financial leverage which is well understood in the practice of finance 
(Brealey et al., 2014). 
Table 2.2 Returns on Equity for Unlevered versus Levered Firm 
 Unlevered Levered 
   
Assets $1,000 $1,000 
Debt 0 200 
Equity 1000 800 
   
Net income 60  54 
   
Return on assets 6.00% 5.40% 
Return on equity 6.00% 6.75% 
   
 
Given the positive influence of tax shields on firm value and returns on equity, it may be 
natural to assume that firms could maximize their value by financing their assets completely with 
debt. There are two main reasons why this is not the case. First, when the firm is completely financed 
with debt it is technically bankrupt and the debt-holders become, by definition, the new shareholders 
(Brealey et al., 2014). Second, increasing debt reduces financial flexibility and increases the risk of 
financial distress (Koller et al., 2015). Consequently, investors require additional returns in order to 
compensate for this additional risk. This increases the cost of capital (i.e., the discount rate used to 
value investments) which has the effect of reducing value. The implication is that the optimal capital 
structure which minimizes the cost of capital and maximizes firm value exists somewhere between a 
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debt-to-value ratio of 0 and 1. The challenge for researchers in corporate finance has been modeling 
the costs of financial distress. Consequently, rather than concentrating on capital structure 
optimization, practitioners of corporate finance have typically been advised to determine an 
“effective capital structure” and focus on value creation via returns on invested capital and revenue 
growth (Koller et al., 2015, p. 657). 
 Several theories persist as to how corporate managers structure the firm’s capital. The tradeoff 
theory of capital structure specifies that firms choose an optimal debt ratio by weighing the tax 
advantages of debt against the costs of financial distress (Cunha, Lambrecht, & Pawlina, 2006; 
Myers, 1984). The pecking order theory of capital structure introduces an element of psychology and 
supposes that, due to information asymmetries and signaling concerns, management may prefer 
internal financing (from retained earnings) over external financing; and debt financing over new 
equity issues (Cunha et al., 2006). Agency theory further introduces psychological factors by 
recognizing the independence of utility curves between the psychological organisms which constitute 
the corporate entity (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The relationship between principals and their agents 
and creditors, and the costs to align their utility curves, influences the amount of debt and equity 
principals choose to issue. 
While distinctly different from publicly traded corporations, households do share some of the 
same capital structure considerations. Within the domain of personal financial planning, creditors and 
household members have a claim on the assets and income of the household. Interest on some types 
of household debt (e.g., home mortgages and student loans) is tax deductible, providing the 
household with the opportunity to employ tax shields via financing investment with borrowed money. 
Of course, increased household debt also reduces financial flexibility and increases the probably of 
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financial distress for the household just as it does the firm. Thus, the question of finding an optimal or 
even effective capital structure is just as pertinent for households as it is for corporations. 
 In one of the few studies to apply theories of corporate finance to the household, Cunha et al. 
(2006) found that the tradeoff model of capital structure best explained the capital structure choices 
of Dutch households. Results were consistent with previous findings that income, household size, and 
education influence household debt levels; but also suggested that households behave as though they 
have a target debt ratio and employ an adjustment process to achieve the optimal level of debt. While 
the study provided some initial evidence that theories of corporate finance may be adaptable to the 
household, it was limited by the omission of an operationalized measure of time preference. This is a 
significant limitation because, unlike corporate managers who discount cash flows by the firm’s 
weighted average cost of capital, households are thought to discount future utility by their subjective 
rate of time preference. It remains unclear as to how time preference might influence the household 
capital structure.  
Intertemporal Choice 
The discounted utility model was proposed by Samuelson (1937) as a general model of 
intertemporal choice. According to the model, intertemporal utility, V, is a function of instantaneous 
utility from consumption, u(ct + k), at time t + k, and a discount factor, D(k) as indicated in Equation 
2.1, subject to constraints (Frederick et al., 2002).  
V(ct,…,cT) = � 𝐷𝐷(𝑘𝑘) 𝑇𝑇−𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘=0  u(ct + k) where     𝐷𝐷(𝑘𝑘) = ( 11+𝑝𝑝)𝑘𝑘        (2.1) 
The discount function mirrors the calculation for compounding interest, except that the individual’s 
rate of time preference, p, substitutes for the interest rate. (Incidentally, this discount function has 
also been adopted by various lifecycle models.) According to this model, an individual’s target debt 
ratio will reflect a constant rate of time preference. 
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Several studies have attempted to calculate individuals’ personal discount rates. Empirical 
field studies have often relied upon the assumption of revealed preferences in observed purchase and 
savings behaviors (Hausman, 1979). One of the problems with this approach, however, is that the 
observed behavior is a function of costs as well as preferences. Theoretically, perfectly efficient 
capital markets allow the individual to borrow and save so that their marginal rate of time preference 
becomes equal to the interest rate at which the individual can borrow and save (Loewenstein & 
Thaler, 1989). Under these conditions, observed purchases and saving theoretically reveal more about 
an individual’s cost of capital than their rate of time preference making it difficult to isolate the 
effects of time preference from observed purchase and savings behavior (Loewenstein, 1987).  
Experimental methods of eliciting time preference have arisen in response to the challenges of 
isolating revealed time preferences. Respondents are typically presented with some hypothetical 
choice between a small reward in the present period and a certain, larger reward in some future 
period (Meier & Sprenger, 2015). Some variations on this theme include changing the amount of time 
between rewards; changing the magnitude of rewards; framing the choice as one between present or 
delayed costs; and using actual instead of hypothetical payoffs (Hardisty, Thompson, Krantz, & 
Weber, 2013b).  
Both field and experimental methods have yielded interesting results. Computed discount 
rates are often very high (Loewenstein & Thaler, 1989). But anomalies not predicted by the 
discounted utility model have also been found; non-constant or time inconsistent discounting in 
particular (Frederick et al., 2002). Initially, observations suggested that “the discount applied to a 
future utility should depend on the time-distance from the present date;” and time inconsistency was 
thought of as a periodic re-evaluation of the original consumption plan (Stroz, 1956, p. 165). 
Conceptually, time inconsistency suggests that the difference between today and tomorrow is greater 
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than the difference between a year from now and a year plus a day (Thaler, 1981, p. 205). Hyperbolic 
discounting was proposed as a model of intertemporal choice to better fit these observations, as it 
produces short-term discount rates that are higher than long-term rates (Laibson, 1997). Several 
studies have yielded evidence in support of hyperbolic discounted utility models (Blackburn & El-
Deredy, 2013; Thaler, 1981). Other anomalies have also been observed for which hyperbolic 
discounting models loose predictive and explanatory power (Hardisty, Appelt, & Weber, 2013a). 
Specifically, empirical evidence from the domain of behavioral economics suggests that the sign and 
magnitude of an economic transaction or event influence an individual’s effective discount rate.  
A magnitude effect refers to the influence that the size of a financial event or transaction has 
on individual financial decision-making. For example, evidence suggests that individuals generally 
discount small gains at a higher rate than large gains (Hardisty et al., 2013a). Sign effects refer to the 
direction of financial events (i.e., a gains or a losses). Most studies of intertemporal choice have been 
framed within the context of gains, and it has only been within the past decade that researchers have 
begun to explore the nature of intertemporal choice for losses (Hardisty et al., 2013a).  
In the earliest choice experiments, participants were offered sets of choices that did not allow 
for negative discounting of losses. Recent empirical evidence suggests that intertemporal choice 
involves a complex interaction between sign, magnitude, and other factors (Hardisty et al., 2013a). 
Individuals appear to discount small gains at higher rates than large gains; but discount small losses 
at lower (even negative) rates than large losses. Contrary to the standard economic framework in 
which individuals should prefer to delay losses, it seems that individuals may actually prefer, in 
general, to realize (some) losses sooner rather than later.  
A possible explanation for these observations is that individuals have a general degree of 
present bias which motivates them to resolve gains and losses immediately (Hardisty et al., 2013a). 
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When the magnitude of the event is small, this degree of present bias is the dominant factor in 
making a decision: individuals prefer to realize a small gain now (which manifests as a high discount 
rate) and resolve a small loss now (which manifests as a low or even negative discount rate). As the 
magnitude of the event increases, other considerations (e.g., uncertainty and resource slack) become 
more important and have a moderating effect on the degree to which decisions are based on present 
bias (Hardisty et al., 2013a). Individuals appear to delay the realization of large gains and the 
resolution of large losses to future time periods, which results in the appearance of individuals 
discounting large gains at lower rates and discounting large losses at higher rates. These findings may 
have implications for household capital structure, including asset allocation and debt structure.  
Implications for Asset Allocation and Debt Structure 
Assets are investments by definition, and asset allocation (i.e., the mix of assets in which an 
economic entity has invested) is often framed in terms of risk and reward (Brealey et al., 2014). 
Modern portfolio theory has been used to describe how investors should allocate their assets so as to 
maximize expected returns per unit of risk (Jacobs, Müller, & Weber, 2014). Generally, the theory 
specifies an optimization problem in which individuals vary the weights of different (uncorrelated) 
assets in order to achieve a target rate of return while minimizing portfolio variance (Brealey et al., 
2014; Cai, Shi, Ni, & Pan, 2013). Over time, the theory has been modified and extended to include 
multiple periods and liquidity constraints (Lagerwall, 2011). The approach remains somewhat limited 
in its application to the household, however, because researchers often omit informational constraints, 
transaction costs, liquidity, and personal preferences (i.e., factors which may influence the utility one 
derives from a given allocation) from their specifications of the utility function. Thus, for all the 
normative power of modern portfolio theory, it generally lacks the ability to predict and explain how 
small investors actually allocate their assets. 
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There is theoretical and empirical evidence which suggests that household asset allocation 
may be influenced by individual future orientation. From a financial accounting perspective, assets 
and liabilities are classified on the balance sheet according to when then their economic benefits and 
costs are expected in time (Kieso et al., 2013). It is well established in the literature that individuals 
engage in their own form of accounting: mental accounting. Like financial accounting, mental 
accounting involves the measurement (i.e., valuation) of economic events over a period of time 
(Thaler, 1999). Given that time preference has been shown to influence individual valuations of 
economic choices, as discussed earlier in this chapter, it stands to reason that asset allocation and debt 
structure (specifically debt maturity structure) would be influenced by individual time preferences. 
That is, the decision to invest in a long-term asset or to finance an investment with a long-term 
mortgage would depend on the discount rate applied to future periods; and the culmination of these 
decisions may be observed on the household balance sheet. The same concept would also apply to 
investment and financing decisions regarding human capital. Theoretically, if the household’s 
intangible assets, such as human capital, could be reliably measured then these investments would 
also appear on the household balance sheet. Unfortunately, individual lifetime earnings are difficult 
to predict and value, and therefore cannot be reliably measured for inclusion on the balance sheet. 
However, this dissertation does control for human capital by categorically measuring educational 
attainment. 
The lifecycle hypothesis is one intertemporal framework which has been used to describe how 
households might allocate their resources to different asset classes based on their position in the 
lifecycle. According to theoretical predictions, individuals consider their expected labor income an 
implicitly risk-free asset and choose to allocate a majority of non-retirement assets to risky securities 
(Campbell et al., 2001). As the value of risky investments in retirement and non-retirement accounts 
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increases in mid-life, individuals begin to shift their asset allocation to risk-free assets. After 
retirement, individuals first consume their most liquid assets (i.e., cash) and as a result the proportion 
of wealth held in risky assets increases. While lifecycle models have gradually been extended to 
include housing wealth and restricted access to tax-deferred accounts, empirical evidence has been 
inconsistent with their theoretical predictions (Auger, Devinney, Dowling, Eckert, & Lin, 2012; 
Marekwica, Schaefer, & Sebastian, 2013; Poterba & Samwick, 2001). Individuals generally appear to 
hold a small proportion of assets in liquid asset classes until they near retirement age, at which time 
the proportion of liquid assets increases slightly before declining again in late life. 
Some researchers have proposed hyperbolic consumption models in order to better explain 
empirical observations. As mentioned previously, hyperbolic discounting has been used to model 
time-inconsistent preferences (i.e., self-control problems) wherein short-term discount rates are 
higher than long-term rates (Laibson, 1997). Within this framework, households allocate their long-
term savings to illiquid assets in order to constrain myopic consumption in future periods. Further, 
because a majority of wealth is held in illiquid assets, households finance present consumption with 
consumer debt (Angeletos et al., 2001). Hyperbolic discounting cannot explain magnitude and sign 
effects which have been observed empirically and which may influence household asset allocation 
and debt structure (Hardisty et al., 2013a). 
Given that assets represent future economic benefits, then individuals may frame asset classes 
in terms of expected economic gains. If so, then the magnitude of the gains expected from a given 
asset class may influence the degree of patience accorded to the decision to invest in that asset class; 
and this may consequently influence the composition of the asset portfolio. Consider an individual 
who is given some amount of cash that they can either consume today, or keep invested in cash via a 
savings account for some small expected return. If individuals are generally less patient when 
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considering small gains, then the individual in question would be expected to act impatiently and 
consume a majority of this cash today and perhaps invest some small portion of it in a savings 
account. By comparison, if the individual is given a choice between consumption today or investing 
in financial securities with a larger expected return, all else equal, then the individual should behave 
somewhat more patiently and invest a relatively greater proportion in securities. In this way, the 
magnitude of expected returns associated with each asset class should influence decisions such that 
individuals appear to have a general preference for allocating assets to investments with larger 
expected returns, all else equal. Individuals should exhibit a general preference for allocating a small 
proportion of total assets to cash, and allocating greater proportions to financial assets (with higher 
expected financial returns) and tangible assets (with higher expected utilities). Indeed this is what has 
been observed empirically (Auger et al., 2012; Laibson, 1997; Marekwica et al., 2013; Poterba & 
Samwick, 2001). 
The corresponding allocative concept for liabilities is debt structure, which refers to the mix 
of debt instruments included in the capital structure. Debt structure is often treated as a focus area 
within the capital structure literature; and much of the research in this area relates to the debt held by 
publicly traded corporations, possibly because these economic entities have considerable flexibility in 
how they can borrow capital (e.g., bank debt, secured mortgages, unsecured bonds, and convertible 
securities, among others). Debt structure can vary across several characteristics, including the source 
of debt, maturity structure, currency mix, and contractual terms (e.g., fixed or floating rate debt, 
covenants, and conversion terms; Servaes, Tufano, Ballingall, Crockett, & Heine, 2006).  
Diamond (1991) proposed a theory of debt structure wherein the credit history of a firm drives 
the choice between bank debt and borrowing from capital markets (i.e., bond sales). Within this 
framework young firms with little or no credit history must borrow from banks, which are in a 
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relatively better position (compared to bond holders) to monitor borrower performance and 
compliance with covenants. As firms establish a positive credit history they gain greater access to 
direct lenders via capital markets, and different debt instruments are resultantly added to the debt 
structure. Bolton and Freixas (2000) proposed a similar framework (which also explains why banks 
are motivated to securitize their debt securities), but emphasized the possibility that young or poorly 
rated firms choose to borrow predominantly from banks because the formation of personal lending 
relationships increases the probability that banks would restructure the firm’s loan in the event of 
financial distress. Empirical evidence has generally supported the predictions of these frameworks: 
firms with a credit rating of A or above appear to finance their assets predominantly with equity and 
unsecured debt; and the capital structure of firms becomes progressively more diversified as credit 
ratings decline (Rauh & Sufi, 2010). Similarly, the debt structures of A-rated firms appear to be 
comprised mostly of unsecured debt, but other modes of borrowing are used (e.g., bank debt and 
subordinated bonds) as credit ratings decline.  
Like corporations, households also have choices (albeit more limited) for borrowing capital in 
order to finance investment and consumption. Households can obtain loans with different rate and 
maturity structures, and with different collateral requirements. Despite such similarities, theories of 
debt structure have generally not been applied to the household; perhaps because they are largely 
silent regarding the influence of personal factors on financial decision-making. The few studies 
which have explored the composition of household debt portfolios have generally analyzed the 
influence of tax incentives on consumer and mortgage borrowing (Jappelli & Pistaferri, 2002). An 
additional study, which could be considered to bridge the corporate finance and personal finance 
domains, modeled the likelihood of business-owning households borrowing from various different 
lenders as a function of borrowers’ personal factors (including age, gender, educational attainment 
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and marital status, among others; Haynes & Avery, 1996). Results showed that business-owning 
households were more likely than non-business-owning households to borrow from a variety of 
sources, consistent with theoretical predictions and other empirical findings. This study was still 
limited, however, by its omission of individual financial preferences from the empirical model 
(among some other limitations). 
Considering that individuals generally have choices regarding the total cost of borrowing and 
the period over which debt can be repaid (for example, choosing between a 15-year fixed-rate 
mortgage with a low interest rate and a 30-year fixed rate mortgage with a somewhat higher rate), 
household debt structure can be viewed through the lens of intertemporal choice. Given that liabilities 
represent future economic costs, individuals may frame debt classes in terms of expected losses. If so, 
then the magnitude of the loss expected from a given debt class may influence the degree of patience 
accorded to decisions when considering borrowing and repayment of debt within that class; and this 
may in turn influence the overall composition of structure of the debt portfolio (Hardisty et al., 
2013a). Consider an individual who holds both a mortgage and a (comparatively lower) balance on a 
credit card. The mortgage represents a significant large future cost due to the resources that have to 
be given up in order to repay the loan, whereas the credit card balance is a much smaller future cost. 
Even though the actual cost of borrowing (i.e., the interest rate) from a line of credit may be much 
higher, the resources that have to be given up (i.e., the future economic cost to the individual) are 
likely not as great as what would be required to repay the mortgage; and as such the credit card 
balance may be considered a smaller loss. Empirical evidence suggests that the individual will make 
decisions that are relatively more present-biased when considering borrowing from and repayment of 
their credit card because it is a relatively smaller loss. As such, the individual would exhibit a 
propensity to repay their credit card early or keep a low balance (so as to resolve the liability) 
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whereas they would not attempt to repay the mortgage as early because it represents a larger loss and 
other considerations moderate the motivation to resolve the liability immediately. The magnitude of 
the expected loss associated with each debt class should influence financing decisions such that 
individuals appear to have a general preference for large long-term debt contracts (i.e., mortgages) 
and for maintaining low balances of consumer liabilities, all else equal. Of all capital raised from 
borrowing, individuals should appear to borrow a small proportion from credit lines and a much 
larger proportion via mortgages and non-consumer loans. 
Thus, when considered as a whole, the research suggests that investment choice and debt 
structure are functions of expected returns, relative risk aversion, time preference, repayment terms, 
and other factors which influence how asset and debt classes are framed. A question which remains 
unanswered, however, is how household asset allocation and debt structure vary with future 
orientation. If it is generally present bias that motivates asset allocation and debt structure decisions, 
then individuals with a stronger degree of present bias should be expected to hold asset and debt 
portfolios which differ from those of more future oriented individuals.  
Economic Theory of Self-Control 
The economic theory of self-control is a behavioral theory of intertemporal choice which 
offers a psychological explanation for the types of anomalies which have been observed in empirical 
studies (Thaler & Shefrin, 1981). The theory is an adaptation of agency theory and models the 
individual as an organization. Intertemporal choice in discrete time is a function of conflict between 
two selves: a myopic “doer” and a farsighted “planner.” Theoretically, both the doer A and the 
planner B maximize lifetime utility Vi, where i ∈ {A, B}, subject to a budget constraint. Lifetime 
utility for both is a function of consumption ct, time preference δi, and other preference parameters 
Ɵi. (Notation is abused for presentation purposes, and δi here denotes the time preference of 
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individual i rather than the discount factor.) The doer is perfectly present-oriented, however, such that 
all future utility is completely discounted. The doer accordingly prefers to maximize present utility. 
Because δA < δB, the planner prefers to maximizes intertemporal utility. This relationship is 
demonstrated in Figure 2.1. Conflict arises between the doer and the planner due to inconsistent 
utility functions. Unbounded, the doer would maximize present utility by consuming lifetime income 
in the current period. Consequently, the planner must employ some “psychic technology” to modify 
doer preferences or the budget constraint in order to maximize lifetime utility (Thaler & Shefrin, 
1981, p. 395). The planner will expend effort on self-control technologies until the marginal cost of 
control equals the marginal benefit in increased lifetime utility. The product of this latent 
optimization is an effective rate of time preference, which influences an individual’s observable 
intertemporal choices. 
Within the context of capital structure, an individual’s debt ratio is the result of the 
equilibrium of conflicting intertemporal motivations and will vary dependent on the amount of 
control the planner can apply. Theoretically, the effective rate of time preference is higher for 
individuals who use less self-control. With few constraints, the doer wields greater influence over 
intertemporal choice, which results in relatively present-oriented choices. Such individuals may be 
observed to accumulate debt against lifetime income and to consume assets, all in order to maximize 
utility (in the present). The result is a comparatively high debt ratio for present-oriented individuals. 
Conversely, individuals who exercise greater self-control make more future-oriented decisions. These 
individuals accumulate assets and use debt financing prudently for investment and consumption in 
order to maximize lifetime utility (including future periods), and consequently have relatively lower 
debt ratios. 
H1: Individual future-orientation is negatively associated with the observed debt ratio. 
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Figure 2.1 The Doer, The Planner, and Intertemporal Choice 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Within the context of asset allocation, the liquidity of an individual’s asset portfolio will vary 
with their degree of future orientation. Theoretically, present-oriented individuals who use relatively 
little self-control place few constraints on their internal doer, which leads to greater consumption and 
little investment in long-term assets in order to maximize utility in the present. The result is a 
comparatively low level of total assets with a high degree of liquidity, as most assets are held in cash 
or equivalents which can be more readily consumed. Conversely, individuals who utilize more self-
control make more future-oriented decisions. These individuals derive comparatively more utility 
from future periods, and as such, they allocate a greater portion of assets to long-term investments 
which results in a higher level of total assets with a lower degree of liquidity. 
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H2: Individual future-orientation is negatively associated with the proportion of total assets 
held in cash and equivalents. 
 Within the context of debt structure, the observations of Hardisty et al. (2013a) coupled with 
the economic theory of self-control suggest that the proportion of total debt which is borrowed via 
small contracts (e.g., lines of credit) will vary with the degree of future-orientation. Theoretically, 
present-oriented individuals attempt to resolve liabilities immediately, which ultimately leads them to 
avoid mortgage financing. By comparison, individuals who exercise greater self-control are able to 
make more future-oriented decisions which reduces the drive to resolve liabilities immediately, 
leading to a greater acceptance of mortgage debt. Thus, individuals which greater levels of future 
orientation are likely to report debt structures characterized by a greater proportion of debt held in 
mortgages. 
H3: Individual future orientation is positively associated with the proportion of mortgage debt 
that comprises total liabilities.  
Collective Financial Decision-Making 
Up to this point, and consistent with a large proportion of the literature, the discussion of 
household finance has been framed within the context of a unitary model. The unitary model of the 
household assumes that household financial behavior can be modeled by a single “well behaved 
utility function” (Bourguignon, Browning, & Chiappori, 2008, p. 503). In practice, unitary models 
typically measure financial data at the household level and personal factors at the individual level. 
For methodological ease, perhaps, it is often assumed that the head of the household or the financial 
respondent controls the finances of the household and that the financial position of the household is a 
function of this individual’s personal factors. For all its methodological simplicity, however, the 
unitary model is inherently limited in its applicability to multi-person households.  
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Individuals utilize a complex system of personal values and managerial behavior to allocate 
resources to needs and goals; and the complexity of family resource management is compounded by 
the addition of multiple individuals to the family system (Deacon & Firebaugh, 1988). Within the 
context of intertemporal choice, families face tremendous complexity in making collective 
intertemporal choices which satisfy all members of the household (Thaler & Shefrin, 1981). 
Researchers have commonly used a collective bargaining framework to model intra-household 
financial decisions (Britt, Huston, & Durband, 2010). Within this framework, goods can be public 
(i.e., for household consumption) or private (i.e., for personal consumption); individual spouses act so 
as to maximize their own utility; intra-household allocations are Pareto efficient (i.e., it is impossible 
to make one spouse better off without making the other spouse worse off); and binding agreements 
can be reached without transaction costs (Castilla, 2014). The household utility function (UHH) in a 
collective bargaining system is weighted sum of each member’s utility, commonly modeled as shown 
in Equation 2.2 (Britt et al., 2010). 
UHH = μuA(VA) + (1-μ)uB(VB)                                                                                         (2.2) 
Each spouse A and B maximizes their utility u derived from a combination of private and public 
consumption V subject to personal preferences and the collective budget constraint. The bargaining 
power of spouse A is μ such that μ ∈ [0, 1] and the bargaining power of spouse B is equal to (1 – μ). 
Spousal bargaining power represents the percentage of total control each spouse is able to exercise 
over intra-household resource allocation. Bargaining power is dependent upon each spouse’s ability 
to threaten the other with an undesired outcome, and the outcome the spouses face if they fail to reach 
an agreement (Pollak, 2007). In the divorce-threat class of bargaining games, power is function of 
each spouse’s competitiveness on the marriage market. Theoretically, income, education, and age are 
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all factors which may influence each spouse’s wellbeing after divorce, and thus influence bargaining 
power (Kenney, 2006; Britt et al., 2010).  
 Empirical evidence has generally supported the collective bargaining model of intra-
household allocations in a single period (Britt et al., 2010; Schaner, 2015). Francois, Helene, and 
Astrid (2009) found evidence of both cooperative and strategic behavior between spouses in a 
nonrandom sample of French heterosexual couples. Participants participated in five experiments in 
order to explore cooperative behavior between strangers and spouses in different information 
conditions; as well as a survey to explore the influence of demographic and psychological 
characteristics on cooperative behavior. Generally, the results suggested that when spouses 
communicate, “behavior is honest and spouses show a strong preference for either an efficient 
outcome or equal outcome” (Francois et al., 2009, p. 17).  
While evidence suggests that couples may, under certain conditions, cooperate to achieve 
efficient outcomes, more recent studies have tested the assumptions of the collective bargaining 
model of the household. Evidence suggests that couples may, at times, engage in opportunistic 
behavior (Francois et al., 2009). Jackson and Yariv (2011) examined the preference aggregation 
assumptions of the collective bargaining model, and demonstrated that “any time-consistent 
aggregation rule that satisfies [the restriction of Pareto efficiency] must be dictatorial, i.e., it must 
track the preferences of only one of the group’s members” (p. 3). Therefore, heterogeneity in time 
preference within a society necessarily implies that there must be a trade-off between time-
consistency, Pareto efficiency, and non-dictatorial decision-making. 
Schaner (2015) followed a similar theoretical method to demonstrate that while households 
may allocate resources efficiently in a single time period, differences in time preference between 
spouses makes it difficult for households to achieve efficient intertemporal allocations. The 
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theoretical predictions of a collective intertemporal choice model were tested experimentally in a 
sample comprised of couples from Western Province, Kenya. Consistent with theoretical predictions 
and prior studies, strategic behavior via use of separate accounts increased with preference 
heterogeneity between spouses (Schaner, 2015). The results suggested that patient spouses utilized 
private accounts to withhold funds from their less-patient partners; even when a joint account offered 
a higher return.  
Theoretical work suggests that households can only achieve efficient intertemporal allocations 
when all members of the household have the same preferences, or when household decisions are 
dictated by a single member (Jackson & Yariv, 2011; Schaner, 2015). It seems unlikely that any two 
individuals would have equivalent preferences; however it is plausible that household financial 
decisions could be dictated by a single partner. Historically, as viewed from within the feminist 
philosophical perspective, men controlled household resource allocations via centralized control, 
separate accounts, and an allowance system (Kenney, 2006). Kenney suggested that intra-household 
control, accounting and allocative systems have evolved over time in response to demands for gender 
equality. Households developed the use of pooled accounts, but men continued to dominate financial 
decision-making. Women began keeping their own accounts in order to increase their bargaining 
power over household resources. Thus, a combination of physical control mechanisms (i.e., the 
degree to which resources are separated) and management roles (i.e., the degree to spouses jointly or 
separately make allocative decisions) constitute a typology of intra-household governance (Kenney, 
2006).   
Other studies which have examined household financial management roles have typically 
done so within frameworks adapted from the corporate literature (i.e., agency theory; Bertaut, 
Haliassos, & Reiter, 2008). Within the corporate context, collective decision-making has been 
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explored through the lens of organizational behavior and leadership orientation. Generally, firms with 
high Power Distance (i.e., separation between managers and employees in decision-making authority) 
tend to be characterized by centralized management structures and dictatorial decision-making 
processes. Consistent with the theoretical predictions of collective intertemporal utility models, 
evidence suggests that firms with well-defined and enforced manager-subordinate relationships 
negatively influence the leverage ratio, all else equal (Lam, Zhang, & Lee, 2013). Within a 
behaviorally-informed interpretation of the collective model of intertemporal utility, organizational 
norms characterized by high Power Distance allow managers to make comparatively efficient 
allocations via dictatorial control.  
Even when presented with the opportunity, not all managers exercise authoritarian decision-
making. Within a delegation framework, the degree to which managers retain decision authority is a 
function of information needs and search costs (Graham, Harvey, & Puri, 2015). When managers 
have an informational advantage (e.g., the manger feels confident in their personal knowledge and 
ability to make a decision in a given policy area) they are less likely to delegate. Conversely, when 
managers require additional information to make a decision (such as in large or complex 
organizations where information is widely dispersed) they must incur search costs to obtain the 
information directly, and it may be more beneficial to delegate to subordinate managers with the 
requisite knowledge.  
Graham et al. (2015) conducted one of the few empirical studies to explore collective aspects 
of decision-making within the corporate setting utilizing a sample drawn from chief executive 
officers (CEOs) and chief financial officers (CFOs) of companies in the United States, Asia, and 
Europe. The results were consistent with the predictions of the theory of delegation: personal 
characteristics, decision area (as a proxy for self-efficacy) both influenced the degree to which 
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authority was delegated. The researchers also found that managers employed various decision rules 
for the delegation of capital and authority, including some which emphasized the subjective 
reputation (i.e., social capital) of subordinate managers (Oh & Bush, 2014). The determination of 
policies and procedures for delegating authority to agents is typically the subject of governance. 
Governance and Capital Structure 
Governance broadly refers to the policies and procedures which regulate an economic entity’s 
consumption of resources. All entities are subject to some form of governance, from entrepreneurs 
who are subject to debt covenants, to publicly traded corporations which are subject to the oversight 
of shareholders via a board of directors. The majority of governance research has focused on the 
publicly traded corporation (Greenwood & Empson, 2003). Within the corporate context, governance 
mechanisms are implemented in order to provide confidence to external suppliers of capital, who 
wish to be assured of a return on their investment (Lampel, Bhalla, & Jha, 2014). 
Agency theory remains one of the dominant theories of corporate governance and has 
important implications for capital structure (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Raelin & Bondy, 2013). 
Principals (i.e., owners) demand a return on investment and agents (i.e., managers) theoretically meet 
this demand by maximizing profits. The principal-agent problem naturally arises, however, due to the 
fact that owners and managers are unlikely to have uniform utility functions. Agents with dissimilar 
preferences may be motivated to act in their own interests rather than in the interests of principals. 
The prescribed solution to this problem typically entails some modification of agents’ preferences via 
incentives and controls in order to align the utility curves of agents with those of principals (Shleifer 
& Vishny, 1997).  
Various governance mechanisms, including the very structure of the organization, may be 
used in order to align the incentives of agents with those of principals. Hierarchical structures, power 
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concentration, formalization, financial incentives, and performance monitoring are examples of 
governance mechanisms which are meant to prevent agents from appropriating firm resources 
(Andrews, 2010). Internal controls, for example, are meant to discourage and prevent agents from 
stealing firm resources to maximize their own utility. The firm’s capital structure not only reflects the 
agency costs principals are willing to incur, but may also serve as a governance mechanism itself.  
In a wholly-owned firm, the owner-manager makes decisions which maximize his utility. As 
additional capital is acquired through the sale of equity, the owner-manager’s claims to firm assets 
and future profits is reduced; and the more likely it becomes that the owner-manager will appropriate 
firm resources to maximize his own utility at the expense of external equity-holders. Consequently, 
external shareholders become more willing to incur monitoring costs (e.g., auditing, formal control 
systems, budget encumbrances, and incentive structures) payable from the firm’s wealth in order to 
limit the degree to which the owner-manager can act in his own self-interest (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976). This is the agency cost of equity.  
The agency costs of debt include the incentive effects of leverage, monitoring costs of 
lenders, and bankruptcy costs (Jensen & Meckling, 1978). The incentive effect refers to the 
phenomenon that large corporations are not financed exclusively with debt because such an 
arrangement would result in a moral hazard: the owner-manager would have an incentive to accept 
undue risks. In such a situation, the owner-manager realizes the majority of benefits from a risky 
venture. If it fails, the creditor may realize a substantial loss. Thus, not only do creditors limit the 
amount they are willing to lend, but they may also impose limitations on borrowers in order to protect 
their investment. The costs of writing, monitoring, and enforcing such covenants constitute the 
monitoring costs of debt, which are born by the borrower to the extent that such costs are 
incorporated into the price of debt.  
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Given a situation where an owner-manager has determined that external capital is required, an 
increase in debt financing reduces the amount of capital required from external equity, and thus 
reduces the agency costs of equity. Each unit increase of debt also increases the agency costs of debt. 
Thus, agency theory predicts that principals finance operations and investment with a combination of 
equity and debt in order to minimize agency costs (Jensen & Meckling, 1978). Despite its 
prominence, agency theory has faced considerable scrutiny over the past several years (Zeitoun, 
Osterloh, & Frey, 2014).  
Some have suggested that agency theory is limited in its applicability to entities which lack 
clear distinctions between ownership and control (Cunha et al., 2006). Professional partnerships, 
nonprofit organizations, and households are some economic entities characterized by ambiguous 
distinctions between principals and agents (Greenwood & Empson, 2003; Van Puyvelde, Caers, Du 
Bois, & Jegers, 2012; Lampel et al., 2014). Partnerships are comprised of multiple owner-managers 
in which principals function as agents of the other principals. Internal monitoring costs are incurred 
as each principal would like to be assured that the other partners act in accordance with agreed-upon 
objectives (Greenwood & Empson, 2003). The close proximity of a small group of partners reduces 
agency costs and results in greater efficiency compared to large partnerships and publicly-traded 
corporations with dispersed ownership. Empirical research is needed to test this theoretical assertion. 
Employee-owned businesses are characterized by similarly ambiguous principal-agent relationships, 
and research suggests that employee-owned businesses in which employees participate in decision-
making experience better performance than non-employee-owned business (Lampel et al., 2014).  
Other researchers have asserted that agency theory implies that principals and agents have 
inherently conflicting goals, which may not necessarily be the case (Van Puyvelde et al., 2012). 
Stakeholder and stewardship theories have been suggested as a supplements in order to explain 
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managerial decision-making in cases where, perhaps due to self-selection (such as when volunteering 
for a non-profit organization), agents are actually motivated to act in the interest of principals. In 
cases where principals (e.g., a non-profit board of directors) anticipate that agents will act in the 
interests of the organization, principals are expected to accept only a low amount of internal agency 
costs – the benefits simply will not outweigh the costs (Van Puyvelde et al., 2012). Additional 
empirical evidence is needed to test this assertion. 
 Evidence suggests that internal social capital may also influence collaborative governance 
and financial performance. Oh and Bush (2014) proposed a framework for dynamic collaborative 
governance “in which forms of social capital have a cyclical and snowballing effect on initiating, 
facilitating, and developing collaborative governance” (p. 9). The structural, cognitive, and relational 
dimensions of social capital develop through three-phase process. For example, trust develops into 
cultural norms and shared values through a process of building reciprocity and shared understandings 
(Oh & Bush, 2014). Within a principal-agent framework social capital reduces the need for 
monitoring, which allows managers to reallocate resources to more productive activities. Consistent 
with this framework, Andrews (2010) found that shared values and trust between organizational 
members positively influenced organizational performance in a sample of English local-level 
governments. Financial performance was not objectively tested in the study, however, and so 
research is still needed to test the influence of social capital on capital structure within a collaborative 
decision-making framework. 
Household Governance Framework 
While households lack the complexity of external equity financing which characterizes 
publicly traded corporations, they may be marked by similar agency problems typical of other non-
public entities (e.g., professional partnerships, employee-owned businesses, and non-profit 
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organizations; Greenwood & Empson, 2003; Jackson & Yariv, 2011; Van Puyvelde et al., 2012; 
Lampel et al., 2014). Agency theory has been adapted by some researchers in order to explain the 
influence of divergent interests on household financial behaviors. Within one adaptation, which is 
analogous to the economic theory of self-control, a two-person household is comprised of a 
farsighted “accountant” and a myopic “shopper” (Thaler & Shefrin, 1981; Bertaut et al., 2008). 
Within this framework, household member i, where i ∈ {A, B}, acts so as to maximize their own 
intertemporal utility Vi from lifetime consumption ∑  𝑇𝑇−𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘=0 cit+k subject to their personal discount factor 
δi, other personal preferences Ɵi, and budget constraints. 
The household’s intertemporal choice in discrete time is a function of household members’ 
preferences. While the shopper-accountant model was originally conceived with the form that δA < 
δB, it is potentially more instructive to first consider the case where spousal time preferences are 
relatively homogeneous, if not equal. Two present-oriented spouses will each prefer to bring 
resources forward in time via borrowing, whereas two future-oriented spouses will prefer to save 
resources for future periods. Likewise, two spouses with relatively moderate patience would be 
expected to agree on a combination of saving and borrowing. When spouses exert equal influence on 
intertemporal choice, the household debt ratio is likely to be negatively influenced by household 
future-orientation (i.e., the sum of spousal future-orientation; Jackson & Yariv, 2011).  
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Shopper 
Max VA = ∑  𝑇𝑇−𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘=0 δAtuA(cAt+k, ƟA) 
 
Figure 2.2 The Shopper, The Accountant, and Household Intertemporal Choice 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evidence suggests that spousal preferences are rarely given equal weight in decision-making 
(Britt et al., 2010; Castilla, 2014; Kenney, 2006); instead, each spouse’s ability to influence 
household financial outcomes is dependent on their share of bargaining power (Pollak, 2007). When 
bargaining power is unequal, one spouse can threaten more severe consequences against the other in 
order to wield greater influence over collective decisions. Thus, the household debt ratio is likely to 
reflect the preferences of the spouse with the most bargaining power.  
H4: The bargaining power of the shopper moderates the influence of the accountant’s future-
orientation on the household debt ratio. 
It is also unlikely that spousal preferences are completely homogenous – one is likely to be at 
least somewhat more patient than the other. Within the present framework, an unbounded shopper 
would generally prefer to maximize utility VA by consuming resources in the present and would incur 
debt in order to move resources forward in time. Conversely, an unbounded accountant would prefer 
to delay consumption to future periods and would minimize debt (to reduce future fixed expenses) 
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Accountant 
Max VB = ∑  𝑇𝑇−𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘=0 δBtuB(cBt+k, ƟB) 
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and engage in saving and investment. In such cases, individual spouses may benefit from 
collaborative and/or strategic behavior in order to modify the preferences or budget constraint of their 
partner (Thaler & Shefrin, 1981; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; Francois et al., 2009). The mechanisms by 
which members assure themselves that resources will not be appropriated by their partner (beyond 
some acceptable degree of risk) constitute household governance.  
Evidence suggests that the principal elements of a household governance structure are the 
household accounting and management systems (Kenney, 2006; Schaner, 2015). Keeping separate 
accounts enables household members to withhold resources from the control of their partner. 
Similarly, centralized management enables one spouse to monitor the financial behavior of their 
partner. More specifically, centralized governance theoretically reduces the influence of the weaker 
spouse and strengthens the influence of the dominant spouse. Thus, governance mechanisms 
moderate each spouse’s ability to act in accordance with their own preferences to the detriment of 
their partner. 
H5: Centralized governance moderates the influence the accountant’s future-orientation on the 
household debt ratio. 
H6: Keeping separate accounts moderates the influence of each the accountant’s future-
orientation on the household debt ratio. 
Bargaining power is likely to influence household governance. All else equal, spouses with 
greater bargaining power are likely to prefer retaining centralized control over resources in order to 
monitor their partner. Both the dominant and less dominant spouse are likely to prefer the use of 
separate accounts in order to withhold resources from each other. Conversely, when spouses have 
equal bargaining power they are more likely to retain control over their own finances; and more 
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likely to keep resources pooled. Heterogeneity in bargaining power is likely to increase centralized 
household governance and use of separate accounts.  
Within the classical economic framework, each spouse will expend effort on monitoring their 
partner or diverting resources to themselves until the marginal costs equal the marginal benefits 
(Schaner, 2015). When spousal time preferences are homogeneous, intertemporal incentives are well 
aligned. In such cases, each spouse would realize few benefits from expending effort on monitoring 
their partner’s financial behavior; or from keeping separate accounts. As the heterogeneity in spousal 
time preferences increases, however, so do the benefits of centralized governance (by the dominant 
spouse) and separate accounting. For example, holding bargaining power constant, an increase in the 
shopper’s present-orientation increases the likelihood household will finance consumption with debt 
(Jackson & Yariv, 2011). Both spouses would then prefer to keep and manage separate accounts in 
order to have some assurance of being able to maximize their individual utility (Kenney, 2006; 
Schaner, 2015).  
Empirical evidence from both the household and corporate literature suggests that information 
sharing and collaboration improve performance (Francois et al., 2009; Lampel et al., 2014). 
Theoretically, positive interpersonal relationships and engagement in the decision-making process 
influence the development of trust and shared social norms (Lampel et al., 2014). In effect, positive 
relationships and trust harmonize preferential differences between spouses. When spouses 
collaboratively make financial decisions, are committed to the agreement, and have confidence that 
their partner will abide by the agreement, the benefits of monitoring and keeping separate accounts 
are greatly reduced. As relationship quality improves, the need for keeping separate accounts and for 
managing resources separately is diminished.  
H7: Relationship quality reduces the likelihood of centralized governance. 
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H8: Relationship quality reduces the likelihood of keeping separate accounts. 
Figure 2.3 Comprehensive Household Governance Framework 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Summary 
Households depend on the allocation of limited resources for survival. Resilience is required 
to absorb financial shocks and adapt to volatile economic conditions (O’Neill & Xiao, 2011). 
Solvency is one component of resilience and a product of household capital structure. While several 
studies have explored factors related to saving and consumption behavior, few have explored 
household finances through the lens of capital structure. An inherent limitation when applying 
theories of corporate finance to the household is that the corporation, inasmuch as it is treated as a 
legal person, is not considered to behave according to a utility function. As a result, the corporate 
literature is largely silent regarding the influence of personal preferences and perceptions on financial 
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decision-making. Evidence from the microeconomic and personal financial planning domains 
suggests, however, that household capital structure is the product of intertemporal choices which 
result from cognitive processes. The application of self-control technologies produce some level of 
individual time preference (i.e., present-orientation or future-orientation) which influences the ratio 
of total debt to total assets, the choice of which assets in which to invest, and the choice of financing. 
Evidence suggests that households comprised of multiple individuals employ various mechanisms to 
aid collective decision-making; and that the structure and effectiveness of these governance 
mechanisms are influenced by the household governance environment. 
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Chapter 3 – Methods  
The complex nature of the analyses undertaken in this dissertation required that the study be 
organized in two parts. The first part assumed a unitary model of the household as a first step toward 
exploring the influence of individual future orientation on household capital structure. The second 
part assumed a collective model of the household in order to explore the influence of individual 
preferences on household capital structure when the household is comprised of two individuals.  
Survey Description 
This dissertation utilized samples extracted from the 22nd wave of the De Nederlandsche 
Bank (DNB) Household Survey (DHS). The DHS is a longitudinal panel study which has been 
administered by CentERdata annually since 1993 via the internet. The DHS is designed to be a 
nationally representative survey of the Dutch-speaking population in the Netherlands. A brief note is 
warranted regarding the reason a Dutch data set was chosen for this research. The research questions 
formulated for this dissertation required the availability of detailed household financial data including 
the composition of assets and liabilities. Additionally, a psychometrically-validated measure of future 
orientation was desired – not simply proxy questions such as the degree to which an individual 
smokes or engages in other types of supposedly short-sighted behaviors. Finally, analyzes of the 
research questions in Part Two of this dissertation required complete individual responses for 
multiple members within each household. After reviewing several data sets, principally of households 
from the United States, it was determined that the DHS best met the requirements for the present 
analyses. This, of course, limits the generalizability of the present findings to the Dutch-speaking 
population in the Netherlands; but it also creates an opportunity for future cross-cultural comparisons 
between the way Dutch and U.S. households vary in their propensities to use financial leverage. 
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The demographic characteristics of the DHS panel generally conform to the official 
population statics reported by CBS with some exceptions (Teppa & Vis, 2012). Working in 
collaboration with Statistics Netherlands (CBS), the initial respondents were selected via random 
digit dialing. At the time, approximately 99% of Dutch households had a fixed phone line. Contact 
persons were sent to the homes of respondents, conducted an initial survey of household 
characteristics, and asked respondents if they would like to participate in a longitudinal study. If 
respondents refused to participate, the contact person was instructed to visit the neighboring 
household and repeat the same procedure (i.e., random walk method; Teppa & Vis, 2012). Responses 
for agreeing households were stored in a master database from which the first panel was selected.  
Participants in the first wave were provided with the technology required (i.e., a basic 
computer and modem) to complete the survey and transmit their responses to a central computer 
terminal located at the University of Amsterdam. All members of the household over the age of 16 
responded to a series of questionnaires. Novel incentives are offered to encourage continued 
participation in the survey. Respondents earn CentERpoints based on the number of completed 
questionnaires and continuation in the panel. Every three months, CentERpoints may be paid to the 
participant in cash, or donated to a charity or state lottery of the participant’s choice. Over time, some 
households have attrited from the study and new households with the same characteristics (e.g., 
region, age, household composition, urbanization, and household income) have been randomly 
sampled from the master database for inclusion in the study. An analysis of the number and 
characteristics of the households that have attrited from the study was outside the scope of this 
dissertation; however, several studies have documented the attrition of hundreds of households from 
the study within a short period of time (e.g., see Van der Cruijsen, de Haan, & Jansen, 2016). Teppa 
and Vis (2012) completed the most comprehensive analysis and discussion of DHS methods and 
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sample characteristics, and reported that only 1.4% of the 2009 panel (i.e., 26 households) was 
comprised of original study participants from 1990 (the researchers included the predecessor to the 
present DHS in their analysis of the data set).  
Changes in technology and fixed phone penetration rates have necessitated changes in 
methods. New recruits are selected from a random national sample of private postal addresses. Those 
with associated fixed phone numbers were contacted by phone; those without were contacted by mail. 
Additionally, the central terminal was moved to the University of Tilburg. Otherwise, the original 
methods described above have remained generally unchanged. The 22nd wave of the DHS consisted 
of six questionnaires, and data was collected from 5,120 individuals over the age of 16 within 2,072 
households between April and December 2014. The questionnaires included items regarding the 
general information of the household, occupation and employment, housing and mortgages, health 
and income, assets and liabilities, and economic and psychological concepts. The assets and liabilities 
questionnaire collected detailed information on respondents’ financial position. For example, 
respondents were asked to indicate the value of 27 different asset accounts ranging in liquidity from 
checking accounts to business equity. 
Part One 
Sample Description 
The first analyses of this dissertation utilized a subsample of household financial respondents 
extracted from the 22nd wave of the De Nederlandsche Bank (DNB) Household Survey (DHS). 
Observations were limited to the financial respondent for each household, consistent with the 
assumptions of the unitary model of the household, resulting in a sample of n = 2,072 household 
financial respondents. Listwise deletion was used to omit incomplete observations (i.e., those with 
missing responses to any of the independent variables under observation). This resulted in a sample 
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of n = 1,309 financial respondents that had completed all the items measured in this study. The 
distribution of household debt ratios was then analyzed and extreme observations (i.e., those in the 
top 5th percentile) were omitted, resulting in a sample of n = 1,244 household financial respondents 
(Cunha et al., 2006)1. Standard diagnostic tests were then conducted to identify and remove outliers 
in order help satisfy the distributional assumptions required by the analytical techniques used in this 
part of the dissertation (Regression with SAS, 2015). The final sample was comprised of n = 824 
individual household financial respondents. 
Empirical Models and Variable Measurement 
The first analysis of part one explored the influence of individual future orientation on 
household capital structure as indicated by the debt ratio. Within a unitary model of the household, 
the debt ratio of household j is a function of the household financial respondent’s i future orientation 
and various other personal and household factors which have been shown to influence both saving 
and borrowing. This empirical model is formally stated in Equation 3.1. The term Xi,j is a vector of 
control variables for demographic and economic characteristics.  
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Post-hoc analyses were completed to analyze the impact of following this procedure to omit extreme observations. The 
first empirical model was tested with the full sample of n = 1,309 respondents, and again omitting the top percentile for a 
sample of n = 1,296 respondents. In both cases, OLS regression results – Tobit regression could not be used due to 
significant heteroscedasticity – indicated that the model explained little of the observed variance in the household debt 
ratio. When the model was tested with the sample of n = 1,244 respondents from omitting the top 5th percentile of 
observations in the household debt ratio, OLS regression results indicated that errors were still heteroscedastic, but the 
model showed greatly improved fit R2 = .52, F(28, 1,215) = 48.28, p < .001, and future orientation had a small positive 
influence on the debt ratio b = .002, t(1,215) = 2.61, p < .01. 
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Debt ratioj = αi + β1future orientationi + βnXi,j + εj                                                      (3.1) 
where Xi,j = (risk tolerance, future expectations, lifecycle status, sex, marital status, 
education, financial knowledge, household size, household income, household net worth, 
asset tangibility)            
The relationship between future orientation and the proportion of household financial assets 
held in cash was explored using the full multivariate model shown in Equation 3.2. The variable cash 
ratioj is the ratio of cash and equivalents divided by total financial assets reported by household j. 
The term Zi,j is a vector of control variables for demographic and economic characteristics which is 
equivalent to Xi,j except for the omission of asset tangibility. Asset tangibility was omitted from the 
model to avoid predicting a share of the asset portfolio with another share of the asset portfolio.   
Cash ratioj = α + β2 future orientationi + βnZi,j + εi                                                        (3.2) 
where Zi,j = (risk tolerance, future expectations, lifecycle status, sex, marital status, 
education, financial knowledge, household size, household income, household net worth) 
The relationship between future orientation and the proportion of total household debt 
obtained via mortgage contracts was explored using the full multivariate model shown in Equation 
3.3. The variable mortgage debt ratioj is the ratio of mortgage and non-consumer debt divided by 
total debt reported by household j. 
 Mortgage debt ratioj = α + β3 future orientationi + βnXi,j + εi                                      (3.3) 
The vector Xi,j was used in this empirical model in order to control for the influence of asset 
tangibility on the mortgage debt ratio, given that such assets may be seen as a substantial source of 
collateral. The method for measuring each of these factors is discussed in the following subsections. 
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Dependent Variables 
The debt ratio represents the proportion of balance sheet assets (which does not include a 
value for the intangible asset of human capital) financed with debt, and was calculated by dividing 
total household liabilities by total household assets. The DHS collected individual-level data from 
each member of the household, necessitating the construction of household-level financial data. This 
was accomplished by summing all intra-household responses for each financial item. The underlying 
assumption within the unitary model of the household is that household financial decisions are made 
by a single household financial respondent, such that household-level financial characteristics are a 
function of the individual household financial respondent’s personal preferences and other 
characteristics. The value of total household assets was measured as the continuous sum of 27 
household-level asset categories. The value of total household liabilities was measured as the 
continuous sum of 10 household-level liability categories. Missing observations for asset and liability 
categories were interpreted as €0 observations. Additionally, when calculating the debt ratio €0.01 
was added to total assets in order to prevent undefined calculations (which could result from having a 
0 in the denominator), and €0.01 was also added to total liabilities to keep the accounting equation in 
balance.  
The cash ratio was calculated by dividing cash and equivalents by the value of total assets. 
Cash and equivalents were calculated as the sum of each household’s positive balance in checking 
accounts (negative balances were treated at a liability), balances in savings accounts, and balances in 
deposit books. The mortgage debt ratio was calculated by dividing mortgage debt by the value of 
total debt. Mortgage debt was calculated as the sum of mortgages on real estate, other (non-
consumer) loans, and study loans.  
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Independent Variables 
Future-orientation was measured by an adaptation of the consideration of future consequences 
(CFC) scale (Webley & Nyhus, 2006). In the DHS version of the scale, respondents were asked to 
indicate the degree to which they agree with 12 statements regarding their disposition toward 
thinking about future consequences on a scale from 1 (extremely uncharacteristic) to 7 (extremely 
characteristic). Responses to the 12 items were added to form a summative scale measured 
continuously. Respondents completed the measure during only one year of their participation in the 
study. In cases where respondents did not complete the measurement during their participation in the 
22nd wave of the study, their responses from a previous wave were used, if available. The 
Cronbach’s alpha for the scale was α = .74. 
Risk tolerance and attitude towards saving have also been shown to influence intertemporal 
choices. Respondents were asked to indicate their agreement with six statements regarding their 
attitudes toward risk in a financial context on a scale from 1 (extremely uncharacteristic) to 7 
(extremely characteristic; Kapteyn & Teppa, 2011). The Cronbach’s alpha for the scale in this sample 
was α = .64, indicating a relatively low level of internal consistency. A decision-maker’s economic 
expectations for the future may also influence the degree to which they believe it makes sense to 
borrow or save. Respondents’ future expectations were measured by a single item which asked 
respondents to predict their household economic situation in five years on a scale from 1 (much 
worse) to 5 (much better).  
Lifecycle status was measured by two variables: the age of the respondent and their 
employment status. The age of each respondent was calculated by subtracting their reported birth 
year from the year in which the wave was administered (i.e., 2014). Only respondents age 16 and 
over were included in the sample, and age was measured categorically with six categories. The 
reference group was formed by respondents age 16 to 34, and other categories were formed in 10-
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year intervals. The sixth category included all respondents age 75 and above. Employment status was 
measured by a single dichotomous variable to indicate whether or not respondents were actively 
employed; and unemployed individuals formed the reference group. 
 Sex was measured as a dichotomous variable (i.e., male or female) and females formed the 
reference group. Marital status was measured categorically. Respondents who report being either 
married or in a registered partnership formed the first group. A registered partnership in the 
Netherlands is a legal arrangement which confers upon the parties of the partnership many of the 
same benefits as marriage, with fewer administrative requirements, the possibility for different 
treatment of property rights, and generally fewer requirements for dissolution compared to divorce 
(Den Haag, 2016; Goosens, 2016). Those who reported living with a partner but not married formed 
the second group. The final category was formed by respondents who reported being single, divorced 
from spouse, widowed, or never married. These respondents were grouped into one category of single 
respondents in order to control for the different levels of efficiency in household production that 
married, cohabitating and single households may enjoy. Single respondents formed the reference 
group. 
Household size has been shown to influence capital structure, but has received different 
treatment in the literature. In the corporate literature firm size is measured by the logarithm of total 
assets, whereas in the personal finance literature size is measured by the number of individuals within 
the household (Cunha et al., 2006). In this dissertation, household size was measured using the 
number of household members. This was done to remain consistent with the existing personal finance 
literature and to avoid potential multicollinearity with other financial independent variables. The 
DHS asks respondents to report the number of household members, from 0 to 9 or more, and is 
treated as a continuous variable. 
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Education represents an intangible asset not listed on the balance sheet, but nonetheless 
affects a respondent’s earning capacity in the labor market; and may also influence the household’s 
capital requirements. The DHS measured educational attainment with nine categories. It was 
necessary in the present study to collapse some of these categories due to insufficient observations for 
some categories. Thus, in the present study educational attainment was measured categorically with 
three categories: up to secondary education, up to vocational college, and up to university education. 
Respondents who completed up to a university education formed the reference group. Subjective 
financial knowledge was measured by a single item which asked respondents to rate their knowledge 
with respect to financial matters on a scale from 1 (not knowledgeable) to 4 (very knowledgeable), 
and was treated as a continuous variable. 
Prior research has demonstrated that it is important to control for income and net worth when 
using financial ratios in econometric models (Garrett, 2012). Using a sample of 29,496 Korean 
households extracted from the 1996 National Survey of Family Income and Expenditures in Korea, 
Moon, Yuh, and Hanna (2002) showed that income positively influenced whether or not Korean 
households met solvency ratio guidelines, and that the relationship was nonlinear. This suggests that 
it is important to control for the influence of household income on the household capital structure. 
Additionally, Bieker (2011) found that income and net worth were uncorrelated with the household 
debt ratio, suggesting that this financial ratio is “different from and independent of the level of 
household income and wealth” (p. 13). Indeed, this difference was discussed and demonstrated in 
mathematical terms previously in this dissertation. This suggests that is it necessary to control for net 
worth when modeling the debt ratio, otherwise regression results may be subject to unobserved bias 
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(Garrett, 2012). Controlling for net worth essentially holds the household accounting equation 
constant which enables specific and meaningful interpretation and discussion of the results.2  
Household net income is analogous to the gross revenue earned by a firm, and households 
with more income may be better positioned to finance investment and consumption with internal 
financing rather than through borrowing. The DHS calculates net income at the individual level based 
on reported individual gross income, tax deductions and tax credits, and other economic transactions 
such as parental support given or received. Household net income was calculated during data 
preparation as the sum of net income for all members of the household, resulting in a continuous 
measure of household net income. Household net income was then measured categorically by four 
categories: households with income from €0 to €10,000; those with income from €10,001 to €30,000; 
those with income from €30,001 to €50,000; and households with income greater than €50,000. 
The accounting equation specifies that net worth or household equity is the residual value of 
assets after all liabilities have been satisfied, and represents the household’s ownership interest in the 
assets. As with net income, households with relatively more equity may be better positioned to 
finance investment or consumption with retained earnings (i.e., household equity) rather than with 
debt. It is worth noting briefly that although both the household debt ratio and net worth may be 
computed from assets and liabilities, they are distinctly different financial constructs. This is easily 
demonstrated mathematically. Assume, for example, that a household has accumulated $1,000 in 
assets through precautionary saving and holds $0 in debt: the household’s net worth is $1,000. A 
                                                 
2 Post-hoc analyses were completed by stratifying the sample into net worth terciles and testing the first empirical model, 
without net worth, using OLS regression. Future orientation was not statistically significant in these analyses, but results 
suggested that the explanatory power of the model varied with net worth. The model had the greatest explanatory power 
within the first stratum with the lowest net worth, R2 = .94, F(17, 254) = 259.90, p < .001, but explained little of the 
variance in observed household debt ratios within the stratum of high net worth households, R2 = .10, F(17, 262) = 2.92, p 
< .001. 
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different household may hold $2,000 in assets and $1,000 in debt and accordingly also have a net 
worth of $1,000. Both households exhibit the same net worth but use debt very differently: the former 
exhibits a debt ratio of 0 and the latter a debt ratio of 0.5. When the debt ratio is modeled without 
controlling for net worth, it is not possible to accurately interpret estimated beta coefficients: a 
positive coefficient could suggest that a household adds debt to the capital structure per unit of assets; 
but could also indicate an increase to both debt and assets. It is because there are multiple ways to 
change the debt ratio that a control must be included in order to facilitate a specific and accurate 
interpretation of regression results. Previous studies have used net worth as a control variable when 
modeling the debt ratio, which was the method adopted for the present study. Net worth was first 
measured continuously by subtracting total liabilities from total assets. Next, net worth was measured 
categorically by quartile in order to mitigate the challenges of dealing with observations of negative 
net worth and bimodal distributions. The lowest quartile of net worth was used as the reference 
group. 
Previous studies have shown that it is important to control for asset tangibility when modeling 
the household debt ratio (Cunha et al., 2006). Individuals may choose to finance tangible assets with 
debt expecting that the increased risk of financial distress could be offset, to a degree, by the expected 
liquidation value of the assets in tangible asset markets (Myers, 1984). As such, individuals who 
weight their total asset portfolio with a relatively greater proportion of investment in fixed assets may 
be more disposed to utilize financial leverage. It is therefore important to control for this motivation 
to use leverage when analyzing the influence of future orientation as a motivation to use leverage. 
Asset tangibility was first measured as the continuous proportion of fixed assets which comprise total 
assets, ranging from 0 to 1. Quartiles of the asset tangibility ratio were then calculated in order to 
measure asset tangibility categorically, and the lowest quartile was used as the reference group.  
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Analytical Methods 
The dependent variable for the first analysis was the household debt ratio, which was 
measured continuously. Despite the prevalent use of ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to 
model continuous dependent variables, some researchers have recently called its use into question 
when applied to financial ratios. This is because financial ratios are typically bounded at one or more 
points, and as such, the use of OLS regression can produce biased estimates of beta coefficients as 
errors are clustered around the bounded values (Ramalho & da Silva, 2013). Tobit regression was 
developed as a method of modeling a continuous dependent variable with censored values, and some 
researchers have employed this method when modeling financial ratios (Cuha et al., 2006). However, 
the use of Tobit regression requires a nuanced interpretation which has not often been made apparent 
by researchers in its application to financial ratios. When modeling the debt ratio y of household j, 
Tobit regression assumes that the debt ratio is indicative of an underlying latent variable yj* which 
takes observable values as shown in Equation 3.4 (Tobin, 1958). 
yj = �
𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗
∗   if    𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗∗ > 0 0     if    𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗∗ ≤ 0                           (3.4) 
Tobit regression uses the maximum likelihood method to estimate the influence of each 
independent variable on the latent variable yj*, not on the observable debt ratio yj. Given the 
precedent set by the current literature, the empirical model shown in Equation 3.1 was modeled using 
Tobit regression, but care was given to interpret the results in a manner consistent with this analytical 
method. The latent variable underlying the observed debt ratio could be thought of as a tolerance for 
the risk of insolvency (since the risk of insolvency increase as the debt ratio increases), or as the 
propensity to use leverage. The results of this dissertation are discussed in terms of the latter. 
Additionally, a hierarchical approach was used – beginning with personal factors, adding 
demographic and lifestyle variables, and then adding financial variables – in order to better observe 
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the incremental improvements in model fit from controlling for different influences on the household 
debt ratio, as documented in the literature. 
The dependent variable for the second analysis was the continuous ratio of cash and 
equivalents divided by total assets, bounded between 0 and 1. The ratio of cash and equivalents to 
total assets was first modeled using OLS regression. Diagnostic tests indicated that the residuals 
exhibited left-skewness and failed to meet the assumption of normality. These findings were 
consistent with expectations and supported the use of fractional logistic regression to analyze the 
model (Liu & Xin, 2014). Fractional logistic regression is a preferred analytical method when 
modeling bounded proportions because parameters are estimated using a quasi-maximum likelihood 
method, which does not make the same distributional assumptions as OLS regression. Models 
estimated using this method take the form shown in Equation 3.5.  
E(Cash ratioi | z) = α + β2 future orientationi + βnZi,j + εi                                              (3.5) 
An abbreviated model including only future orientation and personal factors was estimated first. 
Demographic and lifecycle characteristics were added next, followed by an estimation of the full 
model including financial characteristics.  
The dependent variable for the third analysis was the continuous ratio of mortgage and non-
consumer debt divided by total debt, bounded between 0 and 1. As discussed above, fractional 
logistic regression is the appropriate analytical method for modeling bounded proportions (Liu & 
Xin, 2014). Accordingly, the empirical model shown in Equation 3.3 was estimated using the form 
shown in Equation 3.6. 
E(mortgage debt ratioi | z) = α + β3 future orientationi + βnXi,j + εi                             (3.6) 
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As with the previous analyses, an abbreviated model including only future orientation and personal 
factors was estimated first, followed by a model with demographic and lifecycle characteristics, 
followed finally by the addition of financial characteristics.  
Part Two 
Sample Description 
This second set of analyses utilized a subsample of couples (married or cohabitating) 
extracted from the 22nd wave of De Nederlandsche Bank (DNB) Household Survey (DHS). In total, 
n = 2,072 households were surveyed as part of the 22nd wave. The sample was then limited to 
households which reported that a partner was present in the household, resulting in a sample of n = 
1,490 households. Couples were comprised of the head of household and their partner (Greenwood & 
Empson, 2003; Van Puyvelde et al., 2012). Next, descriptive analyses were conducted in order to 
identify the accountant and shopper within each household, consistent with the theoretical approach 
used for the following analyses.  
The process for identifying the household accountants and shoppers was complex. First, 
observations for each head of household were extracted from the original data file, and the suffix A 
was added to each variable within this new data file. Next, a separate data file for the spouse or 
partner of each household was created, and the suffix B was added to each variable within this data 
file. The two files were then merged with the original data file (without suffixes attached to each 
variable) by household identifier in order to create a household-level data set which contained 
individual responses from both the heads of each household and their spouse or partner. The future-
orientation of both household members was then measured using a modified version of the 
consideration of future consequences (CFC) scale (Webley & Nyhus, 2006). The future-orientation 
scores of each member within the household were then compared to each other. Following a similar 
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procedure as that outlined above, separate data files were then created for the shoppers (i.e., 
individuals with the lowest future-orientation score within their household) and the accountants (i.e., 
individuals with the highest future-orientation score within their household). In cases where spouses 
had equal future orientation scores, it was assumed that the head of household was the accountant. 
The suffixes L and H were added to the responses for each shopper and accountant respectively; and 
these data files were merged with the original data file to create a single household-level data set with 
individual responses from each household shopper and accountant. The data files were visually 
inspected at each step to ensure there were no errors in labeling the responses as described above.  
In cases where only one individual from the household completed the CFC scale, their 
responses where labeled with an H (indicating that they were the accountant) by definition. As such, 
it was necessary to perform and additional analysis and limit the sample to only households where 
both members of the household completed the CFC scale. This resulted in a sample of n = 464 
households. As in Part One of this dissertation, the distribution of household debt ratios was then 
analyzed and extreme observations (i.e., those in the top 5th percentile) were omitted, resulting in a 
sample of n = 459 households (Cunha et al., 2006). Finally, listwise deletion was used to omit 
households with incomplete responses to variables under observation, resulting in a final study 
sample of n = 412 households with complete responses for both members of the couple.  
Empirical Models and Variable Measurement 
The first analysis of part two explored the relationships between the accountant’s future 
orientation, spousal bargaining power, and the household debt ratio. The first research objective was 
to assess the influence of the accountant’s individual future orientation on the household debt ratio, 
controlling for other factors which have been shown to influence household solvency. An adaptation 
of the collective theoretical model was constructed to simplify the development of testable empirical 
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models. This adaptation is shown in Figure 3.1. The corresponding econometric model is shown in 
Equation 3.7.  
Debt ratioj = β1 future orientationB + β2 bargaining powerj + β3 net worthj + β4 net incomej + 
β5 asset tangibilityj + εj                                                                                  (3.7) 
Next, the interaction terms for spousal bargaining power categories and the accountant’s future 
orientation were added to the model, as shown in Equation 3.8, in order to test for moderating effects. 
Debt ratioj = β6 future orientationB + β7 bargaining powerj + β8 net worthj + Β9 net incomej 
+ β10 asset tangibilityj + β11 bargaining powerj x future orientationB + εj        (3.8) 
Bargaining power was measured by three variables following methods similar to Britt et al. 
(2010): age, education, and individual income. Age was first measured continuously by subtracting 
each respondent’s reported birth year from 2014, the year the survey was conducted. Three categories 
for spousal differences in age were then created: each spouse within six years of age, shopper was six 
or more years older than accountant, and accountant was six or more years older than shopper. 
Educational attainment for each respondent was first measured by ordinal categories from 1 (up to 
primary education) to 4 (college education). Three categories for spousal differences in educational 
attainment were then created: each spouse had the same level of education, shopper had higher level 
of education, and accountant had higher level of education.  
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Relationship 
Quality 
Figure 3.1 Simplified Collective Model of Household Capital Structure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As discussed, the DHS calculated a measure of net income for each individual based on 
reported gross income, tax deductions and tax credits, and other economic transactions such as 
parental support given or received. As such, it is possible in some cases for the calculated net income 
to be a negative number. When one spouse reported negative net income, by mathematical definition 
their partner must have reported net income greater than 100% of the total household income. (For 
example, if one spouse reported -€2,000 in net income and their partner reported €102,000, then total 
household income is €100,000 with one spouse contributing -2% of net income and the other 
contributing 102% of net income.) A continuous proportion of household net income contributed by 
each spouse was then calculated by dividing the net income reported for the shopper and accountant 
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respectively by total household net income. Differences in spousal net income were measured 
categorically be creating three categories: both the shopper and accountant contribute between 40% 
and 60% of total net income, the shopper contributes 60% or more of total net income, and the 
accountant contributes 60% or more of total net income. 
Next, the sample was stratified into two groups according to intra-household differences in 
future orientation. The first stratum was comprised of households which exhibited average or below 
differences in future orientation between spouses. (In this study the term spouse is used 
interchangeably with partner or member, and does not refer to marital status.) The second stratum 
was comprised of households with above average differences in spousal future orientation. The 
empirical models shown in Equations 3.7 and 3.8 were then tested separately for each stratum. 
The next analyses examined the relationships the accountant’s future orientation, household 
governance mechanisms, and the household debt ratio. This was accomplished by first modeling the 
household debt ratio as a function of the accountant’s future orientation, as shown in shown in 
Equation 3.9.  
Debt ratioj = β12 future orientationB + β13 governancej + β14 net worthj + Β15 net incomej +  
β16 asset tangibilityj + εj                                                                                                  (3.9) 
Next, the interaction terms for governance mechanism categories and the accountant’s future 
orientation were added to the model, as shown in Equation 3.10, in order to test for moderating 
effects. 
Debt ratioj = β17 future orientationB + β18 governancej + β19 net worthj + Β20 net incomej +  
Β21 asset tangibilityj + β22 governancej x future orientationB + εj                                (3.10) 
Finally, the empirical models shown in Equations 3.9 and 3.10 were tested separately for both strata 
of spousal differences in future orientation. 
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The next set of analyses examined the determinants of household governance mechanisms. 
This was accomplished in part by modeling the probability that household j would adopt management 
structure G as a function of differences in bargaining power µ between members i and p; differences 
in financial knowledge ζ; and the quality of intra-household relationships λ, as shown in Equation 
3.11. 
Pr(Gj = k) = α + β23 |μi – μp| + β24 |ζi – ζp| + β25 λj + εj                                                 (3.11) 
where k ∈ {1, 2, 3}     
Household management structure was measured categorically by a single variable which asked each 
respondent to indicate how the finances were managed in their household. Each respondent could 
indicate one of the following methods of management: (a) I always leave it to my partner to decide 
on financial matters, (b) my partner has more influence than me on financial decisions, (c) my partner 
and I have equal influence on financial decisions, (d) I have more influence on financial decisions 
than my partner does, or (e) my partner always leaves the financial decisions to me. The responses 
from each spouse were paired within each household to create three categories representing the 
management structure of the household: the accountant was dominant in decision-making, the 
shopper was dominant in decision-making, or decisions were made equally. In cases where only one 
spouse answered the question, his or her response was used to represent the management structure of 
the household. In some cases, respondents answered inconsistently with their partner, such as both 
indicating that their partner made the household financial decisions; or both indicating that they were 
dominant in making the financial decisions. In these instances, it was assumed that if neither 
household member monitored financial decisions, or that if both members monitored financial 
decisions, then each partner had an approximately equal opportunity to appropriate resources for 
themselves. Households with such responses were accordingly classified as having a management 
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structure of equal control over decision-making. Interaction terms were calculated by multiplying 
each bargaining power and management structure category by the accountant’s future orientation. 
 Differences in subjective financial knowledge between spouses were also measured in order 
to control for the possibility that authority over financial decision-making might be allocated based 
on context-specific knowledge. Subjective financial knowledge was reported by each individual and 
was measured on a scale from 1 (not knowledgeable) to 4 (very knowledgeable). As with the 
measures of bargaining power, differences in spousal financial knowledge were measured 
categorically by creating three groups: the shopper and accountant reported the same financial 
knowledge, the shopper reported greater financial knowledge, and the accountant reported greater 
financial knowledge. 
 The quality of household relationships was measured by a single variable which asked each 
respondent to characterize their relationship on a scale from 1 (very good relationships between 
members of the household) to 5 (very bad relationships between members of the household). 
Responses to this item were reverse coded so that higher scores indicated more positive assessments 
of the intra-household relationships. The responses from some spouses differed from that of their 
partners. It was assumed that the quality of household relationships was only as good as the lowest 
score reported, and accordingly used the lower score reported by the two spouses as the measure of 
household relationship quality. For example, if one spouse answered that the quality of relationships 
was very good but their partner answered that they were very bad, then this was interpreted and 
recorded as an observation that the quality of relationships was very bad. 
 In addition to modeling the household management structure, the likelihood that household j 
would use separate accounts, S, to manage their finances was modeled as a function of heterogeneity 
in future orientation δ between spouses i and p; differences in spousal bargaining power µ; combined 
65 
financial knowledge ψ; quality of intra-household relationships λ; and combined attitudes toward 
saving φ, as shown in Equation 3.12. 
Pr(Sj = 1) = α + β26 |δi- δp| + β27 |μi – μp| +β28 ψ + β29 λj + β30 φ + εj                              (3.12) 
where ψ = ζi + ζp 
Use of separate accounts was measured by a single item which asked individuals to indicate whether 
they set money aside for particular purposes by using separate bank accounts, jars or envelopes, or 
some other method. Respondents could indicate that they used one of these methods of separating 
funds, or that they did not use such a system. The responses from each household member were used 
to create a dichotomous indicator that the household employed a system of separate accounts. If 
either partner answered that they used one of the systems mentioned for separating funds, this was 
considered an observation that the household used separate accounts. If both partners answered that 
they did not use separate accounts, this was considered an observation that the household did not use 
separate accounts.  
Future orientation was again measured by the modified CFC scale found in the DHS. 
Respondents were asked to indicate their agreement with 12 statements regarding their disposition 
toward thinking about future consequences on a scale from 1 (extremely uncharacteristic) to 7 
(extremely characteristic). Responses to the 12 items were added to form a summative scale 
measured continuously for both shoppers and accountants. The Cronbach’s alpha for the scale was α 
= .74 for both shoppers and accountants, indicating an acceptable level of internal consistency. 
Heterogeneity in spousal future orientation was measured continuously by subtracting the future 
orientation score of the shopper from that of the accountant. 
 Spousal bargaining power was measured by the same variables and in the same manner as 
discussed for the first analysis. Combined financial knowledge, rather than heterogeneity in financial 
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knowledge, was used in the second empirical model. This was done to control for the influence that 
aggregate financial sophistication might have on the household-level behavior of using separate 
accounts. Specifically, it seems plausible that if both spouses have a high level of financial 
knowledge that both spouses would also feel more comfortable using a complex accounting system, 
thereby making their household more likely to respond that they use a system of multiple accounts to 
manage their finances. As discussed previously, the subjective financial knowledge of each spouse 
was measured separately on a scale from 1 (not knowledgeable) to 4 (very knowledgeable). These 
scores were then summed to create a measure of aggregate household subjective financial knowledge 
from 2 (both partners not knowledgeable) to 8 (both partners very knowledgeable). 
 The quality of household relationships was measuring the same way as for the first analysis. 
Finally, a measure of combined spousal attitudes toward saving was included as a control variable 
principally because the use of separate accounts was framed in terms of meeting specific savings 
goals rather than in terms of general financial management. Each partner’s attitude toward savings 
was measured by a single item which asked respondents if they thought that it made sense to save 
money given current economic conditions. Each spouse could answer on a scale from 1 (yes, 
certainly) to 4 (certainly not). Responses were reverse coded so that scores increased with more 
positive attitudes toward saving. The responses from each partner were then summed to create an 
aggregate measure of household attitude towards saving measured on a scale from 2 (both partners 
think it does not make sense to save) to 8 (both member do think it makes sense to save). 
Analytical Methods 
Within the first six analyses of Part Two, the dependent variable in each empirical model was 
the household debt ratio, which was measured continuously. Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression 
was used to analyze each model, although researchers have recently called the use of OLS regression 
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into question when modeling financial ratios. Financial ratios are typically bounded at one or more 
points, and as such, the use of OLS regression can produce biased estimates of beta coefficients as 
errors are clustered around the bounded values (Ramalho & da Silva, 2013). Tobit regression was 
developed as a method of modeling a continuous dependent variable with censored values, and some 
researchers have employed this method when modeling financial ratios (Cuha et al., 2006). A 
limitation of Tobit regression, however, is that its estimation of beta coefficients and standard errors 
is sensitive to non-constant and non-normally distributed residuals. The residuals of each model were 
tested at each step following the procedures outlined by Cameron and Trivedi (2009). Analyses 
suggested that residuals of the empirical models were marked by heteroscedasticity. In such cases, a 
common approach is to estimate a two-part model in which probit regression models the probability 
of the dependent variable being censored (in this case, the probability of having a debt ratio of 0); and 
OLS regression is used to model the continuous, observable responses (Cameron & Trivedi, 2009).  
Within the subsample extracted for analyses in Part Two, no households reported a debt ratio 
of 0. As such, only the second part of a two-part model was tested, and OLS regression was used to 
model the observable debt ratios reported by each household for each empirical model. The White 
test was used to analyze the residuals for each empirical model, and results again suggested that 
residuals were marked by heteroscedasticity. The asymptotic covariance matrix was accordingly used 
to calculate standard errors more robust to the violation of the assumption of homoscedasticity 
(Regression with SAS, 2016).  
The final two analyses in Part Two modeled the household management structure and the use 
of separate accounts. As discussed, the household management structure was measured categorically. 
Accordingly, multinomial logistic regression was used to analyze the likelihood that a household 
chose one management structure over another. Households who indicated that they shared equally in 
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the management of household finances were used as the reference group. Finally, the use of separate 
accounts was modeled as a dichotomous dependent variable, and logistic regression was used to 
analyze the likelihood that households reported using a system of multiple accounts.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
69 
Chapter 4 – Results 
Part One 
Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics for the subsample of household financial respondents are shown in Table 
4.1. The average age of household financial respondents was 55.36 years old (SD = 15.90), and those 
between the ages of 65 and 74 comprised the largest single age group (n = 197). Approximately 63% 
of respondents reported being married, 10% were in cohabitating relationships, and 27% were single. 
In terms of size, households ranged from 1 to 6 members, and the average household was comprised 
of 2.24 members. About 55% of respondents were male, and slightly more than half were employed 
at the time of they completed the survey. Approximately 37% of respondents reported completing no 
more than secondary-level education, 46% of respondents reported having completed vocational 
education, and 17% completed college-level education.  
The mean future orientation was 50.79 (SD = 9.18) on a summative scale from 12 to 84. The 
average respondent reported a slightly negative outlook (M = 2.98, SD = 0.75, where 3 indicated that 
the respondent expected the household economic condition to be about the same in the next five 
years) toward their household finances. Respondents also indicated a generally low level of risk 
tolerance on average (M = 2.38, SD = 0.87), where the highest observed level of risk tolerance was 
5.86 on a scale from 1 (low) to 7 (high).  
The net income of the average household was €21,824 (SD = 21,276). The DHS calculates net 
income based on reported gross income, tax deductions and tax credits, and other income items such 
as alimony paid or received. As such, it is possible in some cases for calculated net income to be a 
negative number. The mean debt ratio was 0.26 (SD = 0.34), indicating a relatively low level of 
leverage on average. Additionally, the average household reported holding approximately 48% of 
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their debt obligations in mortgage and non-consumer debt; and reported holding about 25% of their 
total assets in cash and equivalents. 
Table 4.1 Part One Subsample Descriptive Statistics (n = 824) 
 
n Min Mean Max SD 
Debt ratio 824 0.00 0.26 1.24 0.34 
Ratio of mortgage debt to total debt 824 0.00 0.48 1.00 0.50 
Ratio of cash and equivalents to total assets 824 0.00 0.25 1.00 0.31 
Future orientation 824 21.00 50.79 82.00 9.18 
Risk tolerance 824 0.86 2.38 5.86 0.87 
Attitude toward saving 
               Does not make sense to save 133 0.00 0.16 1.00 0.37 
          Might make sense to save 274 0.00 0.33 1.00 0.47 
          Makes sense to save 408 0.00 0.50 1.00 0.50 
Economic expectations 824 1.00 2.98 5.00 0.75 
Looking for new job 824 0.00 0.13 1.00 0.34 
Employed 824 0.00 0.53 1.00 0.50 
Male 824 0.00 0.55 1.00 0.50 
Age 824 23.00 55.36 89.00 15.90 
Marital status 
               Single 219 0.00 0.27 1.00 0.44 
          Cohabitating 84 0.00 0.10 1.00 0.30 
          Married 521 0.00 0.63 1.00 0.48 
Financial knowledge 824 1.00 2.15 4.00 0.73 
Education 
               Up to secondary education 305 0.00 0.37 1.00 0.48 
          Vocational education 382 0.00 0.46 1.00 0.50 
          College education 137 0.00 0.17 1.00 0.37 
Number of people in household 824 1.00 2.24 6.00 1.13 
Net income 824 -€1,680.00 €21,824.05 €230,532.03 €21,275.57 
Net income categories 
               up to €10,000 284 0.00 0.34 1.00 0.48 
          €10,001 to €30,000 277 0.00 0.34 1.00 0.47 
          €30,001 to €50,000 207 0.00 0.25 1.00 0.43 
          Over €50,000 56 0.00 0.07 1.00 0.25 
Asset tangibility ratio 824 0.00 0.66 1.00 0.35 
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The balance sheet for the average household is shown in Table 4.2. The average household 
reported having approximately €33,160 in cash and equivalents (e.g., amounts in checking accounts, 
savings accounts, and deposit books). Households owed about €100 in payables (i.e., overdrawn 
accounts) and carried an additional €662 in consumer debt, on average. The majority of debt held by 
the average household was in mortgages, and the majority of assets was held in fixed assets. The 
average net worth reported was about €199,808 and ranged from -€97,715 to €5,605,903.  
Table 4.2 Balance Sheet of Average Household in Part One Subsample (n = 824) 
 
Min Mean Max SD 
     
Current assets 
              Cash and equivalents € 0.00 € 33,160.23 € 632,879.00 € 58,094.96 
Non-current assets 
              Certificates of deposit 0.00 310.75 57,750.00 3,143.92 
          Notes receivable 0.00 2,561.51 300,000.00 17,613.73 
          Financial assets 0.00 17,450.60 787,988.94 64,793.09 
          Business interests 0.00 4,720.13 2,000,000.00 71,151.96 
          Fixed assets 0.00 204,225.06 4,058,724.81 261,091.43 
Total assets 0.00 262,117.53 6,285,902.74 338,255.72 
     Accounts payable 0.00 110.32 50,000.00 2,005.23 
Consumer debt 0.00 662.37 116,573.91 6,033.68 
Mortgage debt 0.00 61,536.26 680,000.00 97,487.99 
Total liabilities 0.00 62,308.95 721,100.00 98,255.01 
Household equity -97,715.00 199,808.58 5,605,902.74 306,157.72 
Total liabilities and equity 0.00 262,117.53 6,285,902.74 338,255.72 
     
 
Regression Analyses 
Future Orientation and the Household Debt Ratio 
The results of the Tobit regression are shown in Table 4.3. Model 1 shows the relationship 
between behavioral factors (i.e., future-orientation, risk tolerance, attitudes toward saving, and 
economic expectations) and the latent variable underlying the observed household debt ratio, which 
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was interpreted as the propensity to use financial leverage. Model fit was assessed by calculating the 
predicted values of the debt ratio for each model, and analyzing the correlation between the predicted 
and observed values (SAS Data Analysis Examples, 2016). The squared multiple correlation for 
Model 1 suggests that values of the household debt ratio predicted by only behavioral factors share 
approximately 8.8% of their variance with the observed values of the household debt ratio 
(Regression with SAS, 2015). Model 2 added control variables for demographic characteristics which 
have been shown to influence household saving and borrowing; and the higher squared multiple 
correlation suggests a better model fit when controlling for demographic and lifecycle factors. Model 
3 was the full specification of the empirical model shown in Equation 3.1 and added control variables 
for household financial characteristics. As expected, the full model exhibited the greatest explanatory 
power as exhibited by the squared multiple correlation. 
Contrary to the present alternative hypothesis, future orientation had a small positive 
influence on the propensity to use financial leverage as indicated by the observed household debt 
ratio. When only behavioral factors were included in the model, a one-unit increase in future 
orientation was associated with a .003 unit increase in the latent propensity to use financial leverage. 
Interestingly, when demographic and lifecycle factors were introduced into the model future 
orientation no longer had a statistically significant influence on the propensity to use financial 
leverage. This changed, however, when controlling for demographic and financial characteristic in 
Model 3, which had the greatest level of explanatory power. The results of the complete model 
indicate that a one-unit increase in future orientation was associated with a .001 unit increase in the 
propensity to use leverage. Future orientation was the only behavioral factor shown to have an 
influence on the propensity to use leverage when controlling for demographic and economic factors.  
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Age generally had a negative influence on the latent propensity to use financial leverage. 
Results from the full model suggest that there was not a significant difference between respondents 
younger than 55 years of age. However, respondents age 55 and older had a lower propensity to use 
leverage which generally appeared to increase with age. Sex was also statistically significant, with 
males exhibiting a greater propensity to use leverage than females. Being a male respondent was 
associated with a .039 unit increase in the propensity to use leverage, all else equal. Educational 
attainment also appeared to have a positive relationship with the latent propensity to use financial 
leverage. There was no statistical difference between respondents with up to a vocational college 
education and those with up to a college degree. However, having only up to a secondary level 
education was associated with a .029 unit decrease in the propensity to use leverage relative to those 
with up to a college education.  
Household net income had a positive influence on the propensity to use leverage. Based on 
previous studies which have supported a pecking order model of household capital structure, it was 
initially suspected that households with greater net income would choose to finance investment with 
from retained earnings (i.e., saved income) rather than from debt, which would suggest a negative 
relationship between net income and the household debt ratio (Cunha et al., 2006). The present 
results suggest, however, that households view their net income in terms of debt coverage, and that 
additional increments of net income allow households to engage in additional incremental borrowing.  
Asset tangibility had a positive influence on the latent propensity to use financial leverage, as 
expected. Relative to respondents in the first quartile of asset tangibility, being in the fourth quartile 
was associated with a .402 unit increase in the underlying propensity to lever. Finally, net worth was 
included as a control variable and was negatively associated with a latent propensity to use leverage, 
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as expected. An increase in net worth indicates an increase in residual assets which by definition 
decreases the debt ratio.  
As a post hoc test for robustness, debt ratio quartiles were calculated and a multinomial 
logistic regression was conducted to model the likelihood of a household reporting a debt ratio within 
each quartile, relative to the lowest debt ratio quartile. As discussed, the modeling financial of 
variables is inherently problematic due to violations of the assumptions undergirding OLS and Tobit 
regression analyses. Multinomial logistic regression was chosen as the method for a post hoc test 
because it uses the maximum likelihood method of estimation and does not make the same 
distributional assumptions as OLS or Tobit regression, thus making it robust to errors. For this post 
hoc analysis net income, asset tangibility, and net worth were measured continuously in order to 
reduce the complexity of interpreting the regression results.    
Household net income was measured using the log of net income, asset tangibility using the 
unmodified asset tangibility ratio (discussed previously), and net worth using the log of modified net 
worth. Modified net worth was calculated by adding the absolute value of the lowest (i.e., negative) 
observed value of net worth plus €1 to all observations of net worth. This was done to ensure that all 
observations of modified net worth would be greater than 0, allowing for the calculation of its log. 
The results of this analysis are reported in Table 4.4 and were generally consistent with the findings 
discussed above; although they suggest a more nuanced relationship between future orientation and 
the propensity to use leverage. Specifically, an increase in future orientation was associated with a 
decreased likelihood of reporting a debt ratio in the second quartile relative to the first quartile. 
Conversely, an increase in future orientation was also associated with an increased likelihood of 
reporting a debt ratio in the highest quartile relative to the first quartile. 
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Table 4.3 Hierarchical Tobit Regression Predicting Household Debt Ratio (n = 824)  
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 
β SE β SE β SE 
Intercept -0.327*** 0.081 0.170 0.110 0.002 0.110 
Future orientation 0.003** 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001** 0.001 
Risk tolerance 0.030** 0.013 0.005 0.013 0.007 0.013 
Attitude toward saving (vs. does 
not make sense) 
                Might make sense to save 0.016 0.034 0.010 0.032 -0.004 0.032 
          Makes sense to save 0.013 0.032 -0.014 0.031 0.004 0.031 
Economic expectations 0.115*** 0.015 0.040** 0.016 -0.001 0.016 
Looking for new job 
  
0.059* 0.034 -0.009 0.034 
Employed 
  
0.049* 0.030 0.001 0.030 
Male 
  
0.088*** 0.023 0.039*** 0.023 
Age (vs. 16 to 34) 
                35 to 44 
  
-0.049 0.039 0.003 0.039 
          45 to 54 
  
-0.227*** 0.045 -0.018 0.045 
          55 to 64 
  
-0.215*** 0.044 -0.068*** 0.044 
          65 to 74 
  
-0.233*** 0.051 -0.076*** 0.051 
          75 and over 
  
-0.281*** 0.057 -0.073*** 0.057 
Marital status (vs. single) 
               Married 
  
-0.057* 0.032 -0.009 0.032 
         Cohabitating 
  
0.014 0.042 -0.004 0.042 
Financial knowledge 
  
0.007 0.015 0.0112* 0.015 
Education (vs. college education) 
                Up to secondary education 
  
-0.017 0.034 -0.029** 0.034 
          Vocational education 
  
-0.040 0.031 -0.016 0.031 
Number of people in household 
  
0.032** 0.014 0.001 0.014 
Net income (vs. less than €10,001) 
                €10,001 to €30,000 
    
0.002 0.010 
          €30,001 to €50,000 
    
0.086*** 0.011 
          Over €50,000 
    
0.175*** 0.018 
Asset tangibility (vs. first quartile) 
                Second quartile 
    
0.290*** 0.014 
          Third quartile 
    
0.338*** 0.014 
          Fourth quartile 
    
0.402*** 0.018 
Net worth (vs. first quartile) 
                Second quartile 
    
-0.561*** 0.020 
          Third quartile 
    
-0.528*** 0.017 
          Fourth quartile 
    
-0.788*** 0.018 
R2 8.79%    22.78%    89.30% 
 *p < .1. **p < .05. ***p < .01. 
 
 
 
      
76 
Table 4.4 Multinomial Logistic Regression Predicting Debt Ratio Categories (n = 824) 
Variable Second quartile vs. first quartile Third quartile vs. first quartile Fourth quartile vs. first quartile 
 β SE β SE β SE 
Intercept   276.389*** 65.796   132.526*** 41.156 1616.015*** 167.825 
Future orientation     -0.029** 0.013       0.002 0.013       0.037* 0.020 
Risk tolerance      0.004 0.143       0.045 0.133       0.140 0.203 
Attitude toward saving (vs. does not make sense) 
                Might make sense to save      0.267 0.337       0.025 0.319      -0.433 0.492 
          Makes sense to save      0.240 0.321       0.206 0.312       0.039 0.468 
Economic expectations    -0.016 0.178       0.196 0.181       0.252 0.253 
Looking for new job     0.307 0.415      -0.211 0.464       0.433 0.513 
Employed    -0.459 0.318      -0.169 0.303       0.258 0.478 
Male    -0.568** 0.246       0.655*** 0.253       0.750** 0.362 
Age (vs. 16 to 34) 
                35 to 44    -1.052* 0.546      -0.102 0.635       0.375 0.681 
          45 to 54    -1.210** 0.578      -0.112 0.654      -0.549 0.774 
          55 to 64    -1.178** 0.571      -0.391 0.646      -1.904** 0.783 
          65 to 74    -1.058* 0.621      -0.840 0.703      -1.348 0.881 
          75 and over    -1.883*** 0.673      -1.106 0.746      -2.148** 1.043 
Marital status (vs. single) 
                Married    -0.440 0.352      -0.414 0.349      -0.075 0.525 
          Cohabitating    -0.635 0.516      -0.422 0.535      -0.207 0.679 
Financial knowledge     0.336* 0.174       0.254 0.164       0.381* 0.230 
Education (vs. college education) 
                Up to secondary education     0.349 0.402      -0.649* 0.386      -1.639*** 0.565 
          Vocational education     0.312 0.383      -0.498 0.366      -1.754*** 0.528 
Number of people in household     0.161 0.178       0.144 0.082       0.090 0.227 
Log net income     0.007 0.081       0.144* 0.082       0.636*** 0.135 
Asset tangibility ratio    -1.012* 0.409       3.911*** 0.480       9.939*** 0.894 
Log net worth -17.797*** 4.300     -8.897*** 2.695  -105.961*** 10.971 
*p < .1. **p < .05. ***p < .01.       
77 
Future Orientation and Household Asset Allocation 
Results of the fractional logistic regression analyses predicting the proportion of total 
assets held in cash are shown in Table 4.5. Model 1 is an abbreviated model which includes only 
personal factors; Model 2 adds variables to control for household demographic characteristics; 
and Model 3 is the full multivariate model specified in Equation 3.2. Model fit was assessed by 
analyzing the squared multiple correlation for each model (SAS Data Analysis Examples, 2016). 
The squared multiple correlation for the full model (i.e., Model 3) was R2 = .47, p < .001, 
indicating that the predicted values of the cash ratio share about 47% of their variance with the 
observed values of the cash-to-total assets ratio.  
The present results do not support the alternative hypothesis that future orientation is 
negatively associated with the proportion of total assets held in cash. Rather, the present results 
suggest that future orientation has no influence on the cash-to-total assets ratio. The present 
results also suggest that the proportion of total assets held in cash first declines with age, but then 
increases in retirement years. The statistical significance of age disappears, however, when 
controlling for net income and net worth. Further, net income appeared to have no influence on 
the proportion of total assets allocated to cash while net worth appeared to have a generally 
positive influence on cash-holding. Specifically, however, individuals who reported net worth in 
the second quartile also reported holding the most cash relative to those in other net worth 
quartiles. Those in the third quartile also held a larger proportion of total assets in cash than those 
in the first quartile, but not as much as those in the second quartile. Finally, there was no 
difference in the proportion of total assets held in cash between individuals in the first and fourth 
net worth quartiles. 
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Table 4.5 Fractional Logistic Regression Predicting Cash to Total Assets (n = 824) 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 
β SE β SE β SE 
Intercept 0.238 0.414  2.183*** 0.606 -1.362** 0.643 
Future orientation -0.005 0.006 -0.008 0.007  0.008 0.006 
Risk tolerance -0.179** 0.069 -0.165** 0.072 -0.172** 0.070 
Attitude toward saving (vs. does 
not make sense) 
                Might make sense to save -0.195 0.175 -0.161 0.175 -0.147 0.169 
          Makes sense to save 0.025 0.164  0.061 0.167  0.126 0.161 
Economic outlook -0.197** 0.080 -0.291*** 0.087 -0.200** 0.084 
Looking for new job 
  
 0.173 0.182  0.323* 0.180 
Employed 
  
-0.375** 0.166 -0.142 0.158 
Male 
  
-0.218* 0.125  0.014 0.122 
Age (vs. 16 to 34) 
                35 to 44 
  
-0.415** 0.210 -0.174 0.210 
          45 to 54 
  
-0.416* 0.242  0.020 0.243 
          55 to 64 
  
-1.101*** 0.248 -0.357 0.248 
          65 to 74 
  
-0.944*** 0.277 -0.126 0.278 
          75 and over 
  
-0.734** 0.308  0.246 0.309 
Marital status (vs. single) 
                Married 
  
 0.007 0.177  0.206 0.173 
          Cohabitating 
  
-0.176 0.235  0.042 0.229 
Financial knowledge 
  
 0.001 0.084  0.024 0.083 
Educational (vs. college education) 
                Up to secondary education 
  
-0.240 0.182 -0.400** 0.178 
          Vocational education 
  
-0.441*** 0.167 -0.529*** 0.165 
Number of people in household 
  
-0.169** 0.081 -0.144* 0.078 
Net income (vs. less than €10,001) 
                €10,001 to €30,000 
    
 0.166 0.134 
          €30,001 to €50,000 
    
 0.130 0.160 
          Over €50,000 
    
-0.197 0.295 
Net worth (vs. first quartile) 
                Second quartile 
    
 3.018*** 0.272 
          Third quartile 
    
 1.101*** 0.276 
          Fourth quartile 
    
 0.457 0.290 
R2 2.28% 
 
7.32% 
 
47.30% 
 *p < .1. **p < .05. ***p < .01. 
       
 Consistent with other expectations, risk tolerance was negatively associated with the 
proportion of total assets allocated to cash. Individuals with more positive expectations for future 
economic conditions allocated a smaller proportion of total assets to cash. Conversely, 
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individuals who reported that they were looking for a job held more in cash than those who were 
not looking for a new job, all else equal. Clear differences were observed in the level of 
educational attainment and the proportion of assets allocated to cash. Individuals who reported 
completing only up to secondary education held less cash than those with up to a university-level 
education; however, those with a vocational education held an even smaller proportion of assets 
in cash compared to those with a university-level education.  
Future Orientation and Household Debt Structure 
Results of the fractional logistic regression analyses predicting the proportion of debt 
comprised of mortgage and non-consumer debt are shown in Table 4.6. Similar to the previous 
analyses, Model 1 is an abbreviated model which includes only personal factors; Model 2 adds 
variables to control for household demographic characteristics; and Model 3 is the full 
multivariate model specified in Equation 3.3. As with the previous analyses, model fit was 
assessed by analyzing the squared multiple correlation for each model (SAS Data Analysis 
Examples, 2016). The squared multiple correlation for Model 1 was R2 = .02, p < .001, 
indicating that the predicted values of the cash ratio share about 1.70% of their variance with the 
observed values of the cash ratio. The squared multiple correlation for Model 2 was R2 = .06, p < 
.001, and that for Model 3 was R2 = .54, p < .001, again indicating a successively better model fit 
when including demographic and financial characteristics. 
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Table 4.6 Fractional Logistic Regression Predicting Mortgage Debt Ratio (n = 824) 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 
β SE β SE β SE 
Intercept -1.665*** 0.507 -2.204*** 0.772 -5.848*** 1.276 
Future orientation  0.007 0.008 -0.003 0.009  0.002 0.013 
Risk tolerance  0.114 0.083 -0.026 0.090  0.070 0.131 
Attitude toward saving (vs. does not 
make sense) 
                Might make sense to save  0.211 0.211 0.231 0.221  0.030 0.320 
          Makes sense to save  0.173 0.201 0.222 0.213  0.076 0.312 
Economic outlook  0.267*** 0.097 0.256** 0.111  0.253 0.169 
Looking for new job 
  
0.238 0.235  0.369 0.370 
Employed 
  
0.277 0.208 -0.109 0.311 
Male 
  
0.592*** 0.158  0.517** 0.238 
Age (vs. 16 to 34) 
                35 to 44 
  
0.363 0.268 -0.313 0.427 
          45 to 54 
  
0.225 0.314 -0.593 0.527 
          55 to 64 
  
0.482 0.307 -0.905* 0.516 
          65 to 74 
  
0.399 0.355 -1.206** 0.585 
          75 and over 
  
0.164 0.403 -1.451** 0.647 
Marital status (vs. single) 
                Married 
  
 0.083 0.226 -0.173 0.333 
          Cohabitating 
  
-0.206 0.295 -0.581 0.457 
Financial knowledge 
  
 0.280*** 0.107  0.469*** 0.160 
Educational (vs. college education) 
                Up to secondary education 
  
-0.283 0.236 -0.502 0.364 
          Vocational education 
  
-0.157 0.216 -0.300 0.338 
Number of people in household 
  
 0.039 0.098 -0.073 0.154 
Net income (vs. less than €10,001) 
                €10,001 to €30,000 
    
 0.441* 0.261 
          €30,001 to €50,000 
    
 0.989*** 0.292 
          Over €50,000 
    
 3.565*** 0.721 
Asset tangibility (vs. first quartile) 
                Second quartile 
    
 4.001*** 0.415 
          Third quartile 
    
 4.897*** 0.442 
          Fourth quartile 
    
 3.150*** 0.516 
Net worth (vs. first quartile) 
                Second quartile 
    
 0.760 0.607 
          Third quartile 
    
 2.811*** 0.488 
          Fourth quartile 
    
 0.388 0.487 
R2 1.70% 
 
6.43% 
 
53.60% 
 *p < .1. **p < .05. ***p < .01.       
 
81 
 The present results do not support the alternative hypothesis that future orientation is 
positively associated with the ratio of mortgage and non-consumer debt to total debt. 
Interestingly, male respondents reported debt structures characterized by a higher proportion of 
debt derived from mortgages and non-consumer borrowing. Financial knowledge was also 
positively associated with mortgage debt, and this relationship was more pronounced when 
controlling for the financial characteristics of the household. Net income was positively 
associated with mortgage borrowing, with those in the highest net income category reporting 
much higher mortgage debt ratios relative to those in the lowest net income category. Asset 
tangibility appeared to have a generally positive but potentially curvilinear relationship with the 
proportion of total debt comprised of mortgage and non-consumer debt. Respondents in the 
second quartile of asset tangibility reported higher proportions of mortgage debt relative to those 
in the first quartile; and those in the third quartile reported even greater mortgage borrowing. 
However, while respondents with the highest degree of concentration in tangible assets reported 
borrowing a greater proportion of debt via mortgages relative to those with the first quartile of 
asset tangibility, the proportion of mortgage debt was not as great as those in the second and 
third quartiles. Similarly, there appeared to be no difference in the debt structure of respondents 
in the first, second and fourth net worth quartiles. However, those in the third net worth quartile 
reported holding a greater proportion of mortgage and non-consumer debt.  
 Age appeared to have a generally negative relationship the ratio of mortgage debt to total 
debt. When controlling for financial characteristics, there appears to be no difference in the 
relative amount of mortgage borrowing between respondents in age groups from 16 to 54. 
However, respondents in the progressively older age groups reported successively smaller 
proportions of mortgage and non-consumer borrowing.  
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Part Two 
Descriptive Statistics 
The descriptive statistics for the individuals sampled in part two are shown in Table 4.7. 
The average household accountant was 51.01 years old (SD = 15.62), the average shopper was 
51.09 years old (SD = 15.58), and the average age difference between the accountant and 
shopper within each household was 3.47 years (SD = 3.63). Approximately 51% of household 
accounts were male, while only 48% of shoppers were male. A majority of households (58%) 
reported that accountants and shoppers had the same level of education; while approximately 
23% reported that accountants had completed a greater level of education, and 19% reported that 
shoppers had completed a greater level of education. With the group of households with spouses 
that reported the same level of educational attainment: approximately 1% reported that both had 
completed only an elementary level of education, 42% reported that both spouses completed up 
to secondary education, 14% reported that both had completed up to senior vocational college, 
and 43% reported that both spouses had completed up to a university education. 
On average, household accountants reported higher net income (M = 15,011.49, SD = 
18,611.51) than shoppers (M = 14,113.77, SD = 21,673.13); and reported contributing a slightly 
higher percentage of household net income (M = 0.40, SD = 0.41) compared to shoppers (M = 
.39, SD = .41). By definition household accountants reported a higher level of future orientation 
(M = 53.89, SD = 7.64) than shoppers (M = 46.14, SD = 7.57). The average intra-household 
difference between accountants and shoppers in future orientation scores was 7.75 units (SD = 
6.48). Accountants also reported having slightly more financial knowledge (M = 2.17, SD = 
0.77) than accountants (M = 2.07, SD = 0.70). 
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Household-level characteristics are shown in Table 4.8. The average household reported 
total net income of €29,671.20 (SD = 28,614.49) and also reported holding approximately 77% 
(SD = 0.27) of its assets in tangible assets. The average household debt ratio was 0.37 (SD = 
0.40), indicating that the average household financed approximately 37% of its assets with debt. 
A majority of households reported that the accountant and shopper were essentially the same age 
(M = 0.82, SD = 0.39) and had the same level of educational attainment (M = 0.58, SD = 0.49). 
By comparison, household accountants and shoppers were less equal in bargaining power in 
terms of net income contributed to the household. Approximately 58% of households reported 
that the accountant contributed over 60% of household net income. In terms of management 
practices, 57% of households reported using a system of separate accounts, and a majority of 
households (61%) reporting sharing control over household financial management.  
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Table 4.7 Part Two Subsample Individual Descriptive Statistics (n = 412) 
Variable Mean SD Min Max 
Age 
         Accountant 51.01 15.62 20.00 84.00 
     Shopper 51.09 15.58 24.00 87.00 
     Difference 3.47 3.63 0.00 25.00 
Sex 
         Accountant male 0.51 0.50 0.00 1.00 
     Shopper male 0.48 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Educational attainment 
         Accountant more education 0.23 0.42 0.00 1.00 
     Shopper more education 0.19 0.39 0.00 1.00 
     Same education 0.58 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Net Income 
         Accountant € 15,011.49 € 18,611.51 -€ 1,959.00 € 137,696.06 
     Shopper 14,113.77 21,673.13 -3,013.25 230,532.03 
Percent income contributed 
         Accountant 0.40 0.41 -0.31 1.03 
     Shopper 0.39 0.41 -0.03 1.31 
Financial knowledge 
         Accountant 2.17 0.77 1.00 4.00 
     Shopper 2.07 0.70 1.00 4.00 
Future orientation 
         Accountant 53.89 7.64 27.00 78.00 
     Shopper 46.14 7.57 18.00 72.00 
     Difference 7.75 6.48 0.00 33.00 
n = 412     
 
The balance sheet of the average household is shown in Table 4.9. The average 
household reported having approximately €35,829 in cash and equivalents. Households owed 
about €152 in payables and carried an additional €826 in consumer debt, on average. As with the 
first subsample from Part One of this dissertation, the majority of debt held by the average 
household was in mortgages, and the majority of assets was held in fixed assets. The average net 
worth reported was about €198,299 and ranged from -€114,717 to €2,383,555. 
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Table 4.8 Part Two Subsample Household Characteristics (n = 412) 
 Mean SD 
Net income € 29,671.20 € 28,614.49 
Debt ratio  0.37 0.40 
Asset tangibility ratio 0.77 0.27 
Age bargaining power   
     Accountant more than 6 years older 0.09 0.29 
     Same age (within 6 years of age) 0.82 0.39 
     Shopper more than 6 years older 0.09 0.29 
Education bargaining power   
     Accountant more education 0.23 0.42 
     Same education 0.58 0.49 
     Shopper more education 0.19 0.39 
Income bargaining power   
     Accountant contributes over 60% of income 0.58 0.49 
     Accountant and shopper contribute 40 - 60% of income 0.09 0.29 
     Shopper contributes over 60% of income 0.32 0.47 
Household uses separate accounts 0.57 0.50 
Household management structure   
     Accountant controls finances 0.23 0.42 
     Equal control over finances 0.61 0.49 
     Shopper controls finances 0.17 0.37 
n = 412   
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Table 4.9 Balance Sheet of Average Household in Part Two Subsample (n = 412) 
 Min Mean Max SD 
     
Current assets     
     Cash and equivalents € 0.00 € 35,828.68 € 632,879.00 € 64,232.74 
Non-current assets 
         Notes receivable 0.00 3,266.54 300,000.00 21,852.33 
     Financial assets 0.00 16,549.22 750,000.00 63,384.79 
     Business interests 0.00 1,664.08 150,000.00 10,154.41 
     Fixed assets 0.00 235,792.71 2,306,502.25 215,399.57 
Total assets 0.00 293,101.24 2,383,555.25 267,499.76 
 
    Accounts payable 0.00 152.00 38,037.00 1,957.79 
Consumer debt 0.00 826.26 97,260.63 5,507.76 
Mortgage debt 0.00 93,823.87 690,000.00 115,979.13 
Total liabilities 0.00 94,802.12 698,379.80 116,528.38 
Household equity -114,717.32 198,299.11 2,383,555.25 258,677.01 
Total liabilities and equity 0.00 293,101.24 2,383,555.25 267,499.76 
     
 
Regression Analyses 
Bargaining Power, Governance, and Household Capital Structure 
The first three analyses of Part Two modeled Equations 3.9 and 3.10 in order to analyze 
the moderating effects of spousal bargaining power on the influence of accountants’ future 
orientation on household debt ratios. The results of the first analysis are shown in Table 4.11. 
Consistent with the analyses in Part One of this dissertation, and contrary to the present 
alternative hypothesis, the future orientation of accountants had a small positive influence on 
household debt ratios. Consistent with prior studies, household net worth and asset tangibility 
also influenced household debt ratios. Surprisingly, however, the influence of net income on 
observed household debt ratios was not statistically significant. The only bargaining power 
variable that had a statistically significant influence on observed debt ratios was the percentage 
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of household net income contributed by the shopper. Reporting that the shopper contributed over 
60% of household net income was associated with a 0.062 unit decrease in the reported 
household debt ratio.  
When interaction terms were included in the model, the direct influence of accountants’ 
future orientation on the debt ratio was no longer statistically significant, and only the interaction 
between educational attainment and accountants’ future orientation was significant. This was an 
indication that the influence of accountants’ future orientation on household debt ratios was fully 
moderated by spouses having the same level of educational attainment. A point of clarity is 
required regarding the interpretation of coefficients when interaction terms are included in the 
empirical model. A simplified version of Equation 3.10 is shown in Equation 4.1, which for 
illustrative purposes models only the effects of the accountant’s future orientation and the 
spouses having the same level of educational attainment on the household debt ratio. A 
corresponding numerical example using the present empirical results is shown in Table 4.10.  
Debt ratioj = β1 future orientationB + β2 same educationj + β3 same educationj x future 
orientationB                          (4.1) 
As shown in Table 4.11, when interaction terms were included in the empirical model, the future 
orientation of the accountant did not have a statistically significant direct influence on the 
reported household debt ratio. In other words, the direct effects of the accountant’s future 
orientation on the household debt ratio were not statistically different from zero, controlling for 
interactions with spousal bargaining power variables. As such, the coefficient for the 
accountant’s future orientation shown in Equation 4.1, β1, is interpreted as being essentially 
equal to zero. The focus of interpretation then becomes the moderating variables (i.e., in this 
case, spouses reporting the same level of educational attainment).  
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As can be seen, the coefficient for the direct effects of having the same level of 
educational attainment, β2, must be interpreted as the unit change in the observed household debt 
ratio when the household reports that the couple has the same level of educational attainment and 
the accountant’s future orientation score is equal to zero (i.e., the accountant has average future 
orientation relative to all household accountants, since this variable was standardized). For 
example, the present results suggest that when the household accountant has an average level of 
future orientation (compared to other household accountants, i.e., future orientation equals zero), 
then reporting that both spouses have an equal level of educational attainment is associated with 
a 0.372 unit decrease in the reported household debt ratio, compared to households where the 
accountant has completed a higher level of education. The effects of a one unit increase in the 
accountant’s future orientation on the household debt ratio is then the sum of the coefficient for 
the direct effects of future orientation on the debt ratio, and the coefficients of terms interacted 
with future orientation. For example, for households which reported that spouses had an equal 
level of educational attainment, a one unit increase in the accountant’s future orientation (i.e., a 
one standard deviation increase in future orientation) was associated with a 0.480 unit increase in 
the observed debt ratio.     
Table 4.10 Numerical Example of Coefficient Interpretation with Interactions 
 Accountant future 
orientation = 0 
Accountant future 
orientation = 1 
   
β2 Same educational attainment -0.372 -0.372 
β3 Same education x accountant future orientation  0.000  0.852 
Total effect on debt ratio -0.372 0.480 
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As demonstrated above, the present results suggest that the future orientation of the 
accountant has a positive influence on the household debt ratio, dependent on whether or not the 
spouses within the household have the same level of education. Interestingly, however, the 
relationship between the accountant’s future orientation and the household debt ratio appeared to 
reverse when the households reported that the shopper had a higher level of educational 
attainment. Specifically, when the accountant reported an average level of future orientation, the 
shopper having a higher level of educational attainment was associated with a 0.099 unit 
decrease in the debt ratio. When the future orientation of the accountant increased by one 
standard deviation, the shopper having a higher level of educational attainment was associated 
with a 0.170 unit decrease in the debt ratio. In other words, the future orientation of the 
accountant had a negative influence on the reported household debt ratio, dependent on the 
household reporting that the shopper had a higher level of educational attainment.  
The results for the second analysis, which analyzed the stratum of households with 
relatively homogeneous spousal future orientation, shown in Table 4.12, were generally 
consistent with those of the first: the future orientation of the accountant had a positive influence 
on the reported debt ratio; and net worth and asset tangibility were the only economic variables 
that had a statistically significant relationship with the debt ratio. Additionally, the influence of 
the accountant’s future orientation on the household debt ratio appeared to be completed 
moderated by spousal bargaining power. When the household accountant had an average level of 
future orientation, both spouses having the same level of education was associated with a 0.317 
unit decrease in the debt ratio, compared to households where the accountant had a higher level 
of educational attainment. For these same households, however, a one standard deviation 
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increase in the accountant’s future orientation was associated with a 0.549 unit increase in the 
household debt ratio.  
The results for age differences have a similar interpretation within this stratum of 
relatively homogeneous households. When the accountant had an average level of future 
orientation, reporting that the spouses were of equal age had no influence on the household debt 
ratio. Yet, a one standard deviation increase in the accountant’s future orientation was associated 
with a 0.102 unit increase in the debt ratio when the spouses were the same age. Interestingly, 
within the stratum of households that reported relatively homogeneous spousal future orientation, 
the only bargaining power conditions that were significant were the spouses having the same age 
and the same educational attainment. Specifically, the influence on the debt ratio of the shopper 
having a greater level of educational attainment was statistically no different than that for 
households where the accountant had a higher level of education. Similarly, the influence on the 
debt ratio of the shopper being older was statistically no different than that for households where 
the accountant was older. This suggests that the question of a particular spouse having greater 
bargaining power is less important than the binary question or whether or not the spouses have 
equal bargaining power, at least in the condition where the spouses are in relative agreement 
regarding their future orientation. 
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Table 4.11 Bargaining Power Predicting Debt Ratio, Complete Sample (n = 412) 
 β SE β SE 
Accountant's future orientation  0.031** 0.016  0.011 0.032 
Age difference (vs. accountant older) 
         Same age -0.014 0.060 -0.094** 0.047 
     Shopper older  0.045 0.071 -0.014 0.056 
Education difference (vs. accountant more education) 
         Same education -0.043 0.040 -0.372*** 0.038 
     Shopper more education -0.051 0.049 -0.099* 0.051 
Income difference (vs. accountant contributes over 60%) 
         Shopper contributes 40 - 60%  -0.075 0.061  0.005 0.045 
     Shopper contributes over 60% -0.062* 0.037  0.005 0.025 
Log of household net worth -0.214*** 0.066 -0.082** 0.039 
log of household net income  0.025 0.017  0.003 0.011 
Asset tangibility ratio (vs. first tercile)  
         Second tercile  0.221*** 0.037  0.123*** 0.028 
     Third tercile  0.254*** 0.040  0.140*** 0.030 
Same age x accountant's future orientation 
  
 0.025 0.032 
Shopper older x accountant's future orientation 
  
-0.007 0.036 
Same education x accountant's future orientation 
  
 0.852*** 0.038 
Shopper more education x accountant's future orientation 
  
-0.071* 0.041 
Shopper contributes 40 - 60% of income x accountant's future orientation 
  
-0.015 0.032 
Shopper contributes over 60% of income x accountant's future orientation 
  
-0.002 0.023 
R2 33.16%  66.10%  
*p < .1. **p < .05. ***p < .01.     
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Table 4.12 Bargaining Power Predicting Debt Ratio, Homogeneous Future Orientation (n = 215) 
 β SE β SE 
Accountant's future orientation  0.056** 0.024 -0.038 0.058 
Age difference (vs. accountant older) 
         Same age -0.054 0.086 -0.077 0.055 
     Shopper older  0.042 0.098 -0.011 0.073 
Education difference (vs. accountant more education) 
         Same education -0.006 0.052 -0.317*** 0.046 
     Shopper more education  0.027 0.059  0.006 0.068 
Income difference (vs. accountant contributes over 60%) 
         Shopper contributes 40 - 60%  -0.060 0.078 -0.020 0.049 
     Shopper contributes over 60%  0.007 0.052  0.058* 0.034 
Log of household net worth -0.162*** 0.055 -0.054* 0.031 
log of household net income -0.016 0.023 -0.012 0.015 
Asset tangibility ratio (vs. first tercile)  
         Second tercile  0.227*** 0.050  0.139*** 0.035 
     Third tercile  0.269*** 0.053  0.144*** 0.035 
Same age x accountant's future orientation 
  
 0.102* 0.052 
Shopper older x accountant's future orientation 
  
 0.080 0.056 
Same education x accountant's future orientation 
  
 0.866*** 0.037 
Shopper more education x accountant's future orientation 
  
-0.038 0.080 
Shopper contributes 40 - 60% of income x accountant's future orientation 
  
-0.020 0.043 
Shopper contributes over 60% of income x accountant's future orientation 
  
-0.014 0.046 
R2 31.06%  69.33%  
*p < .1. **p < .05. ***p < .01.     
 
 
 
93 
Table 4.13 Bargaining Power Predicting Debt Ratio, Heterogeneous Future Orientation (n = 197) 
 β SE β SE 
Accountant's future orientation  0.009 0.020  0.026 0.037 
Age difference (vs. accountant older) 
         Same age  0.034 0.077 -0.061 0.063 
     Shopper older -0.004 0.097  0.001 0.071 
Education difference (vs. accountant more education) 
         Same education -0.053 0.051 -0.367*** 0.053 
     Shopper more education -0.129 0.081 -0.161* 0.085 
Income difference (vs. accountant contributes over 60%) 
         Shopper contributes 40 - 60%  -0.102 0.089  0.025 0.094 
     Shopper contributes over 60% -0.089 0.059 -0.054 0.050 
Log of household net worth -0.362*** 0.032 -0.178*** 0.040 
log of household net income  0.059** 0.028  0.018 0.020 
Asset tangibility ratio (vs. first tercile)  
         Second tercile  0.213*** 0.051  0.118*** 0.041 
     Third tercile  0.212*** 0.057  0.136*** 0.047 
Same age x accountant's future orientation 
  
-0.017 0.040 
Shopper older x accountant's future orientation 
  
-0.070 0.046 
Same education x accountant's future orientation 
  
 0.765*** 0.053 
Shopper more education x accountant's future orientation 
  
-0.072 0.047 
Shopper contributes 40 - 60% of income x accountant's future orientation 
  
-0.019 0.066 
Shopper contributes over 60% of income x accountant's future orientation 
  
 0.038 0.034 
R2 43.85%  66.20%  
*p < .1. **p < .05. ***p < .01.     
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Table 4.13 shows the results of the third analysis, which modeled Equations 3.7 and 3.8 
using the stratum of household reporting relatively heterogeneous spousal future orientation. In 
this condition, there was no evidence that the influence of the accountant’s future orientation on 
the household debt ratio was moderated by spousal bargaining power, as the direct effects of the 
accountant’s future orientation on the debt ratio were not statistically significant with and 
without controlling for interactions with bargaining power variables. However, the results were 
generally consistent with the previous two analyses with regard to the relationship between 
differences in spousal educational attainment and the reported household debt ratio. As found 
with the complete sample and with the stratum of homogeneous households, the results of the 
third analysis suggest that the influence on the debt ratio of both spouses having the same level 
of educational attainment is dependent on the accountant’s future orientation. When the spouses 
reported a relatively greater difference in their levels of future orientation, and when the 
accountant had an average level of future orientation, reporting that the spouses had an equal 
level of educational attainment was associated with a 0.367 unit decrease in the debt ratio. Under 
the same conditions, a one standard deviation increase in the accountant’s future orientation was 
associated with a 0.398 unit increase in the household debt ratio. Interestingly, however, the 
results of this analysis differed from those of the first and second in that, when controlling for 
interactions with the accountant’s future orientation, reporting that the shopper had a higher level 
of educational attainment was associated with a 0.161 unit decrease in the household debt ratio 
irrespective of changes in the accountant’s level of future orientation.  
The next three analyses of Part Two modeled Equations 3.9 and 3.10 in order to analyze 
the moderating effects of household governance mechanisms on the influence of accountants’ 
future orientation on household debt ratios. The results of the fourth analysis are shown in Table 
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4.14. Similar to all other results, the future orientation of the accountant appeared to have a small 
positive influence on the household debt ratio. However, there was no evidence to reject the null 
hypothesis for this analysis that governance mechanisms do not moderate the influence the 
accountant’s future orientation on the household debt ratio. While the influence of the 
accountant’s future orientation on the debt ratio was not statistically significant when controlling 
for interactions with household governance structure and the use of separate accounts, the 
interaction terms were also not statistically significant. Additionally, the model exhibited a 
slightly worse model fit when including interaction terms R2 = .32, F(11, 412) = 19.12, p < .001 
compared to the model without interaction terms R2 = .33, F(8, 412) = 26.20, p < .001. (This is 
likely due to the inclusion of additional variables – the interaction terms – without increasing the 
explanatory power of the model.)       
Table 4.15 shows the results of the fifth analysis, which analyzed the moderating effects 
of household governance mechanisms on the influence of accountants’ future orientation on 
household debt ratios for the stratum of households with relatively homogeneous future 
orientation. Again, the future orientation of the accountant appeared to have a small positive 
influence on the household debt ratio. When interaction terms were included in the model, the 
household governance structure appeared to completely moderate the influence of the 
accountant’s future orientation on the debt ratio. When the accountant reported an average level 
of future orientation, the household governance structure appeared to have no influence on the 
debt ratio. However, when the shopper controlled the finances an increase in the accountant’s 
future orientation by one standard deviation was associated with a 0.174 unit increase in the debt 
ratio. With regard to the household accounting system, there was no evidence to reject the null 
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hypothesis that the use of separate accounts does not moderate the influence of the accountant’s 
future orientation on the household debt ratio.    
The results of the sixth analysis are shown in Table 4.16. Within the stratum of 
households exhibiting relative heterogeneity in spousal future orientation, neither the future 
orientation of accountants nor the use of governance mechanisms appeared to have any influence 
on household debt ratios. As with the fourth analysis, the model exhibited a slightly worse model 
fit when interaction terms were included, R2 = .41, F(11, 197) = 13.49, p < .001, compared to the 
model without interaction terms, R2 = .42, F(8, 197) = 18.70, p < .001.     
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Table 4.14 Governance Predicting Debt Ratio, Complete Sample (n = 412) 
 β SE β SE 
Accountant's future orientation  0.033** 0.016  0.013 0.037 
Household uses separate accounts  0.030 0.033  0.030 0.033 
Governance (vs. accountant controls finances) 
         Equal control over finances -0.024 0.038 -0.025 0.038 
     Spender controls finances  0.035 0.050  0.038 0.050 
Log of household net worth -0.210*** 0.067 -0.211*** 0.067 
log of household net income  0.016 0.015  0.017 0.015 
Asset tangibility ratio (vs. first tercile)  
         Second tercile  0.219*** 0.037  0.220*** 0.037 
     Third tercile  0.259*** 0.040  0.257*** 0.040 
Household uses separate accounts x accountant's future orientation 
  
 0.026 0.034 
Equal control over finances x accountant's future orientation 
  
 0.002 0.058 
Spender controls finances x accountant's future orientation  
  
 0.042 0.067 
R2 32.91%    32.66%  
*p < .1. **p < .05. ***p < .01.     
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Table 4.15 Governance Predicting Debt Ratio, Homogeneous Future Orientation (n = 215) 
 β SE β SE 
Accountant's future orientation  0.055** 0.024 -0.101 0.092 
Household uses separate accounts  0.046 0.042  0.069 0.043 
Governance (vs. accountant controls finances) 
         Equal control over finances -0.064 0.060 -0.018 0.067 
     Spender controls finances  0.039 0.070  0.101 0.075 
Log of household net worth -0.156*** 0.055 -0.150*** 0.054 
log of household net income -0.028 0.021 -0.026 0.021 
Asset tangibility ratio (vs. first tercile)  
         Second tercile  0.218*** 0.050  0.223*** 0.049 
     Third tercile  0.268*** 0.053  0.262*** 0.053 
Household uses separate accounts x accountant's future orientation 
  
 0.064 0.050 
Equal control over finances x accountant's future orientation 
  
 0.115 0.098 
Spender controls finances x accountant's future orientation  
  
 0.174* 0.054 
R2 32.83%    33.16%  
*p < .1. **p < .05. ***p < .01.     
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Table 4.16 Governance Predicting Debt Ratio, Heterogeneous Future Orientation (n = 197) 
 β SE β SE 
Accountant's future orientation  0.007 0.021  0.015 0.039 
Household uses separate accounts -0.035 0.045 -0.037 0.048 
Governance (vs. accountant controls finances) 
         Equal control over finances -0.009 0.048  0.000 0.052 
     Spender controls finances  0.002 0.080  0.004 0.079 
Log of household net worth -0.363*** 0.033 -0.363*** 0.033 
log of household net income  0.056** 0.023  0.056** 0.023 
Asset tangibility ratio (vs. first tercile)  
         Second tercile  0.208*** 0.052  0.205*** 0.052 
     Third tercile  0.237*** 0.057  0.236*** 0.056 
Household uses separate accounts x accountant's future orientation 
  
 0.009 0.043 
Equal control over finances x accountant's future orientation 
  
-0.025 0.085 
Spender controls finances x accountant's future orientation  
  
-0.002 0.033 
R2 41.95%    41.13%  
*p < .1. **p < .05. ***p < .01.     
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Determinants of Household Governance 
The final two analyses of Part Two of this dissertation analyzed the determinants of 
household governance mechanisms. The results of the analysis modeling the household 
management structure are shown in Table 4.17. Differences in age and educational attainment 
appeared to have a relatively weak influence on the household governance structure. Reporting 
that the accountant had a higher level of educational attainment was associated with a reduced 
likelihood of reporting that the spender controlled the household finances. That is, when the 
accountant had a greater level of age-related bargaining power, the shopper was less likely to 
control the household finances. Similarly, reporting that the shopper had a higher level of 
educational attainment was associated with a reduced likelihood of reporting that the accountant 
controlled the household finances.   
Differences in financial knowledge appeared to have the strongest influence in 
determining intra-household financial management roles χ2 (4, n = 412) = 66.03, p < .001. 
Relative to households where partners had equal financial knowledge, those in which the 
accountant had a greater level of financial knowledge were more likely to report that the 
accountant was the primary financial manager for the household. Finally, relationship quality 
was associated with a lower likelihood of reporting that the accountant was the primary financial 
manager rather than reporting equal management. Specifically, a one unit increase in relationship 
quality was associated with a 29.9% decrease in the odds of reporting that the accountant 
exercised greater control over financial decisions.   
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Table 4.17 Multinomial Logistic Regression Predicting Management Roles (n = 412) 
Variable Shopper controls vs. 
equal control 
Accountant controls vs. 
equal control 
 
β SE β SE 
Age difference (vs. same) 
         Accountant six or more years older  -1.89* 1.04  0.29 0.45 
     Shopper six or more years older   0.19 0.45  0.35 0.48 
Education difference (vs. same) 
         Accountant more education  -0.33 0.42  0.37 0.32 
     Shopper more education   0.12 0.34 -0.76* 0.43 
Income difference (vs. 40 - 60%) 
         Accountant contributes over 60%  -0.53 0.46 -0.01 0.51 
     Shopper contributes over 60%  -0.25 0.46 -0.54 0.56 
Financial knowledge (vs. same) 
         Accountant more knowledgeable  -0.60 0.45  1.98*** 0.31 
     Shopper more knowledgeable   0.49 0.31 -0.30 0.47 
Relationship quality  -0.11 0.21 -0.36* 0.09 
Pseudo R2 15.48% 
   *p < .1. **p < .05. ***p < .01.     
 
The results of the analysis modeling the use of separate accounts are shown in Table 
4.18. The present results suggest that none of the variables included in the model were 
statistically significant in predicting whether or not households reported using separate accounts 
to help manage their finances. Further, the relatively low concordance ratio suggests that the 
present model exhibited relatively poor fit in predicting whether or not sampled households 
would report using a system of separate accounts. As such, there is insufficient evidence to reject 
the null hypothesis that relationship quality has no influence on the use of separate accounts by 
the household.  
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Table 4.18 Logistic Regression Predicting Use of Separate Accounts (n = 412) 
Variable β SE Odds Ratio 
Age difference (vs. same)    
     Accountant six or more years older  -0.07 0.26 1.17 
     Shopper six or more years older   0.30 0.26 1.69 
Education difference (vs. same) 
        Accountant more education  -0.16 0.17 0.79 
     Shopper more education   0.09 0.18 1.01 
Income difference (vs. 40 - 60%) 
        Accountant contributes over 60%   0.04 0.16 0.90 
     Shopper contributes over 60%  -0.18 0.17 0.72 
Combined financial knowledge   0.14 0.10 1.15 
Difference in future-orientation  -0.02 0.02 0.98 
Relationship quality  -0.09 0.16 0.92 
Combined positive attitude toward saving   0.09 0.08 1.10 
Concordance ratio 58.70%   
*p < .1. **p < .05. ***p < .01.    
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Chapter 5 – Discussion 
Research Findings 
Despite decades of research and practice in the area of personal financial planning, the 
question of debt level optimization remains an open question for individuals and families. 
Indeed, practitioners have continued to rely on heuristics (see Grable et al., 2013) and 
researchers have continued to ask “Why do some people overuse credit and acquire debt beyond 
their means?” (Mendoza & Pracejus, 1997, p. 499). The purpose of this dissertation was to 
explore factors related to household capital structure in order to answer these questions and 
better understand how individuals and families can enhance their financial resilience (i.e., 
solvency and liquidity). The theoretical approach developed to explore this issue was 
interdisciplinary in nature: findings and perspectives were borrowed from multiple domains (e.g., 
corporate finance, personal finance, and family and consumer economics) in order to model 
household capital structure decision-making.  
Generally, the findings of this dissertation were consistent with both the corporate 
finance and personal finance perspectives. In the case of the former, household economic 
variables were consistently the most important factors in predicting household capital structure; 
which suggests that much of household debt policy still comes down to dollars and cents (or in 
the case of this dissertation, euros and cents). In the case of the latter, however, personal factors 
were shown to influence household capital structure. Indeed, the results from Part Two of this 
dissertation suggest that household debt policy-making becomes more complicated as additional 
members are introduced into the decision-making process. Aside from these initial consistencies, 
the present results are unique in the literature – few have modeled household debt ratios – and 
offer new insights regarding the factors that influence household debt use and capital structure. 
104 
The Unitary Model of Household Capital Structure 
As discussed in Chapter Two, the unitary model of the household refers to the 
assumption that household financial decisions can be modeled by a single utility function; 
typically, that of a household financial respondent (Bourguignon et al., 2008). The first set of 
analyses assumed such a model in order to explore the influence of individual behavioral 
characteristics on household financial decision-making, specifically with regard to household 
capital structure. This section includes an interpretation and discussion of the present results. 
Limitations and implications for future research and practice are discussed later in this chapter.  
Household Capital Structure 
Contrary to the hypothesized relationship, future-orientation was positively associated 
with the propensity to use household leverage. This is puzzling, as it seems to suggest that 
future-oriented individuals are relatively more accepting of future costs per unit of future benefit, 
which presumably reduces future utility. Initially this seemed to contradict studies which have 
shown that future orientation is positively associated with saving and negatively associated with 
borrowing (Finke & Huston, 2013; Henegar et al., 2013). A closer analysis of the results 
suggests that household financing decisions may be more complex than previous studies have 
supposed. What follows is a model which was developed post-hoc in order to explain the present 
results which suggest that future-oriented individuals exhibit an increased propensity to use 
leverage.  
First consider an individual with a given capital structure, given rate of time preference, a 
given investment time horizon, and a world absent of taxes. The total utility that an individual 
would expect to derive from their capital structure is equal to the total utility to be gained from 
assets discounted to the present, less the total utility lost from making payments on liabilities 
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discounted to the present. In principle, this amounts to determining the future value of an 
investment, the future value of a set of debt payments, discounting both to the present at the 
individual’s rate of time preference, and then subtracting the discounted value of the debt from 
the discounted value of the asset. This relationship is shown in Equation 5.1, where at is the 
observed level of assets at time t, ra is the expected return on assets, Pd,t is the fixed periodic 
payment on debt observed at time t for n periods, and rd is the cost of debt. The discount factor, 
D(k), is defined by Equation 2.1. The first part of the equation is the discounted utility from 
assets over the individual’s time horizon of k periods. The second part is the discounted 
(dis)utility from debt at time t, dt, repaid over n periods discounted over the entire time horizon 
of k periods.  
u(capital structure) = D(k) u(at(1 + ra)k) – D(k) u( ∑
𝑟𝑟𝑑𝑑 (𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡)
1−(1+𝑟𝑟𝑑𝑑)−𝑛𝑛 𝑛𝑛1 )                             (5.1) 
Individuals derive positive future utility from their capital structure when the discounted 
utility of assets exceeds the discounted disutility of debt. If an asset is financed completely with 
debt (such that the present value of the asset equals the principal value of debt at time t) and the 
return on assets equals the cost of debt ra = rd, the investment time horizon equals the debt 
repayment period n = k, and a fixed rate of time preference is applied to both assets and debts, 
then by definition the individual will derive some net positive utility from this financing 
arrangement. That is, the present value of the asset will be greater than the present value of the 
sum of debt payments. As the investment time horizon extends beyond the debt repayment 
period n < k, all else equal, the returns from the assets increase and the total disutility from debt 
is discounted over an even longer period of time, which reduces the disutility of debt financing. 
The result is a net increase in utility from the capital structure.  
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Assuming that individuals adopt longer time horizons and a lower discount rates as future 
orientation increases, then an individual will derive increasingly more utility from a given capital 
structure as future orientation increases. If an individual desired to maintain a target (future) 
utility from their capital structure, then as future orientation increases additional increments of 
debt could be added to the capital structure in order to hold future utility constant. It seems more 
likely, however, that as future orientation increases an individual would prefer to derive more 
utility in the future thereby increasing the future utility from capital structure. The framework 
illustrated here explains that as future orientation increases, individuals can increase their future 
utility via incremental investment in assets financed with debt, thereby increasing the observed 
debt ratio of the household consistent with the present methods and empirical results.   
This helps explain why previous studies have found that individuals may consider some 
types of debt to be future-oriented debt (Brennan & Binney, 2008). Under certain conditions, 
using debt to finance the purchase of an asset increases future utility. An important distinction is 
to be made here – it is not simply mortgages on tangible assets that may be considered future-
oriented (as we controlled for that motivation), but any debt which is used to finance investment 
in a balance sheet asset. It is possible that these findings could extend to financing investment in 
intangible assets (e.g., human capital) as well. While the present study did not estimate a value 
for human capital to be included on the balance sheet, the present results indicated that education 
had a positive influence on the use of leverage. To the extent that human capital is an asset with 
an expected rate of return over some investment horizon which could be financed with debt to be 
repaid under the conditions discussed, then financing investments in human capital with debt 
would be expected to increase future utility. As an individual’s future orientation increases they 
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would be expected to derive even greater future utility from such a financial arrangement and 
accordingly exhibit a greater willingness to use debt to finance investments in human capital.  
Asset Allocation 
The present results did not support the alternative hypothesis that individual future 
orientation is negatively associated with the proportion of total assets held in cash and 
equivalents. However, other behavioral factors did appear to influence household asset 
allocation. Consistent with expectations, risk tolerance appeared to have a negative relationship 
with the proportion of total assets allocated to the least risky asset class. This suggests that 
individuals who are relatively more tolerant of asset price volatility and uncertainty are likewise 
more willing to allocate a larger proportion of asset portfolio to risky asset classes (e.g., financial 
securities and fixed assets).   
The economic outlook of the household financial respondent was also an important 
behavioral factor in predicting the proportion of household assets allocated to cash and 
equivalents. Individuals with a more positive outlook regarding their future economic 
circumstances allocated a smaller proportion of assets to the safest asset class, all else equal. 
Care must be exercised when interpreting this particular finding because the observed 
relationship does not imply causality. Within the context of a scenario analysis, for example, it 
may be that individuals who felt that their economic condition would improve in the next five 
years effectively assigned a low probability to the possibility of encountering a financial shock. 
Such an individual may have determined that a more effective use of resources was to allocate 
additional assets to risky securities in order to realize some return rather than keeping a 
(relatively) large store of cash. The causal relationship could also run in the opposite direction: it 
may be that individuals with comparatively more asses allocated to risky classes felt more 
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positive about the possibility of earning higher future returns and therefore felt more positive 
about their future economic condition. Recommendations for future research related to this 
specific issue are discussed later in this chapter. 
Conversely, the relationship between looking for a new job and the allocation of assets to 
cash and equivalents was less intertemporally ambiguous. That is, those who reported looking 
for a new job in the present allocated a greater proportion of assets to cash in the present. One 
plausible explanation is that, to the degree that individuals consider their labor income an 
implicitly risk-free asset, uncertainty regarding the stream of labor income would effectively 
reduce the expected value of the annuity and thereby induce an increase in the allocation of 
assets to the risk-free class (Campbell et al., 2001). Another explanation is that individuals 
allocate assets to cash and equivalents not solely as a means of minimizing portfolio variance, 
but also on the basis of estimated working capital needs. Individuals who are looking for a new 
job may allocate additional resources to cash not because they are rebalancing their portfolio to 
minimize variance, but because they simply anticipate the possibility of needing additional liquid 
resources to meet short-term consumption needs (whether these needs arise from a shortfall in 
labor income or from required investment in new work attire and materials). This concept is not 
without precedent in the finance literature: it is generally accepted that corporations keep a 
portion of their cash holdings specifically to support operations (Koller et al., 2015).  
If the concept of working cash is applied to the household, it could help explain many of 
the present findings. When household financial characteristics were not included in the model, 
the relationship between age and the proportion of total assets allocated to cash was consistent 
with other empirical findings which challenge the theoretical predictions of lifecycle models 
(Poterba & Samwick, 2001). Specifically, the proportion of assets held in cash and equivalents 
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declined with age but then increased slightly for individuals over the age of 65. This would 
suggest that households maintain some base level of working cash over the course of their 
lifetime and allocate additional increments of wealth to risky asset classes, until they reach 
retirement age at which point wealth is gradually liquidated and consumed. However, when 
financial characteristics were included in the model age was not a statistically significant factor 
in predicting the proportion of assets allocated to cash and equivalents. 
Individuals with only secondary or vocational education allocated fewer assets to cash 
than those with a college education. Net income was included as a control variable (and was not 
statistically significant) so it seems incorrect to interpret this education effect in terms of 
earnings. For example, the initial inclination may be to infer that individuals with a lower of 
education have lower earnings and are accordingly more cash constrained. This is not a correct 
interpretation, since income was controlled. It would seem that there is something about the 
condition of having a college degree, aside from additional earnings, that is related to holding a 
greater proportion of assets in cash, all else equal. To the extent that having a college degree 
indicates working in a profession which requires a relatively higher level of routine expenditures 
to maintain association memberships, continuing education, and professional working attire, then 
a household working cash perspective could explain this observed relationship.  
Net worth appeared to have a curvilinear relationship with the proportion of total assets 
allocated to cash and equivalents. There was no difference between households in the first and 
forth net worth quartiles with regard to the proportion of assets allocated to cash, all else equal. 
By comparison, however, households in the second net worth quartile reported much higher 
ratios of cash to total assets. This could also be understood in terms of working cash: the first 
increments of additional wealth are allocated to liquid assets in order to meet short-term capital 
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needs, which is observed as an increase in the ratio of cash to total assets. Additional increments 
of wealth are allocated to risky asset classes such that the ratio of cash to total assets declines to 
the point where there is no statistical difference between those in the first and fourth net worth 
quartiles, all else equal. 
 Within the context of financial resilience, the present results suggest that individuals 
consider and balance competing motivations in determining their liquidity position. For example, 
individuals who are relatively risk tolerant may exhibit a propensity to accept the risk of 
financial distress associated with keeping a relatively small proportion of financial assets 
allocated to cash. This motivation may be counterbalanced by other considerations (e.g., 
economic expectations or a job search, as discussed) which lead individuals to increase their 
balance of household working cash. Of particular interest for financial planners and counselors 
was the finding that self-reported financial knowledge had no influence on the allocation of 
household financial assets. While somewhat disappointing, these findings are consistent with 
other studies which have shown that financial behavior is not solely a function of objective or 
subjective knowledge. The implication for practitioners is that while financial education may be 
one component of a strategy toward building household financial resilience, it should not be the 
main component.    
Debt Structure 
The present results did not support the alternative hypothesis that individual future 
orientation is positively associated with the proportion of mortgage and non-consumer debt that 
comprise total liabilities. In fact, the present results suggest that none of the behavioral factors 
analyzed in this dissertation are significant in determining the household debt structure. When 
household financial characteristics were not considered, individuals who reported a more 
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positive economic outlook obtained a higher proportion of their borrowed capital via mortgages. 
A possible explanation is that individuals have a general preference for matching debt maturity 
to asset returns as a way of ensuring resources are available to satisfy required debt payments. 
(Incidentally, such a practice could help individuals maintain their solvency position and 
financial resilience.) Individuals may choose to finance long-term assets (e.g., real estate) with 
long-term mortgages in part because they expect the asset to maintain or increase in value over a 
similarly long period of time. Such an explanation would be consistent with the practice of using 
long-term assets as collateral for mortgage financing (which was generally supported by the 
present findings as they relate to asset tangibility; Geltner, Miller, Clayton, & Eichholtz, 2014). 
It may be that individuals with a more positive outlook for their future economic condition 
estimate that their assets will better retain or increase in value, which effectively increases an 
individual’s estimated capacity for and propensity to use mortgage financing. Despite this 
possibility, the relationship between future economic outlook and the proportion of total debt 
derived from mortgage and non-consumer debt was not statistically significant when controlling 
for household financial characteristics.  
Although the relationship between economic outlook and the mortgage debt ratio was not 
statistically significant, the present results concerning net income also suggest that individuals 
consider future resource availability when structuring their debt. Specifically, an increase in net 
income was associated with an increase in the proportion of debt borrowed via mortgages. 
Assuming that individuals estimate their future net income and resource availability by 
anchoring their estimates to their current net income, then individuals who report a higher level 
of net income may expect to have relatively more resources in the future to support mortgage 
debt service payments (Das & van Soest, 1997; Pompian, 2012).  
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Age had a negative influence on the proportion of debt held in mortgages and non-
consumer debt. This seems consistent with the idea of matching debt maturity to expected 
economic benefits and resource availability. Specifically, as individuals age, their remaining 
lifetime is reduced thereby shortening the period over which assets financed with debt would be 
expected to yield economic benefits. Further, as an individual approaches retirement the 
(present) value of their labor income is gradually reduced to zero. As such, individuals may 
desire to avoid long-term mortgage obligations in late life due to uncertainty regarding the 
availability of resources to satisfy debt obligations in addition to retirement consumption needs. 
A counterargument is that it could make more economic sense for individuals to keep mortgage 
debt in late life (as opposed to paying-off the obligation) so as to finance an increase in 
consumption while leaving (a portion of) the burden of repayment to their estate. Such being the 
case, what can explain the presently observed negative relationship between age and the 
proportion of debt held in mortgage and non-consumer obligations? One possible explanation is 
that individuals, to the degree that they have a bequest motive, may wish maximize the value of 
their estates in part by minimizing the quantity of debt outstanding at death. A second, related 
explanation is that individuals have a general desire to resolve losses quickly (Hardisty et al., 
2013a). Inasmuch as a shortening lifespan reduces the time period over which losses can be 
resolved, then as individuals age they may choose to utilize relatively more consumer financing 
in order to facilitate a quicker resolution of obligations.  
Interestingly, individuals in the third net worth quartile appeared to obtain a higher 
proportion of their financing via mortgages and non-consumer loans relative to those in the first 
net worth quartile. However, there was no difference in debt structure between those in the first 
and second net worth quartiles; nor between those in the first and fourth quartiles. It seems that 
113 
households with the lowest and highest net worth both engage in a relatively high degree of 
borrowing via consumer credit compared to those with middling net worth. What could explain 
this finding? It may be that households at the low end of the net worth continuum are capital 
constrained such that most borrowing is done via credit cards or extended lines of credit. By 
comparison, households at the high end of the net worth continuum may prefer to use equity to 
internally finance investments, thereby using consumer debt simply to finance working capital. 
Further, it may be that households between these two extremes are in the process of wealth 
building and require debt financing to make investments in assets.   
The Collective Model of Household Capital Structure 
 Part Two of this dissertation built on the theoretical underpinnings and analyses 
conducted in Part One by modeling household capital structure within the context of a collective 
decision-making model. As discussed, the collective model of the household assumes that 
financial decisions are not (necessarily) dictated by a single spouse, but are a function of each 
household member’s personal preference and their relative influence over the resource allocation 
process (Bourguignon et al., 2008). The first set of analyses within Part Two modeled the 
household debt ratio as a function of the collective bargaining process; and as a function of 
household governance. The second set of analyses explored the influence of household 
relationship quality on household governance. Following is an interpretation of the results from 
both sets of analyses in Part Two. 
Bargaining Power and Household Capital Structure 
Consistent with the findings from Part One, individual future orientation appeared to 
have a generally positive association with the household debt ratio. It may be that more future-
oriented individuals exhibit a greater propensity to use financial leverage because they desire to 
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finance investments in future-oriented debt in order to grow their wealth (Brennan & Binney, 
2008). However, the results from Part Two suggest that an individual’s propensity to use 
leverage is moderated by their partner’s bargaining power.  
Relative educational attainment appeared to be the most significant dimension of 
bargaining power for moderating a partner’s influence on the household financial position. One 
might be inclined to think that this strong influence could be related to both spouses having a 
high degree of educational attainment, in which case the results would be explained by a high 
level of aggregate household knowledge. The descriptive statistics presented earlier suggest, 
however, that this is not the case. As a group, households reporting equal spousal educational 
attainment were near evenly split between those where both spouses had completed only up to a 
secondary level of education, and those where both had completed up to a college degree. Thus, 
it seems that this particular result is not a function of high aggregate educational attainment, but 
rather reflects the unique aspect of the household power distribution when spouses have an equal 
level of education.  
When the household debt ratio was modeled without interaction terms, the accountant’s 
future orientation appeared to have a statistically significant positive influence on the debt ratio. 
When interaction terms were included, the direct effects of the accountant’s future orientation 
were not statistically significant, but the interaction of the accountant’s future orientation with 
the relative educational attainment of the shopper was statistically significant. Further, when the 
accountant’s future orientation was held constant (i.e., equal to 0, indicating an average level of 
future orientation), households where the shopper had a higher level of educational attainment 
than the accountant reported lower debt ratios than those where the accountant had a higher level 
of educational attainment than the shopper. This result seems consistent with those of Part One: 
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accountant-dominant households used more leverage than shopper-dominant households. 
However, the other observed relationships in Part Two suggest that the dependent relationships 
between the accountant’s future orientation, relative spousal bargaining power, and the 
household debt ratio are complex. 
When the accountant had an average level of future orientation (i.e., still held constant 
relative to the conditions described above), households where spouses had an equal level of 
educational attainment reported lower debt ratios than those where the accountant had a higher 
level of educational attainment than the shopper. This seems to make sense considering that the 
shopper had additional bargaining power in this condition. The magnitudes of the coefficients 
suggest that these households used even less leverage than households where the shopper had a 
higher level of educational attainment than the accountant. When the spouses had relatively 
equal educational attainment, an increase in the accountant’s future orientation was associated 
with an increase in the household debt ratio, relative to households where the accountant was 
older. Conversely, when the shopper had a higher level of educational attainment, an increase in 
the accountant’s future orientation was associated with a decrease in the household debt ratio. 
What could explain these relationships? 
At first, one may be inclined to interpret these findings as suggestive that when 
bargaining power is relatively equal, more future-oriented accountants desire to take on 
additional debt in order to constrain the budget of the shopper (Thaler & Shefrin, 1981; Bertaut 
et al., 2008). This explanation is inconsistent with other present findings: the use of debt to 
modify the budget constraint of the shopper only makes sense if future orientation is negatively 
associated with leverage (i.e., household borrowing is positively influenced by the shopper’s 
present orientation). The evidence from Part One suggests that individual future orientation 
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actually has a positive association on the individual propensity to use leverage. As such, the 
leverage-as-constraint explanation is not supported by the totality of the present evidence.  
An alternative explanation is that conflict in intertemporal motivations leads spouses to 
respond to their partners’ borrowing propensities in different ways, dependent on the bargaining 
power of each. For example, households with equally powerful spouses may use less leverage 
than households with a powerful accountant, all else equal, because the shopper has relatively 
more influence on household financial decisions. The accountant’s future orientation still has a 
positive relationship with leverage in this condition because the accountant has an equal ability 
to influence household finances. That is, more future-oriented accountants are able to influence 
household financial decisions such that additional debt is added to the capital structure. Shopper-
dominant households use less leverage than households with a powerful accountant, all else 
equal, reflecting the shopper’s relatively lower propensity to use leverage. Under this condition a 
dominant shopper reacts to their partner’s propensity to use leverage by constraining borrowing 
and a negative relationship is observed between the accountant’s future orientation and the 
household debt ratio.  
If the spousal-intertemporal-conflict explanation is correct, then it is reasonable to expect 
that these relationships would be more pronounced for households with relatively greater 
heterogeneity in spousal future orientation. When spousal future orientation was relatively 
homogeneous, the same general relationships held: the accountant’s future orientation had a 
positive influence on household leverage when educational attainment was equal, but a negative 
influence on household leverage when the shopper had a greater level of educational attainment. 
One notable difference, as compared to the model with the full sample, was that shopper-
dominant households with averagely-future-oriented accountants used more financial leverage 
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than accountant-dominant households. At first, this finding seems contradictory to the 
intertemporal-conflict explanation. Given the condition of relative homogeneity in future 
orientation there is, by definition, little difference between accountants and shoppers. It is 
reasonable to expect that, holding the accountant’s future orientation constant, the capital 
structures of accountant-dominant and shopper-dominant households would be similar, which is 
what was observed.  
Spousal future orientation was relatively heterogeneous, shopper-dominant households 
used less leverage regardless of the accountant’s level of future orientation. Additionally, when 
educational attainment was equal, the accountant’s future orientation still had a positive 
influence on the household debt ratio. Taken together, these results seem consistent with an 
intertemporal-conflict explanation for the observed relationships: when spouses have relatively 
similar levels of future orientation, then the capital structures of accountant-dominant and 
shopper-dominant households resemble each other. The difference in future orientation leads 
shopper-dominant households to respond to the accountant’s propensity to use leverage with 
some constraints on borrowing. When there is a greater difference in spousal future orientation, 
shopper-dominant households constrain the use of leverage regardless of their partner’s future 
orientation. A limitation of this explanation is that it does not suggest a compelling reason for 
equal-powered households to use less financial leverage than accountant-dominant or shopper-
dominant households when future orientation is relatively homogeneous.  
It could be that there is something about the collaborative process within an equal-
powered household which generally reduces the propensity to use leverage, holding future 
orientation constant. Within a homogeneous household, perhaps it is that each member, being 
somewhat equally disposed to use leverage, sacrifices some of that personal preference in 
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negotiating the household capital structure such that the household uses less leverage than if they 
were dominated by either the accountant or the shopper. If so, then the management structure of 
the household and the influence of relationship quality on the management structure may reveal 
additional details about such a bargaining process. It would be expected that households 
characterized by equal control over finances use less leverage than those which are controlled by 
either the accountant or shopper (especially assuming homogeneous spousal future orientation); 
and relationship quality would have a negative influence on the centralization of control be either 
the accountant or shopper. This was the subject of the second set of analyses and the results are 
discussed in the following section.  
Household Governance 
It was initially hypothesized that accountant-managed households would use less 
financial leverage than equally-managed or shopper-managed households. This was based on the 
initial belief, based on the prior literature, that future orientation would negatively influence the 
individual propensity to use leverage. Given the results of Part One, a revision to these 
hypotheses would suggest that accountant-managed households would use more leverage than 
equally-managed or shopper-managed households. 
The present results suggest that the management structure of the household has little to no 
influence on household capital structure. When testing the governance model of household 
capital structure without including interaction terms, the future orientation of the accountant had 
a positive influence on the household debt ratio, consistent with all prior analyses. When 
interaction terms were included to test for moderation, however, the model lost explanatory 
power, and neither the accountant’s future orientation nor the household governance mechanisms 
or their interactions had a statistically significant influence on the household debt ratio.  
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An exception to this was observed when testing the model within the stratum of 
households with relatively homogeneous levels of future orientation. Under this condition, the 
household management structure did appear to moderate the influence of the accountant’s future 
orientation on the household debt ratio. Contrary to (revised) expectations, however, there was 
no difference in the household capital structure between equal-managed or shopper-managed 
households relative to accountant-managed households, holding the accountant’s future 
orientation constant at an average level of future orientation. Further, the accountant’s future 
orientation had a positive influence on the household debt ratio when the finances were managed 
by the shopper. This result seems to contradict those of the bargaining power models. It is 
important to remember that under the condition of relative homogeneity, there is little difference 
between accountants and shoppers. The presence of a more future-oriented accountant implies a 
relatively more future-oriented shopper.  
If individual future orientation is positively associated with the propensity to use financial 
leverage, then an increase in the shopper’s future orientation should be associated an increased 
use of leverage even by shopper-managed households. In the case of a homogeneous household, 
an increase in the accountant’s future orientation implies some increase in the shopper’s future 
orientation. This helps explain the positive association of the accountant’s future orientation with 
the household debt ratio in the governance model when spousal future orientation is relatively 
homogeneous. This is contradictory to the intertemporal-conflict explanation proposed in the 
previous section. Why is it that when spousal future orientation is relatively homogeneous 
shopper-managed households with a more-oriented accountant use more leverage; but shopper-
dominant households with a more future-oriented accountant use less? It would seem that 
bargaining power and management structure influence household capital structure in different 
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ways; and that the shopper’s bargaining power must not be positively associated with the 
shopper controlling household financial decisions, which is supported by the present empirical 
results. 
While households with a relatively more-educated shopper were less likely to report that 
the accountant managed the household finances than both spouses having equal control, they 
were just as likely to report having a management structure of shopper-control as equal-control. 
This suggests that a shopper-dominant power distribution does not necessarily imply a shopper-
controlled management structure. It is not surprising, then, that the shopper’s bargaining power 
and the household management structure have different influences on the household capital 
structure.  
Regarding the other tests of the governance models, the relationships between 
management structure and household capital structure were not statistically significant within the 
full sample and the heterogeneous stratum because governance mechanisms have no influence on 
household capital structure. The accountant’s future orientation had a positive association with 
the debt ratio when the shopper controlled financial decisions and when future orientation was 
relatively homogeneous simply because a higher level of future orientation reported by the 
accountant implied a higher level of future orientation for the shopper. Considering the 
implications of the unitary model, a household managed solely by a more future-oriented 
shopper would be expected to use more financial leverage than one managed solely by a less 
future-oriented shopper. It would seem that these results simply reflect the positive association 
between individual future orientation and the propensity to use financial leverage; but that 
governance mechanisms have no influence on household capital structure.  
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It is important to consider the influence of relationship quality in assessing the 
plausibility of the intertemporal-conflict explanation. Somewhat consistent with the present 
hypothesis, relationship quality was negatively associated with the likelihood of the accountant 
retaining centralized control over financial decisions compared to sharing control. It must be 
noted that relationship quality had no influence on the likelihood of the shopper retaining control 
compared to sharing control. Even though governance mechanisms appeared to have no 
influence on household capital structure, this result may reveal something about the collaborative 
process: positive relationships are generally associated with more equal management holding 
bargaining power (and other factors) constant. Within the present theoretical framework, this 
result suggests that inasmuch as an accountant may have more bargaining power or financial 
knowledge, accountants in households with positive relationships may voluntarily collaborate 
with their less-patient spouse in order to reduce agency costs and achieve more efficient financial 
outcomes (Deacon & Firebaugh, 1988; Jackson & Yariv, 2011; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). In 
other words, an accountant in a household characterized by positive relationships may willingly 
forsake some leverage, which they would otherwise prefer, as part of a collaborative process for 
setting household debt policy. 
Taken together, the most plausible explanation for the results of Part Two seems to be the 
intertemporal-conflict explanation. First, individual future orientation appears to have a positive 
influence on the propensity to use financial leverage. Accountants, being more future oriented 
than shoppers, accordingly prefer to use a greater level of financial leverage than shoppers. 
Within the collective model of the household, bargaining power appears to explain household 
capital structure better than household governance. When spouses have relatively similar levels 
of future orientation, then the capital structures of accountant-dominant and shopper-dominant 
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households resemble each other. By contrast, shopper-dominant households appear to use less 
leverage than accountant-dominant households. If the less-dominant accountant is very future 
oriented, then the dominant-shopper responds by further constraining the proportion of debt 
which comprises the household capital structure, presumably due to their conflicting 
intertemporal motivation and dominant ability to influence household finances. The household 
capital structure of equal-powered spouses is characterized by less debt than those of accountant-
dominant households. However, unlike in shopper-dominant households, accountants with an 
equal amount of bargaining power still retain an ability to influence the household capital 
structure such that the accountant’s future orientation has a positive influence on the household 
debt ratio. Finally, relationship quality is negatively associated with the accountant wielding 
dictatorial control over household finances relative to sharing control; which suggests, to a 
degree, that positive household relationships facilitate a collaborative process for making 
collective intertemporal choices and managing lifetime household resources (Deacon & 
Firebaugh, 1988). 
Limitations 
As with any study, the analyses undertaken in this dissertation were marked by some 
limitations. Sampling was a challenge in many respects, and several of the study limitations 
relate to sample selection and sample size. Most notably, a large number of households were 
omitted from the original sample in Part One due to values on diagnostic tests which fell outside 
accepted tolerance ranges (Regression with SAS, 2015). Despite the large number of households 
omitted from the sample, this was done to conform to generally accepted diagnostic criteria in 
order to maximize the explanatory power of the models; and with the recognition that future 
studies should explore the issue of sample selection in greater depth. Even so, by omitting so 
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many households from the study sample the present results may be limited in their 
generalizability.  
 The findings in Part Two were similarly limited due to sampling-related issues. 
Specifically, these analyses were limited due to the use of a small sample. Out of n = 1,490 
households that had a partner present in the household, in only n = 464 households did both the 
head of household and their partner complete the CFC scale. Aside from limiting the 
generalizability of results, the small sample size also presented methodological challenges in 
modeling financial outcomes to test hypotheses. Specifically, the small sample size used in these 
analyses limited the number of variables that could be included in the empirical models. As such, 
there may be some factors which influence household capital structure which were omitted from 
the collective models, thereby reducing their explanatory power.    
The lacking reliability of the scales used in this study represent an additional 
methodological limitation. The CFC scale used in the present analyses exhibited a marginally 
acceptable level of internal consistency in both parts of this dissertation. Second, by measuring 
an individual’s future orientation during only one year of their participation in the study, an 
implicit assumption that future orientation is stable over time is embedded in the present 
implementation of the CFC scale. While this is a common assumption in economic analysis, 
“relatively little is known about the stability of time preferences,” and some empirical evidence 
suggests that future orientation is not stable over time (Meier & Sprenger, 2015, p. 273). Two 
areas of additional research are needed with regard to the CFC scale. First, additional research is 
needed to test the assumption of future orientation stability and to explore the implications for 
using the CFC scale. Second, further research is needed to explore the construction and 
reliability of the DHS version of the CFC scale, as these issues are beyond the scope of the 
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present study. Additionally, the risk tolerance scale used in this study exhibited a low level of 
internal consistency, so the results pertaining to risk tolerance must be interpreted with some 
care. 
Other limitations were related to study design, due mostly to limited data availability and 
limited research concerning the analyses undertaken in this dissertation, specifically with regard 
to the collective models of household capital structure. For example, the present empirical 
models excluded the influence of taxes and interest rates. While the utility model of capital 
structure, which was developed ex-post to explain the present findings, implies that taxes, the 
interest rate on debt, and the expected returns on invested capital influence the composition of 
household capital structure, these variables where not measured within the DHS – a limitation in 
the data available. Additionally, the analyses in Part Two were designed based on a review of the 
extant literature, and resultantly no analyses were included to test relationship quality as a 
moderator of spousal bargaining power. Incidentally, even if such analyses had been planned the 
small sample sizes available in Part Two may have limited the ability to test such relationships 
since doing so would require several more interaction variables (i.e., the interaction of each 
bargaining power differential with the accountant’s future orientation). Each of these limitations 
have implications for future research, which are addressed in the following section. 
Implications for Future Research 
The utility model of capital structure developed ex-post to explain the (unexpected) 
positive relationship between individual future orientation and the household debt ratio 
represents the greatest opportunity for future research. The simple version presented in this 
dissertation implicitly assumes that debt is not tax deductible and that there is therefore no utility 
to be gained from tax shields. This assumption was made ex-ante due to limitations of the data 
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availability regarding (i.e., information on household marginal tax rates was not reported) and to 
simplify the analysis of concurrent borrowing and saving. Similarly, tax shields were omitted 
from the ex-post theoretical model simply to explain the present empirical findings. In reality, 
some countries (including the Netherlands and the United States) allow individuals to deduct 
certain types of interest on debt (e.g., home mortgage interest) which has the effect of reducing 
the taxes paid by the household. That is, debt can have value or increase utility to the extent that 
it acts as a tax shield. Research is needed to further develop and refine the proposed utility model 
of household capital structure in such a way that accounts for the value of tax shields from debt 
service, the interest rate on debt, and expected returns on invested capital.  
Once a refined version of the model has been developed, additional research will be 
needed to further test the model empirically. This will require researchers address some of the 
current study limitations. Ideally, researchers should collect data from households regarding their 
marginal tax rate (which may be approximated simply by consulting the appropriate tax table for 
the household’s taxable income), the interest rate on each loan and credit card, and the expected 
rate of return on each asset. For example, household financial respondents may know the rate of 
interest earned on savings and checking accounts, certificates of deposit, and their expected rate 
of return on financial securities. Empirical studies should also explore the influence of individual 
attitudes toward debt on the household debt ratio. It seems plausible that individuals with a 
subjective negative attitude towards debt (a function, perhaps, of conditioned social norms) may 
value obligations in such a way that they derive relatively more disutility from borrowing than 
those with a less negative attitude toward debt (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1977). This would be 
expected to influence the proportion of household assets financed with debt. 
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The present findings related to household asset allocation and debt structure also present 
opportunities for future research. With regard to the asset allocation, it was noted that the present 
results are limited in their ability to infer the causal direction of households’ allocation of total 
assets to cash. Is it that individuals feel positively about their economic future and then invest in 
risky assets? Or, is it that individuals who hold a larger proportion of their assets in risky 
investments expect their wealth to grow and accordingly feel more positive about their future 
economic situation? Aside from addressing these questions via longitudinal study, research 
should also further develop and explore the concept of working cash as applied to the household; 
and should also explore how the allocation of assets to working cash influences the asset 
allocation within the investment portfolio. Do individuals keep a store of cash for working 
capital and then consider this an investment in the risk-free asset within the context of their total 
asset portfolio? Or, do individuals use mental accounting to separate working cash from the 
combination of investments in the risk-free and risky assets in their investment portfolios? 
With regard to debt structure, the present results suggest that individuals match debt 
maturities to the periods when resources will be available to service the debt. Further research is 
needed to more rigorously explore this possibility, in addition to exploring the other facets of 
household debt structure (Servaes et al., 2006). Additionally, research is needed to explore how 
bequest motives might influence household debt structure in late life.   
Future research efforts should also address the methodological challenges and limitations 
noted in the previous section. The debt ratio is inherently exposed to the potential for extreme 
values because households may report as little as €1 in assets and €0 in debt which results in an 
undefined debt ratio; and following the method employed in this dissertation of adding €0.01 to 
both assets and debts, the resulting debt ratio would equal 101. While Tobit regression was used 
127 
to model the household debt ratio based on the methods employed by other researchers (see 
Cunha et al., 2006), it is notably sensitive to violations of the assumptions of constant and 
normally distributed errors. Standard diagnostics where used in the extraction of study samples 
to ensure the data met the assumptions required to make reliable inferences, but in the process 
several observations were omitted. Future research could avoid these complications by utilizing 
different analytical methods such as ordinal logit regression or multinomial logistic regression. A 
multinomial logistic regression analysis was completed in Part One of this dissertation as a post-
hoc test, but using the limited data set extracted primarily for the Tobit analyses. 
The previous section alluded to yet another area of future research: an analysis of the 
DHS version of the CFC scale. As mentioned, additional research is needed to explore the 
stability of future orientation over time (Meier & Sprenger, 2015). The results of such studies 
will have serious implications for theoretical and empirical research related to consumer 
behavior and individual financial decision-making. If future studies show that future orientation 
changes over time, then it calls into question much of the prior research related to future 
orientation and personal finance, the manner in which future orientation has been measured 
(including the DHS methodology), and the results presented in this dissertation. With regard to 
CFC scale construction, future studies should examine the dimensions of future orientation 
measured by the DHS version of the scale. Does the scale measure only the weight given to 
future periods, or does it also measure the number of periods considered (i.e., time horizon)? If 
the scale is actually measuring two distinct dimensions of future orientation, can scale reliability 
be improved by measuring each dimension separately? Further, would the relationships found by 
the present analyses change if different specifications of the scale were used?  
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Finally, additional research is needed to better understand the determinants of household 
capital structure within the context of collective financial decision-making. First, larger samples 
are needed, which requires researchers to exercise diligence in incentivizing participation and 
collecting data from multiple members within each household. Second, research should explore 
and test the explanation offered for the present empirical observations. Why is it that relative 
bargaining power appears to influence household capital structure but not the household 
management structure? If management structure is not the process via which bargaining power 
influences the proportion of debt used to finance assets, then what is? If setting household debt 
policy is truly a process of working through intertemporal conflicts, then how do households 
work through these conflicts? It may be that heterogeneity in spousal future orientation is 
positively associated with money arguments which may occur during the process of debt policy 
negotiation (Britt et al., 2010). These questions are not meant to be exhaustive, but represent 
merely some of the opportunities for future research to build upon and extend the work presented 
in this dissertation. 
Implications for Practice 
The results of this dissertation also have important implications for the practice of 
financial planning. Most importantly, the present results suggest that common solvency 
heuristics (i.e., a debt ratio no greater than 40%) may not adequately represent a household’s 
utility-maximizing capital structure and should not be applied indiscriminately to all households. 
A household’s optimal or utility-maximizing capital structure is likely to be unique and specific 
to the household’s economic situation, investment opportunities, access to capital, and the 
personal characteristics of the financial decision-makers. As such, the utility-maximizing debt 
ratio for a household may well exceed 40% particularly if its financial decision-makers have a 
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high degree of future orientation and invest substantially in human capital (which is not recorded 
on the balance sheet). One recommendation for practitioners is to collect data on clients’ future 
orientation in order to better evaluate the reasonableness of a household’s financial position. 
With regard to asset allocation, the present results suggest that individuals give some 
consideration to their needs for working capital when determining how much cash to keep on 
hand. The implication for practice is similar to that noted above regarding solvency ratios: one 
size heuristics do not fit all households. A heuristic based on monthly income or monthly 
expenses ignores the uncertainty of future income flows and resource availability and the 
opportunity cost of keeping resources in cash. A recommendation for financial planners is to 
adopt a goal-oriented approach in working with clients in order to align estimates of household 
working capital needs with the life-goals and activities of the household. 
An additional implication for practice is that bargaining power and governance 
mechanisms may be ineffective in aligning the motivations of spouses when they differ greatly in 
their intertemporal preferences. It seems likely that when intertemporal motivations are relatively 
heterogeneous that some other mechanisms are used to negotiate household financial decisions, 
which could include forms of costly communication such as money arguments (Britt et al., 
2010). A recommendation for financial counselors is to collect data on clients’ future orientation 
and financial management practices, in addition to other information, in order to develop a better 
understanding of sources of financial disagreement. As with the recommendations for future 
research, these few implications are not exhaustive but simply represent a starting point for how 
the present research can be used to shape how practitioners think about the complex issue of 
household capital structure the process by which households balance their competing 
intertemporal motivations to set household debt policy. 
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Summary and Conclusions 
This dissertation began with a simple question: what is the optimal amount of debt for the 
household? This is an important question because, while debt can be used to finance important 
investments (e.g., higher education or a home), increasing debt relative to assets increases the 
risk of financial insolvency and cost of financial distress (Brealey et al., 2014). Maintaining 
solvency has been considered a primary objective of financial planning, and many practitioners 
use a household debt ratio of 40% as a heuristic benchmark (Grable et al., 2013). Despite the 
many studies which have explored saving and borrowing behaviors in isolation, which affect 
asset and debt accumulation respectively, few have examined the issue of debt optimization. By 
contrast, theories of capital structure have been developed within the domain of corporate 
finance to answer precisely this question (Brealey et al., 2014). 
The few studies which have applied theories of capital structure to the household have 
done so in a somewhat literal manner (Cunha et al., 2006). This dissertation extended this line of 
research by developing a model of household capital structure tailored to the household via the 
inclusion of personal factors, such as time preferences, which have been shown to influence 
personal financial behavior. Contrary to expectations, the present results suggest that future 
orientation has a small positive influence on the propensity to use financial leverage. This model 
and the present results help explain previous observations that individuals consider some types of 
debt to be positive and future-oriented (Brennan & Binney, 2008). An important implication for 
practice is that commonly used solvency heuristics may not adequately represent a particular 
household’s optimal level of debt. Rather, a household’s utility-maximizing debt level is likely to 
be unique and determined by its economic situation and the future orientation of its financial 
decision-maker. It is recommended that practitioners collect data on clients’ future orientation, 
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among other characteristics, in order to better evaluate the reasonableness of a household’s 
financial position.  
 With regard to asset allocation, it was initially suspected that the mix of assets in which 
the household invests is a complex function of multiple trade-offs. Whereas Modern Portfolio 
Theory has been proposed and used in a prescriptive manner to describe how households should 
allocate their assets in order to create a minimum-variance portfolio, behavioral theories have 
been used to describe and predict how households actually allocate their assets (Brealey et al., 
2014; Cai et al., 2013; Campbell et al., 2001; Thaler, 1999). More recently, empirical findings 
have not supported lifecycle models of asset allocation (Auger et al., 2012; Laibson, 1997; 
Marekwica et al., 2013; Poterba & Samwick, 2001).  
It was hypothesized that future-oriented individuals would derive relatively more utility 
from the large expected future gains associated with long-term investments and allocate a greater 
proportion of assets to long-term asset classes whereas present-oriented individuals would 
allocate a greater proportion to cash (Hardisty et al., 2013a). The results did not support this 
alternative hypothesis. The results did suggest that other behavioral factors influence household 
asset allocation; risk tolerance and (subjective) economic outlook in particular. It seems that a 
household’s liquidity position is a complex function involving trade-offs between different 
motivations – much as initially suspected, though realized in a different manner.  
Two important implications for financial planners stand out. First, as with the findings 
concerning household capital structure, commonly used liquidity heuristics may not adequately 
represent a particular household’s optimal allocation of resources to cash. Some households will 
require more and some less dependent on a variety of factors which influence their needs for 
working-capital and the allocation of additional resources within the minimum-variance 
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portfolio. Second, as the present results suggest that financial knowledge has little to no 
influence on household liquidity, financial planners and counselors craft strategies to help 
households meet liquidity goals which focus more on goal-oriented behavioral interventions and 
less on simply imparting information via tradition forms of financial education.  
The second part of this dissertation challenged the assumptions of the unitary model 
within the context of household capital structure. Building on the collective bargaining 
framework commonly used to model intra-household financial decision-making, it was 
hypothesized that an individual’s future orientation would influence the household capital 
structure, but that this influence would be moderated by the relative bargaining power of their 
spouse (Britt et al., 2010; Castilla, 2014). It was also hypothesized that households would 
employ different financial management practices (e.g., keeping separate accounts and 
centralizing managerial control) which would also moderate an individual’s influence on the 
household capital structure (Andrews, 2010; Kenney, 2006; Lampel et al., 2014).  
Through a series of initial descriptive analyses, the “accountant” and “shopper” (i.e., 
respectively, the more- and less-future-oriented individual within a household) were identified 
(Bertaut et al., 2008). It was initially expected that the accountant’s future orientation would 
have a negative influence on the household debt ratio; but that this influence would be moderated 
by the shopper’s relative bargaining power. While the accountant’s future orientation had a small 
positive influence on the household debt ratio, the shopper’s relative bargaining power appeared 
to fully moderate their partner’s influence.  
Other findings from the tests of the collective models were also interesting and 
informative. In particular, households with spouses who were relatively equal in bargaining 
power utilized less leverage than those where either the accountant or the shopper was more 
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dominant. Additionally, the accountant’s future orientation appeared to have a positive influence 
on the household debt ratio when bargaining power was equal, but a negative influence when the 
shopper had more bargaining power. Further, the model was tested with subsamples of 
households with homogeneous future orientation and those with heterogeneous future 
orientation, and the results suggest that, as expected, the shopper’s bargaining power had a 
stronger moderating effect on the accountant’s future orientation when spousal future orientation 
was heterogeneous. With regard to household governance, relationship quality appeared to have 
a somewhat negative influence on the degree of control centralization. However, governance 
mechanisms appeared to have no direct or moderating influence on the household debt ratio. 
The most plausible explanation for the results observed from tests of the collective 
models seems to be that household capital structure is negotiated through a collective bargaining 
process, and that conflicts in intertemporal motivations lead spouses to respond to their partners’ 
propensity to use leverage in different ways, dependent on their relative bargaining power. When 
bargaining power is equal or when household relationships are good, accountants may willingly 
forsake some leverage, which they would otherwise prefer; but they are still able to express their 
propensity and thereby positively influence the proportion of household assets financed with 
debt. When shoppers have more power, they respond to their partners’ propensity to use leverage 
in the opposite manner by restricting debt in the capital structure. This moderating influence 
increases as spousal intertemporal conflict (i.e., the difference in future orientation) increases. 
This finding adds to the literature by brining additional clarity to the manner in which individuals 
within the household system interact to make intertemporal financial decisions and set household 
debt policy (Deacon & Firebaugh, 1988). It also lends additional support to the collective model 
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of household, which suggest that household resource allocation involves the interaction of 
multiple individual utility functions (Jackson & Yariv, 2011).  
In conclusion, household capital structure is influenced by individual intertemporal 
motivations. Future orientation positively influences an individual’s propensity to use debt to 
finance investments. Asset allocation, by contrast, is a function of working capital needs, 
lifecycle factors, and risk tolerance. The debt which is used to finance assets seems to be 
generally structured so as to match the periods in which resources will be available to service the 
debt. Finally, within a household comprised of more than one individual, household debt policy 
is negotiated through a complex bargaining process which can be affected by the degree of 
congruence in household members’ future orientation.   
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